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Synopsis 
The duty to honour and protect officials of foreign embassies 
is of utmost importance and has been given due recognition for 
centuries. The main legal conventions dealing with the doctrine of 
the inviolability of foreign officials representing their countries 
as diplomats among others are The 1961 Vienna Convention On 
Diplomatic Relations, and The 1973 Convention On The Prevention And 
s 
Punishment Of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Person, 
Including Diplomatic Agents. 1\ 
The sovereign equality of States, the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the promotion of friendly 
relations among the nations all warrant that foreign diplomats 
should receive good and honoured hospitality in a receiving State. 
The privileges, immunities and protection accorded to 
diplomats are treated as rights rather than mere privileges and 
therefore cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the sending 
State. The objective underlying those rights is basically to 
ensure that diplomats carry out their duties effectively and 
without any hindrance. The State is under a legal obligation to 
protect diplomats not only from the wrath of its own agents but 
also private persons who may seek to at tack them . Since the 
beginning of the second half of this century, there has been a 
spate of attacks on diplomats by political activists. The 
dissertation therefore seeks to find out whether the international 
iv 
measures provided to protect diplomatic agents under the 197 3 
Convention on The Prevention And Punishment Of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomats are adequate. 
It is emphasised here that the Convention has significant loopholes 
which need to be taken care of in order for it to serve the purpose 
for which it was drafted. 
v 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The role of diplomatic agents in international law is indeed 
vi tal. It endeavours to protect the interests of the sending 
State and its nationals/ promote friendly relations, and enhance 
cultural as well as scientific relations between the sending and 
recieving States. 
Diplomacy has been in existence since time immemorial. The 
agents entrusted with this noble duty were accorded special 
privileges and immunities as a sign of respect to the sovereign 
~ rtfu,hi1Yv 
sending State. The fhonours accorded to them were special in the 
sense that the same were not given to other foreigners in the 
receiving State. Since then the protection and honour of the .. 
dignity of the diplomatic agents became as squa ~ important as 
. . d d h . h . . h ~h't' / l. 1,... the1r duty. It was cons1 ere a 1g cr1me to v1olate t e onour 
of the agent. Such a crime could sometimes result in the death 
penalty or confiscation of the property of the offender, or both. 
In the beginning, the privileges and immunities were 
accorded to the d iplomatic agent on the basis of his status as 
a representativet f the head of the sending State. The diplomatic 
~~~ 'f . h ' h d agent was then person1 y1ng 1s ea of State. Later on when 
diplomatic missions were established, the theory of 
extraterritoriali Y i was developed. According to this, the 
~fl. -({_,..I 
premises were (as if they were~ the territory of the sending 6r 
~ 
2 
State. The premises of the missions were like ships floating on 
the seas in other territories . A other theory has now been ~ 
developed which accords privileges and immunities on the basis 
of ~functional necessi~y' . r This theory justifies ~at the r 
0 ...-'\ ~ 
privileges ~d immunities/ ar--e. being made necessary only to enable 
the agents carry out the functions of the missions. 
1\ 
The preamble of the Convention on Diplomatic Officers 
adopted at Havana in 1929, provides that diplomatic officers do t 
~ 
not in any case represent the person of the Chief of State but 
only their governments. The diplomatic agents should only claim 
privileges and immunities essential to discharge their official 
duties. 
The international law on the privileges and immunities of 
the diplomatic agents is the result of State practice and 
customary law for generations. The privileges are now codified 
in o ~n international instrument, i.e The 1961 Vienna Convention G 
On Diplomatic Relations, hereinafter referred to as the 1961 
Vienna Convention. However, the preamble of this Convention 
reiterates that the rules of customary international law shall 
continue to govern questions not specifically regulated by this 
instrument. 
1.2 RATIONALE 
It is urged that there is an urgent need for increased 
security for diplomatic agents. It is also imperative that all 
parties to the 1961 Vienna Convention and the 1973 Convention on 
3 
the Prevention And Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, hereinafter 
referred to as the 1973 Convention discussed in this dissertation 
recognise that the sanctity of the institution of diplomacy needs 
to be safeguarded. This is the main rationale for choosing the 
dissertation topic. 
This work deems it fit to conclude that civilised and 
friendly relations among States could be maintained and promoted 
if some of the suggestions put forward in this dissertation are 
seriously appreciated. 
1.3 THE OBJECTIV~ 
The objective of this study is to trace how some of the \ ( 
privileges and immunities are enshrined in the provisions of the 
1961 Vienna Convention. The immunities and privileges are 1 
arranged in order to deal with the premises of the mission first 
then the functions and finally the person of the diplomatic 
agent. Although Articles 22, through 36, provide for the 
diplomatic privileges and immunities, this study will concentrate 
on Article 22 which provides for the protection of the premises, 
and Article 29 for the I violability of diplomatic agents. 
Though the duty to honour and protect diplomatic agents by 
the receiving State is well codified under international law, 
this study seeks to establish that the violation of diplomatic ( 
agents has of late increased. Some diplomats have been attacked . 
and as saul ted, others are kidnapped and taken hostage/ while some ~ 
have been fatally shot. There are quite a number of/ reasons for 
4 
such attacks and hence violations of diplomatic inviolability. 
But most importantly, this work endeavours to find out whether 
individuals and political organisations have found diplomatic 
agents as assets and integral part of their struggles. It also 
looks at existing international arrangements for the protection 
of diplomats to assess their adequacy within the realm of the 
1973 Convention. Therefore, this study is mainly concerned with 
two Conventions; the 1961 Vienna Convention and the 1973 
n '1 ' r; 
Convention. This study will in addition look at other methods t 
adopted at the United Nations to enhance the protection of 
diplomats. The study will also briefly look at the 1977 European 
Convention On The Suppression Of Terrorism, hereinafter referred 
to as the 1977 European Convention and the 1971 Organisation of 
American States Convention To Prevent and Punish Acts Of 
Terrorism, hereinafter referred to as the 1971 OAS Convention. 
SCOPE 
This research will concentrate on the crimes committed by 
private individuals and political organisations and not those of 
the States. It had been argued during the preparation of the 1973 
Convent ion that there were enough measures to cater for the 
violations of diplomatic immunity by State agents . Therefore, we 
will analyse the 19 73 Convention to find out the protection 
accorded to diplomatic agents against crimes committed by private 
individuals and political organisations . 
According to Nicolson , the term diplomacy " is derived from 
the Greek Verb 'diploun ' meaning 'to fold ' . In the days of the 
Roman Empire all passports, passes along i mperial roads and way 
bills were stamped on double metal plates, folded and sewn 
5 
together in a particular manner. These metal passes were called 
'diplomas'. At a later date this word 'diploma' was extended to 
cover other less metallic official documents, especially those 
covering privileges or embodying arrangements with foreign 
communities or tribes". 1 
For the purpose of this dissertation, a diplomat is one who 
is a representative of a government who engages in relatioq with 
I 
another government to the benefit of his own State. 
/ 
The work 
deals specifically with only permanent mission diplomats and 
therefore excludes ad hoc diplomats or those of special missions 
and also representatives of States to inter - governmental 
organisations including representatives of States to 
international conferences. The dissertation takes this line of 
focus from the 1961 Vienna Convention which concentrates on 
permanent diplomatic missions. In situations where mention is 
made of those in the excluded categories, it is meant merely for 
clarification purposes and it is not to be taken as part of the 
general arguments of the dissertation. 
The term 'terrorism' is employed in this study to refer to 
criminal acts committed against diplomats by private individuals 
and political organisations. This is because it was the objective 
of the preparation of the 1973 Convention to protect diplomatic 
agents from acts of terrorism perpetrated by individuals and 
private organisations. If this is the case, one could reasonably 
conclude that acts which form crimes in the 1973 Convention are 
Nicolson Harold, Diplomacy (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963) P.26 
6 
in stricto sensu acts of terrorism. This, we find to be the case 
even though the word terrorism did not find its way into the 1973 
Convention. However, this study defines terrorism as: " an 
intentional and unlawful use of force or violent attack against 
the person of the diplomatic agent, diplomatic mission or 
property in order to intimidate or coerce any State in 
furtherance of political or social objective2. 
"The protection of diplomats" involves the preservation of 
diplomatic immunity by a State. The State must treat the diplomat 
with due respect and prevent any attack on his person, freedom 
or dignity. For the purpose of this study, it also implies the 
prevention, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of crimes 
against diplomats. 
1.5 METHODS OF STUDY 
While doing this research we shall rely very much on the 
library materials in form of books and articles in periodicals. 
However, there were very few books on the subject of the 
privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents. Further there is 
dearth of information on the regional ~nventions discussed in \ 
chapter V1. The search has rather foun~ plenty of books and 
articles on 'terrorism '. In the event, the libraries of the 
International Islamic University Malaysia, the National 
2 This definition is i~luenced by versions of the 
United Kingdom (1974),, A.H.Buckelew(T980),The ~s 
Fe eral Bureau o Inves igation (1980), u.s Department 
of Justice (1984), and U.S department of Defence 
(1983) quoted by Schimid Alex P. and Jongman Albert J, 
et al, Political Terrorism: A New Guide To Actors, 
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories And 
Literature, (North- Holland Publishing Co. Amsterdam, 
Oxford, New York, 1988}, P.35 
X 
7 
University of Malaysia, The Agricultural University of Malaysia, 
the National University of Singapore and the National library of 
Malaysia will form our main out-of-campus sources. 
The research had also sought to carry out some field study 
to interview diplomats. It is however disheartening to note that 
this has been the most difficult part of our study since our 
exploratory discussions with potential respondents have drawn 
almost a complete blank. Hence the dissertation depends mainly 
on library research. The main sources for the 1961 Vienna 
Convention and the 1973 Convention are the Year Books of ¥Y\JZ... 
" International Law Commission (I.L.C.) which are available in our 
source libraries and the research has drawn heavily on them. It 
is also worth mentioning that the American Journal of 
International Law (A.J.I.L.) has also been extensively used. 
1.6 ARRANGEMENTS OF CHAPTERS 
The dissertation has been divided in the following order: 
Chapter 1 (Introduction) introduces this study. 
Chapter 11 deals with the traditional privileges and 
immunities of diplomatic agents and their development. It traces 
the earlier history particularly since the beginning of 
residential diplomacy. 
Chapter 111 examines diplomatic privileges and immunities 
as provided for in the 1961 Vienna Convention with special 
emphasis on Articles 22 which provides for the protection of the 
diplomatic premises and 29 for the inviolability of diplomatic 
8 
agents. 
Chapter 1V outlines some of the causes of terrorism and the 
problem of finding an internationally accepted definition of the 
term ~terrorism' . It also looks at the violations of diplomatic 
immunity in form of acts of terrorism. There are two kinds of 
violations. One of the violations is commit ted by the State 
agents or done with the help of the State organs and another one 
which is the main focus of this study is by private individuals 
and political organisations. 
Chapter V presents an analysis of the 1973 Convention on The 
Prevention And Punishment Of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. This discussion 
will touch on the motive of the offender and the duty of State 
Parties to prevent the preparation of crimes in their 
territories. Further, it will deliberate on the taking of 
appropriate measures to legislate jurisdiction of crimes in the 
municipal law, to disseminate information to other State Parties 
and to prosecute or extradite the offenders. The discussion will 
also look at the issue of asylum with specific reference to the 
perpetrators of crimes against diplomats and examine provisions 
on dispute reso l ution and the interpretation of the 1973 
Convention. 
7 
Chapter V1 looks at other methods , adopted at international 
and regional levels to enhance the protection of diplomats. It 
deals with resolutions of the United Nations, the OAS 1971 
9 
Convention and the 1977 European Convention . 
Chapter Vll concerns conclusions and suggestions on how 
protection of diplomats could be strengthened. The duty to honour 
and protect diplomatic agents does not fall solely on the 
receiving State but rather a duty that should squarely be shared 
by all States. 
10 
CHAPTER 11 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since time immemorial the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between States has been taking place on the basis of 
the mutual con s ent of the parties concerned. It is therefore 
worth noting that the creation and continuation of diplomatic 
r e lations are a matter of tacit consent and not of right. 
Eileen Denza writes; 
Eve r y government is both a sending and a receiving State 
and its own diplomats abroad are sureties for its 
behaviour . 1 
Treaties stipulating the mutual exchange of diplomatic 
relations were always made as a sign of diplomatic 
und e rstanding . The honour and respect given to diplomatic envoys 
also come from this cordial relationship and understanding . 
2.2 PRIMITIVE DIPLOMACY 
from 
Dip 1 ornacy in the primitive era began as occasional messages 
one k1ng of a tribe or local group to another. The 
1 Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Agents and Missions, 
Privileges and Immunities in encyclopedia of 
public International Law,Instalment 9,Edited by 
R.Bernhardt (North Holland, Amsterdam , 1986) P.95 
11 
messages included inter tribal interests such as marriages~ 
I ~ death of the .~King or his mother~ coronations and other basic . -,.~. 
issues of mutual interest. 
In Australia~ the Arunta (Aranda) tribe in Central 
Australia. had institutions of messengers and envoys that were 
/ 
highly developed. The Diery and Wotjobaluk tribes and in Aruhem 
land~ the Murngin, the Yiritja of the Kangaroo tribes all had 
institutions of messengers and envoys. 2 
In Africa~ diplomatic ties were known to have existed among 
the Bantu of South Africa. 
counsellors, called Tinyumi . 3 
The Ba-Rong Kings had special 
The Wanyamwezi in Tanzania 
selected their most respected members for the posts of envoys, 
while the Bakong had this duty entrusted to the medicine-men. 
The King of Glidyi Ewe of the Gold Coast (Ghana) had salaried 
? 
officials called Atikploto,(sing)· Atikloe . 4 Dupuis' Muslim 
informants allege that the first Dahomean (Benin) embassy to 
Asante (Ghana) arrived in the Capital, Kumasi in the early 18th 
Ragner Numelin, The Beginnings of Diplomacy: _A_ 
Sociological S¢tudy of Intertribal and International <;,.J. 
relations, (Oxford University Press, 1950 ) p.128 I 
Ibid, P. 129. 
Ibid, p. 132. 
12 
century. 5 When King Mutesa of Buganda in Uganda converted to 
Islam~ he is reported to have sent an emissary to his rival 
tbrother' King~ Kabalega of Bunyoro~ to inform him about the 
new faith. 6 
Envoys were members of a tribe or group which enjoyed 
general esteem and often belonged to the group of most 
outstanding persons of the tribe. The North American Indian 
diplomats ranked next to the princes in esteem. 7 The Malayan 
Archipelago had envoys t o inform other Kings of important 
8 events. 
In Greek history! special missions were exchanged between 
the Greek States. 9 The Romans too, established relations with 
their neighbours in the form of treaties. 
I • The Roman ~Pr1est who 
8 
Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, The 
structure and evolution of a political order 
(Cambridge University Press 1975), p. 320. 
Kasozi Abdu B. THE SPREAD OF ISLAM IN UGANDA, (OUP 
1987) P. 21. 
Ragner Numelin, Op. cit, P.134. 
Ibid, P.138. 
NICHOLSON, Diplomacy,(3rd Ed.Oxford Univ.Press, 1969) 
p. 38. See also B. SEN, A diplomatic handbook of 
International Law and Practice.( 2nd.Ed. Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1979) P.3. 
13 
e.-'s 
was in charge of Romj p relations with other countries was known 
as tPetiales' . 10 
The Bible mentions diplomatic relations in 2 Kings 18:35~ 
and 1 Kings 10. The incident of King Solomon and the Queen of 
Sheba is very famous both in the Bible and the Quran (Q.27:22-
44) as one of the early signs of diplomatic relations. The Jews 
established relations with friendly countries and not 
necessarily with their neighbours who they considered as enemies 
and uncivilised. They employed messengers MAL'AK on public and 
. . II pr1vate occas1ons. 
In the Islamic world of West Asia, since the time of the 
Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H), emissaries had been sent abroad for 
religious and political purposes. Quresh mentions eighty 
incidents in which the Prophet sent and received envoys. 12 The 
Prophet is reported to have sent envoys to Byzantium, Egypt, 
Persia, Ethiopia and other countries. Although these missions 
were specific in nature, others which were made during the 
10 
11 
12 
caliphate were general and of international character. G 
B. Sen, Op. cit, PP.3-4 
Ragner Numelin, Op. cit, PP. 144. 
Muhammad Siddique Quresh, Foreign Policy of Muhammad, 
(Islamic Publications (PVT) Ltd. 1989) PP.56-99 
14 
The Fatimids and Mamluk Kings! too! did send and receive 
envoys. 13 
2.3 PHASES OF DIPLOMACY 
The ~a of diplomacy can be divided into two phases; 
1) The first phase is that of early diplomacy in which 
envoys were not designated to be permanent, or in 
other words emissaries were sent on specific missions 
on behalf of their majesties. 
2) The second phase of diplomacy is that of resident 
ambassadors who were sent to the receiving States to 
stay there until recalled. 
The custom of appointing early resident ambassadors first 
started in Italy and then spread to other European States around 
the world in the middle of the fifteenth century. 
Mattingly writes , 
By the 1450s all the major States of the peninsula had set 
up organised chanceries which required written reports from 
their agents and kept copies of records . Each of these 
13 B.Sen, Op. cit, P.5 
15 
chanceries was the centre of permanent embassies which 
provided a constant flow of the information and channels of 
official intercourse with important neighbours.14 
It is through the resident envoys that the concept of 
extraterritoriality developed and began to be used on the 
premises of the envoys. Under this concept, "the offices and 
homes of the diplomats and even their own persons were to be at 
all times as though they were on the territory of the sending 
State and not the receiving one. nl5 Therefore the diplomats 
were not subject to the local jurisdiction because they were 
always considered to be residing in the sending State. During 
the occasion of a security problem at the embassy of the United 
States in Moscow, the Secretary of State, George Shultz told a 
press conference on April 8, 1987 "they (Soviets) invaded our 
sovereign (sovereignty). nl6 
Generally, all diplomats are citizens of sending States. 
The French constitution for example forbids French citizens to 
H 
15 
16 
G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, Penguin 
Books,1955) P.87 
McClanahan Grant V, Diplomatic Immunity,Principles 
and Practices, (St.Martin's Press Inc . 1989) P.30 
Ibid, P. 89. 
16 
act as diplomats of foreign countries in Paris . Britain too 
refuses to receive British subjects as diplomats.17 
When a mutual agreement is signed to establish diplomatic 
relations, the appointment of the envoy himself is based on a 
tacit consent .18 A receiving State is free to refuse a 
diplomatic agent or declare a diplomat 
Yl- i .. 
l /,. persona non grata even ~. 
after present),ng his credentials . 
A 
2.4 DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
Diplomatic immunity is as old as the institution of 
diplomacy itselt. 19 Under this immunity, there are rules that 
must be applied to the diplomats . These rules are founded on 
mutual consent and common usage which have been in existence for 
generations. 
The immunity and privileges were intended to give the envoy 
an opportunity to carry out h i s duties of office . The business 
of the diplomat was to promote peace and, therefore, he laboured 
for the public good. The office was not meant to be used for 
17 
18 
19 
SATOW'S Guide to diplomatic practice,(Longman 1978), 
P.89 - 90. 
Grzybowski Kezimierz, "The Regime of Diplomacy and 
The Teheran Hostage' I.C.L.Q. Vol. 30 (1981) P.43 
Ibid 
17 
evil and wrong-doing. And if such a diplomat was asked to leave 
the country, it was intended to serve the cause of public peace. 
Presently, diplomats enjoy full immunity in the receiving 
state. Unless the sending State decides to waive that immunity, 
the receiving State cannot withdraw the immunities 
unilaterally. 20 
It is important to note that these rules were reciprocal in 
a sense that a receiving State accorded such a treatment to a 
foreign diplomat in the same way as her agent would be accorded 
in the sending State. Since the foreign envoy was a personal 
representative of the sovereign ruler, the honour and respect 
accorded to him were supposed to be that befitting that ruler. 
Dr. Ragner Numelin has observed that primitive societies 
did develop customary procedures of starting wars, making peace, 
discussing trade and sending inter-community messengers who 
conducted business. These officers were recognised and entitled 
to free movement and personal inviolability. The host community 
would even provide food, shelter and sometimes would go to the 
extent of offering sexual privileges21. 
20 
21 
Mattingly G, Op. cit, PP. 40-44. 
Ragner Numelin, Op. cit., P.113; 
McClanahan Grant V, Op. cit, P.18 
? 
I 
See also 
I 
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It is accepted that the origin of diplomatic immunities is 
based on customary rules and usages that have been in practice 
for generations. Treaties too were made to give further 
strength to the privileges and immunities.22 There was also the 
practice of some States t ~~~he immunities and privileges 
as part of their common law. 
Although these treaties were made to further enhance the 
importance of these rules, it remains a fact that the substance 
of the treaties were to be determined by the customary usage of 
international law. Since there were no written documents 
pertaining to the privileges and immunities of the diplomats it 
could not be ascertained whether in all States the rules 
intended to provide absolute or partial immunity. Also, written 
treaties did only refer to the rules of customary usage of 
international law and provided no further details . However we 
could deduce that since in most cases the envoy was the 
personification of the foreign emperor or king, the honour and 
respect that were accorded him were those befitting the sender. 
The Greek Kings (750-350 B.C) had heralds who served them 
as their accredited messengers. The heralds were inviolable and 
22 Hardy Michael, Modern Diplomatic Law (Manchester 
University Press, 1968), P. 5. 
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were assured of the right to return to their homeland. Any 
abuse or molestation against them was regarded as a grave 
offence against the gods of the cities, for the heralds were 
considered to be under the protection of these gods.23 
The Romans too treated the immunities of the diplomats as 
part of the Stoic Philosophy and codified them in their Civil 
Law. They believed that the immunities were derived from the Jus 
naturale and jus civilis. According 
they were held sacred . 24 
to the Justinian Digest 
Diplomats are reported to have been treated courteously by 
the Saracen and Christians in the middle Ages. They were given 
hospitable and honourable receptions. It is reported that gifts 
were even bestowed upon the heralds who brought declaration of 
war. 25 
When the Prophet Muhammad received a letter from Musaylamah 
(who claimed to be a prophet) in which he claimed partnership in 
authority and messengership with Muhammad and to divide the land 
between them, the Prophet said: 
By God were it not that heralds are not killed, I would 
23 
24 
25 
McClanahan Grant V, Op. cit, P. 21. See also Ogden 
Mantell , 'The Growth Of Purpose In The Law Of 
Diplomatic Immunity', (1973) 30 A.J.I.L, P.450. 
Ogdon Mantell, Op.cit, P.452 
P. 454 
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have beheaded the two of you (envoys) . 26 
The principle of inviolability was so deeply ingrained that 
\'(4='-t-J 
even envoys of the enemy State was entitled to t ~/respect and Gr 
protection ~practice recognised for centuries.27 Likewise the 
.ft...t...v '-'>' vm.. 
ancient Indian Kings sent envoys to one another and they tob 
were accorded personal immunities and privileges in respect of 
residence, carriage, and postal correspondence. 
2.5 SOURCE OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
Historically, the rules of the privileges and immunities 
the diplomatic agents were not to be found in statutes 
written documents, but in practices and usages that had existed 
for generations as rules of international law to protect the 
personal inviolability of the foreign envoy.28 
26 
27 
28 
A. Guillaume , The Life of Muhammad Oxford 
Univ . Press , 1978),P.649. 
This statement is quoted by the I.C.J Judge Tarazi, in 
his dissenting opinion from the lectures of Prof. 
Ahmed Rachid, of the Istanbul Law faculty, at the 
Hague Academy of International Law in 1937; (1980) 
I.C.J Reports, On the case Concerning the U.S 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran . P.59 
Green L.C, ~Trends In The Law Concerning Diplomats' 
(1981 ) 19 C.Y.B.I.L, P.132 
Murty B. S, The International Law Of Diplomacy; The 
Diplomatic Instrument and World Public Order,(New 
Haven Press, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dorderecht, 
Boston , London, 1989) P. 335 
.. 
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Pierce Arrant (Pectus Aerodius) a sixteen century Judge of 
the Criminal Court in Angers said, "The ambassador is protected 
~ by a Law common to all people and has public character which 
/ 
derives its sanctity from three sources: Firstly, from the one 
sending him, secondly, from those to whom he is accredited 
thirdly, from the important nature of negotiations which his 
function carries on. " 29 Gentili (Of the Positive School) was of 
the view that the law that protects the diplomat was derived 
f r om the practices of the States. However, he recognised that 
the law of nature was binding between States. He said that the 
right of the embassy was, by reason of a certain divine 
providence, immutable of universal application, and was admitted 
and recognised even by barbarous peoples.30 
Lord Denning M. R. in Rahimtoola V Nizam of Hyderabad31 
remarked: 
I think we should go back and look at the principles which 
lie behind the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Search as 
you will among the accepted principles of international law 
and you will search in vain for any set propositions. 
29 Ogdon Ma ntell, Op. cit, PP. 455-456 
30 Ibid. 
31 (1958) A.C. 378. 
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There are no agreed principles except for this. That each 
ought to have proper respect for the dignity and 
independence of other States. 
In Barbuit's casej2 Lord Talbot said: 
The privileges of a Public Minister are to have his person 
sacred and free from arrests, not on his own account but on 
account of those he represents. The foundation of this 
privilege is for the sake of the Prince by whom an 
ambassador is sent. 
President Fillmore is reported to have responded to the 
anti-Spanish riots at New Orleans and Kay West in 1851 in the 
following manner: 
Ministers and consuls of foreign nations are the means and 
agents of communication between us and nations, and it is 
of utmost importance that while residing in the country 
they should feel a perfect security so long as they 
faithfully discharge their respective duties 33 
It is a duty of a receiving State to abide by the rules of 
usages and customary law when it chooses to have representatives 
32 (25 ER 777) 1733. 
33 Green L. C, Op. cit, P.135 
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of foreign countries in her capital. 
King Alphons X issued an order in the Twelfth century that 
guaranteed the inviolability of diplomats and the immunities 
from suit in court. 34 The Law of Castile, 1348 (Law 1X, Part 
Vll,Title XXV of Las Siete Partidas) which was probably 
completed in 1263 by Alphonso X of Castile provides as follows; 
Envoys frequently come from the land of Moors and other 
countries to the court of the King, and although they may 
come from the enemy's country and by his order,we consider 
it proper and we direct that every envoy who comes to our 
country, whether he be Christian , Moor or Jew shall come 
and go in safety and security through all our dominions, 
and we forbid anyone to do him violence , wrong or harm or 
injure him in property. 35 
In 1651 the Netherlands, by legislation forbade offending, 
damaging, injuring by word, act or manner, the ambassadors ' 
residents, agents or other ministers of the Kings, Princes, 
Republics or others having the quality of public minister . It 
also prohibited any injury or insult directly or i ndirectly in 
any fashion or manner whatsoever in their own persons, gentlemen 
34 
35 
M. Ogden, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity 
(1936) P.46 
Traite du juge competent des Ambassodeurs (The Hague 
1723) P.168, cited by Ogden Montell, Op . cit, P.461 
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of their suit, domestic servants, dwellings, carriages and the 
tu- f 
like, under a penalty of being corporally punished as violation &1 
of the law of the nations and disturbance of public peace. 
The English common law and the statute of Queen Anne 1708 
asser;/ almost in similar terms that a person is guilty of a 
misdemeanour who, by force or personal restraints, violates any 
privilege conferred upon the diplomatic representative of 
foreign countries or who sues or persecutes or executes any writ 
or process whereby the person of any diplomatic representative 
of a foreign country or the person of a servant of any such 
representative is arrested or imprisoned. 
The law of the United States, (the United States code 
section 252-254 of the title 22, Act of April 30, 1790) states 
that : 
Every person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or in 
any other manner offers violence to the person of an 
ambassador or a public minister in violation of the law of 
nations shall be imprisoned for more than three years and 
a fine at the discretion of the courts.36 
~ It is emphasized that the origin or sources of diplomatic F 
36 G.E. Do Nascimento E Silva, Diplomacy in 
International Law, ( Leiden: A.W Sijhoff, 1972), P. 
92. 
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law are generally derived from or based on customary rules of 
international law. And as a result the States owe their 
obligation not to any treaty or a statute but to the rules and 
usages that have been in practice for generations. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
A study of the subject of diplomacy since the medieval 
period gives an in-depth understanding of the importance of the 
work of diplomats. 
It is noted from the writers of diplomatic history that the 
'rv't'c <;. 
role of diplomacy and diplomatic immunity were recogpised by r, 
pr imi ti ve societies. In that respect we can refer to the'm as the Gr 
pioneers of diplomacy . The reasons that necessitated the 
beginning of diplomacy in the medieval period make it more 
important today that the present society should uphold the 
virtues and honour of that office .? It should be recalled that 
past generations did uphold the importance of diplomacy in 
soc i ety to the extent that the profession was noble and 
prestigious. 
A person appointed to the position of a diplomatic agent, 
carries with him an important duty . He is the eye and ear of his 
country in the receiving State . The establishment of diplomatic 
relations is an a ccepted form of friendly and mutual 
26 
understanding. Therefore, since this relationship is mutual and 
cordial it cannot be taken to be a right. The result of this 
tacit understanding extends to the honour and respect that are 
accorded to the diplomat in the receiving State. 
The immunity and privilege accorded to the diplomat are as 
old as the institution of diplomacy itself. It was out of 
necessity that the receiving State was required to accord the 
diplomat all immunities and privileges. It was necessary for 
the envoy to carry out duties of his off ice without any 
interference from the receiving State. Secondly the envoy was 
the personification of the sovereign ruler. The violation of his 
office and person amounted to the abuse of the foreign head of 
State. Thirdly, it is contended that the violation of diplomatic 
agent could be a source of unpleasant relationship. Therefore, 
in order to avoid such a situation it was found necessary to 
give all possible assistance, honour and respect to the envoy of 
~ I • •' llw ~f-vn.. e..~ n, r-r r~,;{vto H~o the sovereign country. 
CHAPTER 111 
PRIVILEGES AND IMMD~ITIES OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The International Law Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 
Commission) was by the General Assembly resolution 685 (V11) of December 1952, 
requested to consider codifying matters conce rning "Diplomatic Intercourse and 
immunities.1 The Commission began work on the topi c using the draft articles 
which had been prepared by the special Rapporteur and an extensive memorandum on 
the law of immunities and privileges which had been prepared by the Secretariat 
of the United Nations. The memorandum had analvz d earlier codification of the 
international law on the privileges and immunities of diplomats .2 By the 
2 
The International Law Commission had in 1949 drawn up a 
list of topics to be discussed which included a topic 
on "Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities" but had not 
given it priority. Official Documents as quoted in 
(1954) 48 A.J.I . L, P.68 
The following are some of the earlier codification on 
the international law of diplomatic immunity: 
Buntschli s Draft Code 1868, The Fiore Draft Code 1990, 
Resolution Of The Institute of International Law, 
Cambridge 1895, Pessa'Draft Code 1901, Project of the 
American Institute Of International law 1925, Project 
of International Commjssion of American Jurists 1927, 
Phillimore's Draft Code 1926, Strupp's Draft Code 1926, 
Draft Code of The International Law Association of 
Japan 1926, The Resolution of The Institute Of 
International Law, New York, 1929, (1932) 26 A. J.I.L, 
PP . 1- 189 
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') 
immunities and embody the results into an international convention. , The 
governments of eighty one States were represented.3 
The codification of the privileges and immunities in the modern treaties 
began with the General Act of the Congress of Vienna 1815 which was modified at 
A 1X - I~ - Clift Uv 
Axis La chapal e in 1818, the 1928 Havana Convention, the Draft Articles of the 
Harvard Law School and the 1946 Convention on the privileges and immunities of 
the United Nations. 4 
3.2 THE 1961 VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. 
The 1961 Vienna Convention attempts to spell out the international 
customary law on the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents. It is 
specifically concerned with permanent diplomatic missions. Hence the topic our ~ 
study . 5 
PERroNS ENTITLED TO PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. 
The following persons are entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities: 
Article 29?provides for diplomatic agents. 
Article 37'"?provides for the following categories of persons entitled to 
United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and 
Immunities: Vienna March 2- April 14 1961, (1961) 55 
A.J . I.L, P.1062 
Grzybowski Kazimierz, "The Regime Of Diplomacy and the 
Tehran Hostages" (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. P.48, See also 
Donoghen Joan E, "Perpetual Immunity for Former 
Diplomats? A response to Abisinito Affair: A 
Restrictive Theory of Diplomatic Immunity'' (1989) 27 
C.J.T.L, P . 620 --
Official Documents (1958) 52 A.J.I.L, P.180, Reports of 
the International Law Commission hereinafter referred 
to as I.L.C (1957) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, PP. 6-7 
,r;; 
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privileges and immunities6: 
(a) Members of the family of the diplomatic agent if they are not 
nationals of the receiving State. 
(b) Members of administrative and technical staff of the mission and 
members of their families. 
(c) Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals of 
or permanently resident in the receiving State. 
(d) Private servants of the members of the mission if they are not 
national or permanently resident in the receiving State. 
(e) Article 38? provides for diplomats who are nationals of or 
permanently resident in the receiving State . 
THE INVIOLABILITY OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS 
The protection of diplomatic agents is enshrined in Article 29 of the 1961 
Vienna Convention which provides that : 
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be 
1 iab 7e to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State sha 77 
treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent 
any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.i 
Looking at the wording of this article, it is certain that it describes two 
important duties which are vital to the inviolability of the serving diplomat. 
The first duty of a receiving State is to ensure that the diplomat is not 
Some of these persons enjoy full diplomatic immunities 
while others enjoy only partial immunities. 
This Article with a slight difference is similar to 
Article 17 of the Harvard Law Draft. 
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liable to any form of arrest or detention. Conventionally, it is known that 
arrest and detention are made by the government. The Article, therefore, could 
be interpreted to infer that the government shall not arrest nor detain a 
diplomat. The receiving State shall receive him with honour and respect. The 
article obliges the State to restrain its organs or agents, for example, the 
police, the customs and others from applying local measures8 on the person of 
a diplomatic agent. In other words, the receiving State must guarantee non -
exercise of measures that may constrain the function of the foreign envoy. 
The State shall treat him with honour and respect because he is the 
representative of a foreign sovereign State. It shall in that respect accord him 
V.I.P treatment wherever he is. None shall molest his honour, dignity and 
person. The State shall not treat him like any other foreigner but accord him 
high regard and honour. The concept of inviolability is a supporting principle 
from which all privileges and immunities derive. The inviolability obligates 
receiving States to afford the person of the diplomatic agent an increased 
f0 
protection. 9 The privileges and? immunities based on international law give;1 
diplomatic agent positive right , which other inhabitants do not posses. 10 The 
------
privileges and immunities allow the agent to carry out his/her duties without 
10 
The Supreme Court of the United States, expressed the 
view that an attack upon the house of an envoy is 
equivalent to an attack upon his person. Precaution 
must be taken against mob violence and if the attack is 
done an apology must be expressed to the sending State. 
Moore : Digest, Vol.V, P.62 quoted by B.Sen, Op. cit, 
p . . , '16 
Commentary on Article 17 Harvard Law Draft, (1932) 
26 A.J.I.L, PP.91-3 
(1957) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.52 
31 
fear. 11 
The second duty envisaged in Article 29 is that a receiving State, apart 
from non-application of the local measures on the person of the envoy, is 
enjoined to give due and unreserved protection to the person of the diplomat from 
individuals and private groups or organisations . It is vital for the receiving 
State, the law enforcement authorities and the courts to act within proper limits 
to observe the duty imposed by Art i c 1 e 29. 12 
In the case of United States diplomats and~nsular staff, the 
International Court of Justice spel t out a two-fold duty on the part of a 
receiving State, namely to desist from any act attributable to the government or 
its agents which would infringe the inviolability of the diplomatic mission and 
its staff and the obligation to protect against such infringement by members of 
the public. 13 
The violent incident in which a Russian envoy was arrested in London in 
1708 gives us an insight into the obligation of the receiving State towards a 
diplomat. The Queen in her obligation to fulfi 1 the duty of protecting the 
diplomat made appropriate restitution for the exercise of the local measures on 
11 
1 z 
13 
Higgins Rosalyn, "The Abuse Of Diplomatic Privileges 
And Immunities; Recent U.K Experience'' (1985) 79 
A.J.I.L, P.641 
Brown Jonathan, "Diplomatic immunity; State Practice, 
The Vienna Convention On diplomatic Relations" (19e8) 
37 I.C.L.Q, P.73 
The United States Diplomatic and Con3ular staff In 
Tehran, I.C.J. Reports, (1980), P.3. 
..,..,-, 
-f. 
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the person of the diplomat. 14 China, too, recognised her failure of non 
cc~mission or lack of restraint in the acts which infringed upon the personal 
ii~violability of the diplomat when Chinese soldiers murdered C.Von Ketteler, the 
German Minister in Peking and Mr. Sugiyama, the chancellor of the Japanese 
legation. 15 
Mr. Leavell, the American Minister to Guatemala, was stopped by a police 
officer in the city of Guatemala and taken to the barracks where he was detained 
for a while. The President of Guatemala recognised the failure of his government 
to fulfil the duty of protecting the person of the diplomat and promised to make 
appropriate restitution for violating the personal inviolability of the foreign 
envoy.16 on July 14, 1918, Mr. Diamandi, the Romanian Minister to Russia was 
arrested. As a sign of protest and solidarity, the entire diplomatic corps, 
altogether nineteen heads of missions, sought audience with V. I.Lenin and 
presented a note of protest for the arrest of their colleague and they demanded 
r 
his release. The Soviet government recognised the duty of non exercise of local (Sr. 
laws on diplomats and the Minister was released . 17 
Even though the Iranian Minister to the United States, was allegedly 
arrested for disorderly conduct on November 27, 1935, the Minister was released 
14 
15 
16 
1i 
Satow, Op. cit, P. 121 & 177 
Przetacznik Franciszek, Protection of officials of 
Foreign States according to International Law, 
(Martinus Nijhogg Publishers: The Hague/Boston London, 
1983) P. 24. 
Ibid, p . 25. 
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on the ground of diplomatic immunity and the United States made restitution for 
the violation of the duty of non commission. 18 
3.3 THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS IN TEHRAN. 
-b 
The most important case in which international attention has been directed Gr 
... ' I 
was that concerning the United States diploma~~ and consular staff in Tehran. 19 
.::t, /' This case involves the attack on diplomats and the violation of the mission b1• 
premises. 
The facts in brief are that on February 14, 1979 at about 10.45 am, during 
the political unrest in Iran following the fall of Dr. Bakhtiar, the last Prime 
Minister appointed by the Shah, an armed group attacked and seized the United 
States embassy in Tehran, taking 70 persons hostage including diplomats in the ~ 
embassy. In the incident two persons associated with the embassy were killed and 
serious damage was caused to the embassy and the residence of the ambassador. 
In response to the appeal from the embassy during the attack Mr. Yazid, the 
Deputy Prime Minister, arrived at the embassy at about 12.00 noon. He quelled the 
disturbance at the embassy and restored the control of the embassy to the 
officials of the mission. On March 11, 1979, the United States ambassador 
received a letter from the Prime Minister expressing regret for the attack on the 
embassy and stated that arrangements had been made to prevent repetition of such 
incidents and indicating readiness to make reparations for the damage. 
In November 1979, a very large number of demonstrators marched to and fro 
18 
19 
Ibid. 
(1979) International Court of Justice, (I.C.J) 
Reports, P.19. See also Grant V. McClanahan, Op.cit, 
P.230, Przetacznik Franciszek, Op. cit,P. 27. 
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in front of the United States embassy. The Police Chief came to the embassy and 
assured the Charge' d'affaires that the police was doing all that was possible 
to protect the embassy. At about 10.30 am, on November 4, the United States 
embassy compound in Tehran was overrun by a strong armed group which described 
themselves as Muslim students and followers of the Imam's policy. They gained }.::... 
access to the building and tried to set it on fire. All diplomats and consular 
staff in the embassy, were taken hostage. 
During the ordeal repeated calls were made to the Iranian foreign ministry. 
The Charge' d'affaires too, who was at the ministry at the time of the seizure 
appealed to the authorities for help to rescue the diplomats. But no security 
personnel were sent to provide relief and protection to the embassy and the 
diplomats.On the following day November 5, 1979, the United States consulates in 
Tabriz and Shiraz were seized by militant Iranian students.As a result diplomats 
I 
consuls and other personne 1 were taken as hostages and the embassy records were ~r 
ransacked. 
On November 18, 1979, when Ayatollah R. Khomeini, was questioned by the 
press about the holding of the hostages, he responded by saying that the 
diplomats were spies and subject to being taken hostage . 
The United States, ' requested the International Court of Justice to adjudge 6(-
and declare among others that : 
The Government of Iran, in tol erating, encouraging and failing to prevent 
and punish the conduct described in the preceding statement of facts, violated 
its international obligation to the United States as provided for by; 
Articles 22,24,25,27 ,31 ,37 ,and 47 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations. 
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Articles 28,31 ,33,34,36,40 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations 
Articles 4 and 7 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. 
That the government of Iran, is under a particular obligation immediately 
to secure the release of all the United States nationals. 
The International Court of Justice held: 
1 • That the Islamic Republic of Iran,by conduct had violated in several 
ttu s 
respects;\ obligatio'/\ owed by it to the United States of America under cq 
international conventions in force between the two countries as well as 
under the long established rules of international law. 
2. That the violation of these obligations engages the responsibility of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran towards the United States of America under 
international law. 
3. That the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately take 
a ll steps to redress the situation resulting from the events of November 
4, and all that followed. 
4. (a) That the government of Iran must immediately terminate the unlawful 
detention of the United States Charge'd'affaires and other 
diplomats, consular staff and other United States nationals in 
Iran . 
36 
(b) That it must ensure that all the said persons have necessary means 
of leaving Iranian territory including means of transport. 
5. That the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is under an obligation 
to make reparations to the government of the United States of America for 
the injury caused to the latter by the events of November 4, 1979.20 r /Vo l , qy ~<4 
In the case of the Confederation Suisse V Ivan de Juth21 , the Court held 
that the inviolability of the diplomatic agent, "guarantees special 
protection instituted by law with a view to safeguard more 
completely the physical and moral integrity of representatives of a State 
on diplomatic missions abroad " . 
The Supreme Restitution Court of Berl i n of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1959, held as follows : 
20 
21 
22 
It is indisputably a rule of law in all civilised countries that the 
individual persons who are called diplomats .. . are entitled to 
receive from the local sovereign a very high degree of personal 
protection of their peace .22 
The Iranian take over of the embassv was the onlv one 
which resulted in proceedings before the International 
Court of Justice . This was because the US and Iran 
were both signatory to the optional clause appended to 
the 1961 Vienna Convention, accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
22 Revue de Droit International Prive, 550 (1927), see 
also Przetacznik Franciszek, Op.cit, P . 38. 
Ibid, P. 40. 
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These incidents are clear examples of violations of persons and honour of 
the diplomats provided for by Article 29 of the 1961 Convention. 
3.4 THE DUTY TO PREVENT ATTACKS AND ABUSE OF DIPLOMATS. 
The second part of Article 29 provides that, " ... The receiving State 
. shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, 
freedom or dignity." 
Although it comes second to the first duty it appears that the 
international community now places much more emphasis on this duty. There have 
been a lot of attacks on the diplomats by private individuals or organisations. 
The receiving state is therefore obliged to give due and unreserved protection 
r 
which is necessary to prevent any attack on the person of diplomatic agent. The 
term "attack" is not defined but may include kidnapping and taking diplomats 
hostage, threat, attempt or conspiracy to do so. 23 
It was observed that diplomats become an integral part of terrorism because 
of their importance as representatives of sovereign governments. Their 
importance and influence on the international scene is very significant and 
anything that affects them is likely to cause an alarm among nations. Therefore 
l rLo , 
taking them as hostages earns them publicity as well as wealth through ransom and r:., 
a release of fellow prisoners in any one country. 
The wording of Article 29 cannot suffice to work as an instrument to ( 
Prevent an attack on the diplomat. It is therefore necessary to have a better 
23 Brown Jonathan, Op. cit, P.72 
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mechanism by which a diplomat shall be protected . Therefore, Article 29 further 
provides that, "The receiving State . .. shall take all appropriate steps to 
prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity." In otherwords the 
receiving State shall take all appropriate steps to prevent attacks on' diplomatic 
agents. 
There are no hard and fast rules as to what is supposed to be the 
appropriate steps. It is not known whether the standards should be that of the 
sending State or the receiving State. But it appears that the standard should 
usually be that of the receiving State. It is the receiving State which should 
look into its own security and protect the diplomats accordingly. Some countries, 
as a measure of protection to diplomatic agents, employ uniformed guards in front 
of the mission buildings but others do not depending on the security situation 
in those countries. But if the mission or the diplomatic agent feels that there 
is tension or a threat that requires extra protection, the agent or the mission 
can always apply for increased protection from the receiving State . 
In the case of the United States diplomats in Iran, the embassy applied for 
more protection the moment it rea 1 i sed that there was a threat . It is an accepted 
fact that it might be difficult to prevent an attack on diplomats and their 
families . The receiving State may find it difficult to assign body guards to 
diplomats and their spouses. Some capital cities like London and Washington have 
thousands of these agents with diplomatic immunity. What those States can offer 
usually is the employment of armed guards outside the mission¥ buildings . We ffl 
contend that the dependence on such a force may not be so reliable. The forces 
which were stationed at the United States embassy in Tehran did very little to 
39 
prevent an attack on the embassy from the militant students .24 
In Egypt, in 1986, the Police force which was responsible for the 
protection of diplomats by guarding the embassies was on mutiny for days and the 
missions were left without protection . 25 Therefore extra precaution should be 
observed when employing security guards. The Egyptian pol ice could possibly have 
escalated the mutiny by taking the diplomats hostage and demanding negotiations 
with the government for a raise in their pay which was basically the cause of the 
mutiny. 
It is the basic duty of the receiving State to take all appropriate steps 
available to her to protect diplomatic agents . Since the second half of this 
century many diplomats have been victims of violent attacks . Appropriate 
preventive measures may arise in different situations . One such situation is 
when a warning or threat is communicated, and there is a likely attack on the 
diplomat. Second, is the situation when a diplomat is in actual danger or is 
attacked. Third, is the general situation which warrants general prevention 
from any attack on the diplomat whether there is an imminent danger or not. 
There are many occasions when diplomats have been threatened or presumed 
to be in imminent danger . The threat is usual l y communicated to diplomatic 
agents or the press. In such circumstances the receiving State should step up the 
security measures. 
24 
25 
It should remembered that the assassins of Indra 
Ghandi, the Indian Prime Minister , were her own 
security men. 
Grant McClanahan, Op . cit,, p. 147 . 
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For example, in 1948, the Cuban government took preventive steps when the 
United States ambassador was threatened with death. 26 In 1951, the Spanish 
government warned the ambassador of the United States about an assassination plot 
against him and assigned four plain clothesmen to keep a constant watch on him. 
When Mr.Y.Alon, the Israeli Military attache' in Washington was killed on August 
19,1974, President Nixon ordered the secret service to increase protection of 
officials of foreign States. When the United States ambassador, Mr. Davies, was 
killed in Cyprus in 1974, the President of Cyprus assured the Secretary of State, 
H. Kissinger, that he would take all necessary measures to protect American 
officials. on September 20, 1978, the Canberra government decided to reinforce 
the armed guards for officials of foreign States when the Indian High 
Commissioner received a threatening note27 • In 1970, a new police force, the 
executive protection service was created in Washington, in addition to all other 
measures in existence to give assured protection to foreign embassies and 
resident officials of foreign States. 28 
Although all such measures are taken to prevent attacks on diplomats, it 
is submitted that more measures are still needed to protect the diplomats during 
their way to and from the embassies( car- protection) . Diplomats have been blocked 
while travelling in their limousines and attacked or kidnapped . It is unlikely 
that bullet proof limousines can be provided to many diplomats but a way has to 
be found whereby less attacks could be envisaged against diplomats while 
travelling. 
26 
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Ibid, P.53 
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However most of the diplomats are left in imminent danger when travelling 
in cars since no adequate protection can be provided by receiving States. 
3.5 HOSTAGE TAKING OF DIPLOMATS AND NEGOTIATIONS. 
It is also common knowledge that diplomats are attacked and sometimes taken 
hostage. The duty of a receiving State is to take appropriate measures to protect 
the diplomat. In a situation of hostage taking, usually there are two types of 
diplomatic kidnappings. 
1. The first situation is where the diplomats are besieged within the building 
and taken hostage. In this situation a receiving State knows where the diplomats 
and their captors are. Indeed negotiations in this circumstance is inevitable. 
To what extent is the obligation of a receiving State in this regard? Should it 
attack the building? The attack could be futile because not all all rescues have 
/ 
been successfu1.29 The State is therefore left in a dilemma. In the case of the 
Tehran seizure of the United States diplomats, if the rescue attempt by the 
United States had not been aborted, the results probably would not have been good 
for the hostages and their captors. It is presumed that Iran was ready for any 
surpri ses and eventualities and probably all the hostages would have died as a 
29 The Austrian government did not make a rescue attempt 
when the OPEC Ministers were taken hostagej in Vienna. G-
The Ge rman attempt to rescue the Israeli athletes in 
Munich in 1972 ended in the death of all. Bowyer Bell, 
Op . cit, 184-88 and 194, 
In November 1985, the Egyptian Commandos made a rescue 
attempt on the Egyptian plane at e Malta'S Airport. It Gr 
is still regarded as the worst rescue attempt in 
historv as half the number of hostages were most li kel v 
killed-by the commandos.Clutterbuck Richard, Kidnap, -
Hii a ck and Extortion, (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987) 
p. 195 
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result of gunfight.~ 
Mr. A Dubs, the American ambassador to Afghanistan, was kidnapped by Muslim 
extremists in Kabul and taken to an hotel where he died of gunshots on February 
17, 1979 as a result of gunfight between the Afghan police, who stormed the hotel 
where the ambassador was being held hostage by the extremists. 31 
But not all rescues have been failures. There were quite a number of 
successful rescues. 32 The British rescue squad managed to free Iranian 
diplomats and other people who had been taken hostage in the Iranian embassy in 
London when it was occupied by Anti-Khomeini supporters.33 
Although these rescues have been successful attempts to do so should be 
discouraged, as in most cases there are a lot of casualties. It is suggested that 
the best method preferred is to ta 1 k to the captors of the hostages. Many 
scholars and diplomats too advocate negotiations as it has to a certain extent 
been successful. It is not usually i~ the intention of the terrorists to harm ~ 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Ryan Paul B, The Iranian Rescue Mission, (Naval 
Institute Press:Annapolis, Maryland,1985), Aftermath 
Raid, P.125 
Przetacznik Franciszek, Op. cit, PP.64-126. 
The rescue operation of the Israeli passengers of Air 
France taken hostage at Entebbe-Uganda, in 1976, was 
verv successful and a triumph for Israel. Przetacznic 
Franciszek, Op. cit, P.186. In May 1977, the 
Netherlands government too was able to rescue the 
hostages in a train hijack. Clutterbuck Richard, 
Op.cit, P.184 
Ibjd, p. 191. 
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their hostages. In 1972, the Black September, issued a statement after the rescue 
attempt to free the Israeli athletes in Munich, that "Our fighters had strict 
orders not to harm the zionist hostages unless in self defence. 34 Hostage 
~tl 
taking is a medium through which they try to publicise their cause and achieve G;, 
their demands.35 This turned out to be the real situat ion when on November 18, 
1974, Mr. Lechoco took hostage the Philippine ambassador to the United States. 
He demanded publicity and safe conduct for his son to the United States. 36 
Statistics indicate that 4% of all kidnapped victims are ki l led by terrorists, 
while 33% of the diplomats kidnapped are released without paymenl' and 50% are 
re 1 eased on paymentj of ransom demand . 37 
11. The second situation is where the hostages are kept in a secret place . In 
such a situation the government does not know the whereabouts of the hostages nor 
their captors. Unlike in the first s i tuation where the government can threaten 
the captors that if their hostages are killed or harmed they too would receive 
a severe penalty, in this circumstance, the government cannot even threaten 
anyone because there is no way fo r a receiving State to know the place and the 
identity of terrorists. The hostages in this situation remain at the mercy of 
their captors. The hostage takers can choose to do whatever they l i ke . If they 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Aston C.Clive, A Contemporary Crisis; Political 
Hostage-Ta king And The Experience Of Western Europe, 
(Westport, Connecticut:Greenwood Press,1982) P.89 
Laquer Walter, The Terrorism Reader; A Historical 
Anthologv, (Wildhood bouse London,1979) P.256 
Murphy John F, Punishing International Terrorists. 
(Rowman & Allanheld, 1985) P.24 
Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism And The Liberal State, 
(London:The Macmillan Press Ltd . 1977) P . 225 
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choose to kill their hostages, they walk free to the praise of their 
organisations and sympathizers and if they decide to release them, it is out of 
their kindness. Public opinion has very little to offer in this regard unless 
they claim responsibility. Therefore, there is possibly no better option other 
than negotiations. 
The basic obligation of a receiving State is that it shall take appropriate 
steps to protect the person, dignity and honour of the diplomat . But if it 
happens that a foreign envoy is attacked and taken hostage by the terrorists, the 
issue that arises is the extent of the obligation on the receiving State. The 
question is whether the receiving State is under a legal obligation to secure the 
release of the kidnapped diplomat. Primarily because of this dilemma States 
differ in policies of negotiation and giving in to the demands of hostage takers. 
~ 
h Cl--7.st' There are two schools of tho~ t. The first school maintains that ther~-h 
should be no negotiations and that the receiving State should not give in to the~ 
demands of the captors. The second group consists of those who advocate for ~ / 
'J~Frn.. 
negotiations and to a certain extent give in to the demands of the captors. 
In the first group we find the two strongest adherents of the policy of non 
negotiations, namely, the United States of America and Israel . These two -..::r 
countries vehemently refuse to negotiate with any terrorist group. There have 
been press releases and public declarations of non-negotiation policy with Gr 
terrorists. The policy of non-negotiation advocated by these two countries has 
put the lives of their diplomats in real, imminent danger. The basic objection 
to the policy of negotiation is that going into negotiation and giving in to the 
45 
demands of the captors only encourage such terrorist groups to go for more 
citizens of these countries residing abroad . In their opinion, if the terrorists 
realise that these countries are not going to sit down and negotiate or give in 
to their demands, they would be deterred or discouraged from attacking and taking 
their diplomats or citizens as hostages . 
Critics, friends and relatives of the captives consider this attitude 
inhumane, particularly since the option given to the terrorist is the killing of 
innocent diplomats. The hardline policy of non-negotiation by the United States 
tJ 
has resulted i intlivi'dual high price in the form of lives of those taken 
hostage. A number of diplomats have been killed because of that policy. 
Although the objective of this policy has been to discourage terrorists 
from attacking American diplomats, recent figures suggest that there has been a 
continuing assault on American officials . In the period of 1971-1980, the United 
States Department 1 i sted 254 terrorist attacks on the their diplomats . Five 
United States ambassadors were killed in that period. 38 
It is true that there have been instances where the parties refused to 
negotiate and thus hostages were released . For example: 
Mr. J.W Sanchez, the Paraguayan Counsellor at Huzaingo was kidnapped in 
Buenos Aires on March 24, 1970 by the Argentine Liberation Front . The Government 
of Argent; na refused to negotiate and four days 1 ater the Counse 11 or was re 1 eased 
38 Wardlaw Grant, Political terrorism,(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) P . 73 . 
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unharmed. 39 Mr. G. Jackson, the British Ambassador to Uruguay, was kidnapped by 
the Tupamaros on January 8, 1971 and released after nine month in captivity on 
September 9 , 1971 . ~ 
But the occasions when terrorists have released diplomats without harming 
them after a rejection of negotiations are rare cases and should not be taken as 
triumphs by those States which refuse to negotiate. 41 Many diplomats have lost 
their lives as a result of the policy of non-negotiation . The list is long, but 
the following is indicative of what is happening in non-negotiation 
circumstances. 
1. Mr. E. Elrom, the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul, was kidnapped by the 
Turkish People's Liberation Army on May 17, 1971, and was killed on May 
23, 1971 because the receiving State refused to negotiate . 42 
2 . In 1975, Palestinian guerrillas burst i nto the Saudi Arabian Embassy in 
Khartoum on the occasion of a party in honour of the American Ambassador . 
They took hostage the Ambassadors of Saudi Arabia and the United States 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Przetacznick Franciszek, Op. cit, P. 55. 
The United States Agency for International Development 
official assigned to the Uruguayan Police department 
was kidnapped by the Tupamaros on July 31, 1970 and 11 
davs later was found dead with two shots in the head. 
Th~ government of the receiving state had refused to 
negotiate with the kidnappers. Przetacnick Franciszek, 
Op. cit, P. 1 26. 
Louis M. Bloomfield I Gerald F. Fitzgerald, ~ 
cit,P . 16 
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and the Charge'd'affaires of the United States, Jordan, Japan and Belgium . 
They put forward several demands, one of which was that the Jordanian 
government was to release Abu Daud and other members of the Al-Fatah in 
the Jordanian prisons. The government of Jordan refused. The guerrillas 
released most of the diplomats except the American Charge'd'affaires, Mr. 
Moore, the American Ambassador to Sudan, Mr. Noel, and Mr. G. Eid, the 
Be lgium Charge' d'affaires, who were later dragged to the basement of the 
embassy and shot dead on March 2 , 19 7 3. 43 
4. on April 24, 1975, the Baeder-Meinhof group seized the West German Embassy 
in Stockholm and held 12 hostage, among them A. Stoeckler, the ambassador. 
The West Germany government refused to negotiate or to give in to the 
demands of the terrorists and manifested its decision to the receiving 
State. On Apri 1 25, 1975, the group severe 1 y wounded West Germany's 
Military attache', Colonel Von Mirbach, and blew up the Embassy. H. 
Hillegard, the head of the economic department at the Embassy, was killed 
by the explosion. 44 
Franci szek Przetaczni ck sums up the reasons given by the governments of the 
receiving States who refuse to negotiate with the kidnappers of diplomats as 
follows: 
(a) That it is unconstitutional to release the prisoners who had already been 
43 
44 
Ibid, P. 20 
Przetacznik Franciszek , Op. cit , P. 63 note 
126. 
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tried and sentenced. That the executive order cannot be used to free 
captives convicted without the approval of the Judiciary. 
(b) That it is not legally possible and honourable for the government to 
negotiate with a criminal organisation even if it is meant to save 
innocent lives. 
(c) Acceptance of these demands puts the future of the country at stake and 
creates a precedent which is very dangerous. 45 
There is no doubt that these are good reasons but there is always a way for 
the States to achieve what they want. Therefore, there is no reason why 
5 
concession could not be made to the demands of terrorist groups in order to ~' 
A 
secure innocent lives. There is not even a guarantee that once a State refuses 
to negotiate, there shall not be any attack on its diplomats. Despite the policy 
of non negotiation, attacks on diplomats and their embassies have continued 
unabated. 
Of late, there were behind the scenes negotiations to secure the release 
of weste rn captives in Beirut. 46 There have also been allegations of the United 
States seeking the assistance of nations which have been implicated in 
"terrorism" to intercede in getting captives freed. Syria and Iran are reported 
to have assisted in getting the Western hostages freed in Lebanon. Whether this 
was done at the request of the western countries or on humanitarian grounds, 
45 
46 
Ibi d , P.55 
The famous "Iran-Contra Affair" arms scandal is ve ry 
much seen as the objective of behind the scenes 
negotiations. 
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there appeared to be some negotiations going on behind the scenes and there were 
supposed to be demands and concessions. The fact that the captives were released 
after intercession is proof of some negotiations .47 
There is a possibility that terrorists have resorted to hit and run or 
suicidal activities in which they can attack diplomats or embassies and kill 
every one including themselves (the terrorists). This is so because the 
terrorists in such circumstances do not anticipate any concessions from the 
parties concerned . The rationale of non-negotiatio~ is not convincing. 07 
There is no justification for a State to forego the precious life of a 
diplomat because of a hardl ine pol icy of non-negotiation, which is not even 
consistent at all times. If this policy were consistent in all circumstances 
perhaps one would tend to respect it but this is not the case. 
Diplomats are innocent people with families and friends . It is not proper 
to sacrifice them so easily. 48 It is not the life of the diplomats that should 
be bartered for demands which are not even precious. There has always been a way r;, 
out for the governments to secure their objectives, without resorting to violence 
47 
48 
The Israeli government is reported to have been forced 
into reconsidering a deal with the terrorists who had 
held over 100 Israeli passengers in an Air France 
aircraft a t Entebbe. Israel Radio had announced that 
the Cabinet was willing to negoti ate . But fortunat e l v 
such negotiations did not materialise because of the -
successful rescue operation at Entebbe on July 3, 1976. 
Wilkinson Paul, Political Terrorism, (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1974) P.214 
Crelinsten Ronald D./Szabo Deni s, Hostage-Taking, 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1979), P.42 
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or hardline policies. There is therefore no reason why the governments cannot 
find amicable solutions to the release of diplomats. 
The second school advocates for negotiations in order to secure the release & 
~ 
of diplomats. The following are some of the situations in which negotiation is 
anticipated: 
,, )"" 
~f rst tu~t } o , e receiving State is willing to negotiate and to 
a ce rtain extent give in to the demands of the "terrorists". 49 Braz i 1 ; s 
reported to have paid a high price in releasing prisoners as well as paying 
ransom money.50 Interestingly, all these hostages were not Brazilian diplomats 
49 This group has been criticised by the hardliners for 
choosing to bargain because it encourages other 
terrorist groups to go on with these activities of 
taking diplomats and citizens of countries who are 
willing to give in to their demands. 
Wilkinson for example, says that: 
? 
The great disadvantage involved in any 
concession or bargain, which will have to 
deliver some tangible gain to the terrorists 
if it is to be effected, is that the 
terrorists will have to set a precedent and 
establish a model for emulation bv other 
groups. Moreover, if the terrorists ' weapon ~ ~ 
is seen to pay off against a particular 
50 
government, the authority and credibility of 
that government is thereby gradually 
diminished, terrorist - groups are tempted 
into increasing brazen attempts at blackmail, 
and t here is a dramatic inflation in the 
ransom price demanded by the terrorists. 
Wilkinson Paul, Op. cit, P . 129 
It is true that a government that succumbs to the 
demands of the terrorists pays a high price in the form 
of all those demands but not in losj of innocent lives. ~ 
There were three cases of diplomatic kidnappin g in 
which Brazil either paid ransom or released political 
prisoners. See Baumann Carol Edler, Diplomati c 
51 
but Western diplomats and some of them came from countries which refuse to 
negotiate with terrorists. This did not really amount to a high price as it is < 
being portrayed. on the one hand, Brazil negotiated and gave in to the demands 
of the groups51, while on the other hand, countries like the United States 
- -- -1 
refused any contact with these groups and as a result many of her diplomats lost 
their lives. 
r 
This idea of negotiation should not be mis~derstood to mean that whenever ' 
there is any attack on diplomats the sending State or receiving State should just 
give in to the demands blindly. It is suggested that careful study should be made 
to convince the attackers that hostage taking cannot be the solution.52 It is 
also proposed that effort should be made to find solutions to the terrorists' 
grievances through proper channels. 
T~@con si tuet-ion · w 1i s t:¥ti i eQ · 
sending State is not interested in negotiat}on~The obligation on the rece1v1ng ? !.<! \.A,/1 t -
State in this regard !2 hard :and usuall~is left .with no other alternative except 
to play the 'wait and see game'. The result is sometimes good, that hostages are 
not killed but the worst has also been seen, where the hostages have been killed. 
(111\~ 
y~ on · ....wliic Jlegotiation ·s 1 ike1Y. is wheriJhe receiving 
State is not interested in negotiating with the captors because of its policy of 
non-negotiation while the sending State may be a willing party. The sending State 
51 
52 
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(The Hague/ Martinus Nijhof£,1973) P.74 
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52 
will probably place a heavy burden on the receiving State and accuse it of 
failing to play her part in protecting a diplomat. However, there is no clear (; 
rule as to what a receiving State should do in such a situation. It all depends 
on the circumstances o he-events. If the receiving State is known to have 
influence over the alleged kidnappers or hostage takers, the duty on its part is 
indeed heavy. It would be presumed that in such a circumstance, the intervention 
of the receiving State would change the minds of those involved in the 
kidnapping. The hostage takers in the case of the United States diplomats in 
Iran were known to be fully under the influence of Imam Khomeini. There is no 
doubt that if he had asked them to withdraw from the embassy, they would have 
done so without hesitation. Therefore, abstention from influencing the student 
militants did put a greater burden on the government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Abstaining from influencing the militant students amounted to violation 
of the inviolabi_l ity of the internationally protected persons, namely, the United 
. ~ 6 States d1plomats and consular staff. r 
Resolution 638 of July 1989 is in line with this idea . It condemned all 
acts of abduction and demanded immediate safe release of all hostages and 
abducted persons and called upon all States to use their political influence in 
accordance with the Charter of the U.N and principles of international law to 
secure release of all hostages and abducted persons and to prevent the commission 
53 
of acts of hostage taking and abduction. 
In circumstances where the receiving State does not hav~ influence but 
can negotiate for the release of the hostages, the general opinion is that a 
53 Wellens Karel C, (Ed) Resolutions and Statements of The 
United Nations Securitv Council 1946 - 1992 - a 
thematic Guide(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993) P.7 
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receiving State should do as much as possible to secure the release of the 
diplomat. How much this should be, again depends on the circumstances. The 
receiving State should consult or inform the sending State of all avenues it 
intends to take to secure the release of the diplomat . If the receiving St ate is 
capable of negotiating with the terrorists, it should do so unreservedly~~ ~ 
s~t~ ~1 Abrogation of that pol icy in that particular incident 
amounts to a failure to fulfil her duty in protecting the diplomat. 
When Mr. K.Spret, the West German ambassador to Guatemal ~was kidnapped on 
March 31, 1970, by members of the Rebel Armed Forces in Gua~mala City, he was 
slain by his abductors on April 5, 1970. 54 Willy Brandt, the then Chancellor of 
the Federal Republic ~f Germany broadcasted a~munique to the effect that: 
~e government of Guatemala had been incapable of assuring the 
protection necessary to diplomatic agents accredited to her. 
The Foreign Minister, too, submitted a protest note to the President of 
Guatemala saying that "the Guatemalan government had failed to provide adequate 
protection to Mr. K. Spret as required by international law because the 
Guatemalan government failed to obtain his release:·55 
These communications and declarations cast a heavy burden on the Guatemalan 
~ 
government. It could be argued that the government had to.rl) t:fnegotiat;i~"' G 
in order to secure the·release of the diplomat and therefore once it failed to 
54 Bloomfield Louis M. /Fit zgerald Gerald F, Op. c i t ,P.10. 
55 Przetacznik Franciszek, Op.cit, P. 4. 
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do so, it abrogated its duty to protect the diplomatic agent .56 
~.Lv 
I t is quite difficult to be precise what the receiving State should do if ~( 
a diplomatic agent is kidnapped in her territory . It all depends on the facts 
and how much the receiving State endeavours to get the diplomat released. There 
tU to . . S h r-are no given rules_9f what the rece1v1ng tate s ould do, but it should be seen Lrl 
0, ~ ~1JJ~ t by the sending State to have done enough to secure the release ~~ 
f!]'V ~ v~~ ~enf ri ed Von Ho 11 en ben, the West German ambassador to Braz _:)was 
kidnapped on June 11th, 1970, the Brazilian President Emilio Garrastazu Medici 
flew to Rio de Janeiro to take personal charge of the search57 for the 
56 
57 
It is clear from the communications of the German 
government to the Guatemalan government that Germany 
wanted to see that there were some negotiations taking 
place with the Rebel Armed forces regarding their 
demand for the release of 17 prisoners. But one 
wonders whether German~ would bow down to such demands 
if it had been in Guatemala ' s .position . It mav be 
remembered that Germany had been holding two · 
Palestinian 'terrorists brothers ' the Hamedei, who had 
been convicted in Germany. These two Palestinians were 
the object of negotiation swap with a terrorist group 
which was holding two Germans in Lebanon. The group 
demanded that Germany releasef these two brothers j · '$'f. J--f" the Germans were if released. But Germany refused 
to budge . 
l 
The Chanc e llor of West German/, Mr . Willey Brandt, too, 
took personal charge of the Mhnich crisis when the 
Israeli athletes were taken hostage in 1972. This was 
a tremendous job done by the leaders of these countries 
to show how much they were concerned. These incidents 
do not set the standard . W · ~ i . As h~~9ave 
indicated earlier, there is no prescri~d1 :ll/rules 
as to what the receiving State should do but it should 
be seen to be doing enough to secure the release of the 
diplomat. 
Gr 
? 
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ambassador. 58 
drnt~ <tJ 
Another disturbing problem about some of the groups which do not favour 
--
giving in to the demands of the terrorists is the inconsistent soft approach that 
-
-follows incidents in which terrorists demand the release of prisoners. In the 
incident in which ambassador Noel, Moore and Guy Eid were murdered in Sudan in 
L , 0V w"t~ l1V 1 
1973, the group demanded, nter. alia, that Jordan releases Abu Daoud and other 
members of the Al Fatah movement in Jordan as well as Major Kafeh Hindawi, the 
Jordanian official, serving a life sentence for plotting against the government. 
The Jordanian government refused to entertain the demands and as a result the 
diplomats were killed. What followed was that on March 14, 1973, King Hussein 
announced that he had commuted the death sentence of Abu Daoud, an Al-Fatah 
leader, and 16 other Palestinian commandos . 59 It could be argued that if Jordan 
had negotiated with the terrorists ~the re 1 ease of the A 1- Fatah 1 eader, Abu (; 
Daoud, the assassination of the diplomats would not have occurred . But it was 
left to the terrorist group to decide the fate of the diplomats . 
In this particular incident not only should Jordan have released the 
prisoners but Sudan, in whose territory the incident happened, shoul d have done 
more than just communicating the messages . Sudan should have urged the 
governments whose diplomats had been taken hostage to find an amicable solution. 
A soft approach was necessary to consider some of the demands knowing very well 
- -
how ferocious the Al Fatah group was i n the Middle East . Sudan did not do much 
58 
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to obtain the release of the diplomats as they only waited to see what would 
happen. It suffices to know that later Sudan released these terrorists into the 
hands of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. All those statements of 
• 
condemnations by Sudan were quietened when sympathizers of the gro~p objected to 
the intention of President Nimeiry placing the terrorists on trial. Nimeiry 
should have known the force of the Al Fatah in the Arab world and should have 
reacted earlier than that f'?; n order to save the lives of the diplomats. The GJ. 
obligation to protect the lives of the diplomats was not shown by SUdan nor by 
those countries whose diplomats had been taken hostage. They all either waited 
to see what would happen or decided that the lives of those diplomats should be 
sacrificed for the honour of the policies of those nations. Indeed the lives of 
these diplomats were more valuable than those people in the prisons. 
The incident of the West German ambassador to Guatemala suggests a heavy 
burden on a receiving State. The duty of a receiving State to a kidnapped 
diplomat is undefined but it is clear that the receiving State must take all 
appropriate steps to safeguard and secure the release of a diplomat. Much as the 
\ \.\,\) ~ 
appropriate steps are meant to be those of the receiving State they should J ~ I 1 
convince the world and particularly the sending State that they were appropriate 
and effective. 
The 1nternational Convention Against The Taking of Hostages (1979)60 
,..._, 
provides in its preamble that a~is an offence of grave concern to ~ 
the international community and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention, any person committing an act of hostage taking shall either be 
60 The convention was adopted by resolution 34/145 of the 
General Assembly December 1979. 
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prosecuted or extradited. 
Article 3 states that; 
1 . The State party in the terri tory of which the hostage is he 1 d by the 
offender shall take all measures it considers appropriate to ease 
the situation of the hostage, in particular, to secure his release 
and, after his release, facilitate, when relevant, his departure. 
2. If any object which the offender has obtained as a result of the 
taking of hostages comes into the custody of a State party, that 
State shall return it as soon as possible to the hostage or the 
third party referred to in Article 1, as the case may be, or to the 
appropriate authorities thereof. 
The article enjoins State Parties to take all measures they consider 
appropriate to secure the release of the hostages. It also envisages situations 
of bargaining and concessions to the demands of hostage takers. 
In resolution 579 of December 1985, the Security council affirmed the 
obligation of all States in whose territory hostages or abducted persons are held 
to take adequate measures to secure their release and to prevent the commission 
of acts of hostage taking or abduction in future. 
3.6 DIPLOMATIC MISSION PREMISES. 
The other important aspect of diplomatic immunity is the inviolability of 
the mission building. 
Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states: 
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable . The agents of the 
receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the 
head of the mission. 
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take ali appropriate 
steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion 
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission 
or impairment of its dignity. 
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property 
thereof and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune 
( i ) 
from search, requisition, attachment or execution. 
Article 22 envisages mainly the following duties : 
The first duty is that a receiving State shall treat the 
mission of the sending State as inviolable. Therefore it shall 
exercise restraint and non- commission of all acts which may 
violate that inviolability in the form of entering the 
premises of the mission without permission .61 
58 
(ii) The second duty is that the receiving State is under a special 
duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of 
the mission from invasion and prevent disturbances or 
distraction of its dignity . 
( i i i ) The third duty is that the receiving State shall as well exclude the 
furnishings, property and means of transport from the local 
jurisdiction in the form of search, requisition, attachment or 
execution. 
The receiving State is required to treat the premises of the mission with 
honour and dignity . It shall restrain its agents or organs, e.g the police or 
army, from entering the premises of the mission unless prior permission is 
granted. The concept of the inviolability of domicile was upheld by Article 22. 
61 The principle of non violation of the premises of the 
mission had been enunciated with regard to the U. N 
Headquarters. It was emphasised at the time of drafting 
the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the 
U.N.in London that the headquarters of the organisation 
should enjoy immunity by local authorities for purpose 
of arresting any one or serving a writ. (1957) __ 1
Y.B.I.L.C, P . 58 
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The premises of the mission were like floating ships regarded as portions of 
-
foreign territory .62 The concept of extraterritoriality was extended to the 
premises of the mission in order to confer absolute privileges and immunities .6J 
·~ ' . . ~ ;~t..e...- ,..,. .,. ...o :> • "- J (' J r ..- r ' • 
However: recent interpretations refer to extraterritoriality <;_s just a "functional 
necessity" . Harvard Draft is si 1 ent about the extraterritoriality of the premises 
of the mission. However Article 2 of the Draft provides that the privileges and 
immunities are conferred on the basis of functional necessity. It states that the 
receiving State shall permit a sending State to acquire land and buildings to the ) 
discharge of functions. 
- In Radwan V. Radwan64 Cumming - Bruce J said, 
. . there is no valid foundation, or alleged rule that diplomatic 
premises are to be regarded as outside the territory of the receiving 
62 
63 
Deak Francis, "Immunity Of Foreign Missions From Lo cal 
Jurisdiction" (1929) 23 A.J.I.L, P.591 
1 . The fi~e Draft Code 1890 extends the concept of 
exte ritoriality to the offices of the legation, 
consular archives and to the residents of the 
Ministers and diplomatic agents, Article 363. 
2. The resolution of the Institute of International 
Law 1895 provides in Articles 7, 8, 9, and 10 the 
concept of exterritoriality of the acts of the 
Ministers or representatives and their residences. 
3. The project of the American Institute of 
International Law 1925 and tQe Project of the 
International Commission of~urists 1927 Articles 
21 and 23, and Article 16 of the Havana Convention 
ref er to the premises as domicile of the sending 
Stat e . ~ 
4 . The Phillmbr~ Draft Code 1926 provides that the 
residence of diplomatic agent and the residence of 
the diplomatic suit are deemed to be exterritorial 
6 . The Pessoj~Draft Code 1911 does not consider this 
concept ~s it allows the agents of the State to 
remove a crimina l by force if the head of the 
mission r e fuses to give his consent . 
64 1972 3 W.L . R, P.735 
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State." He said that exterritoriality in this (as in every case) is a 
fiction only for diplomatic envoys are in reality not without but within 
the territory of the receiving State. The premises of the mission are 
inviolable and local authorities may enter them only with the consent of 
the head of the mission. But this does not make the premises foreign 
territory or take them out of the reach of the local law for many 
purposes. For example a commercial transaction in the embassy may be 
governed by the local law particularly tax law, marriage may be celebrated 
there only if conditions laid down by the local law are met and children 
born in it, unless their father has diplomatic status acquire local 
nationality. He also said that if the premises of the mission were part of 
the territory of the sending State that would have been done at the 
formulation of the 1961 Convention. 
The question whether the agents of the receiving State may enter the 
premises of the mission in case of fire or national security was an issue of 
great concern and controversy during the formulation of Article 22. It touched 
on the position of the receiving State in cases of extreme emergency in order to 
eliminate a grave and imminent danger to human life, public health or property ~ 
or to safeguard the security of the State, fire or crime violence in the premises ( 
-
of the mission. Among t he ideas discussed were that the head of the mission would 
cooperate with the local authorities in cases of fire, epidemic or .other extreme 
emergency. But this was opposed and in particular by delegates who, in their 
opinion, thought 'it dangerous to leave it to a receiving State to judge a 
61 
situation that requires emergency attention. 65 It is contended that if such an 
idea had been put into the article, there would have been abuse or misuse of it 
by either communist or western receiving States, by making an abrupt check up on 
the missions for their own ends in the guise of an emergency or safeguard the 
State security . Therefore, the idea was dropped. 66 
- On June 14, 1980 the Liberian authorities ( entered the French embassy and G; 
removed the son of the late Head of State, who had taken refuge in the mission. 
It had been one of the most heinous crimes any civilised government could commit. 
Spain / broke off diplomatic relations with Guatemala on February 1, 1980, after Gr 
/ 
the local police had stormed the embassy against the wishes of the ambassador, 
to relieve the occupation of the premises by a group of peasants who had taken 
the ambassador and other diplomats hostage .67 Cuba on the other hand has seen 
exceptions to the concept of absolute inviolability of the diplomatic premises 
from a different angle. When some armed refugees broke into the Ecuadorian 
embassy in Havana on February 13,1981 and took the ambassador and three other 
hostages, the Cuban security forces stormed the building. The authority in Havana 
replied to the protest by the government of Ecuador that they would act 
65 (1957) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, PP.55-59, see also (1962) 56 
A.J.I.L. PP.100-2 . 
66 However there are different views if the ambassador is 
67 
himself taken hostage and the local authorities believe 
that he i s in no position to give consent they may take 
such action necessary to rescue the situation. It may 
also appear that the hostage takers are about to carr y 
out their threats in the premises of the mission. The 
local authorities may act in a manner deemed fit in 
consultation with the sending State. Denza Eileen, ~ 
cit, P . 267, Sutton Stephen, "Diplomatic Immunity and 
The Siege Of The Libyan People's Bureau" (1985) Public 
Law, P.197 . 
B.Sen, op. cit, P.113 
- 62 
unilaterally whenever it wa~ neces~ary to establish order. 68 Havana had done it ~ 
C' ...-v ..({., I , •• ...v ( 
in a similar manner 1when 14 armed refugees had entered the Papal Nunciature and . l 
T 
took four nuns hostage89 
Article 22 provides absolute inviolability to the premises of the forei ~~ 
mission in a receiving State and under no circumstances should the agents of a 
receiving State enter the mission without prior permission of the head of the 
mission. 70 
Although in certain circumstances a receiving State can take a risk in 
cases where it is absolutely sure of the abuses of the mission, the popular 
opinion is that in no way should a receiving State order its agents to enter the 
premises of the mission without prior permission from the head of the mission. 
Contrary to the concept of absolute inviolability, in 1973, the Iraqi 
68 
69 
70 
The Aden Government was also of the view that 
diplomatic immunity does not protect diplomats who 
violate international law. Therefore the government 
1 
considered its storming of the Iraqiembassy as legal 
~ w ' } the retaliatory measure ta er.l by Iraq ~as 
illegal.(Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
Sept. 1979 l. 
B.Sen, Op. cit, P.113 
There have been other violations of the premises 
through electronic mechanism in the form of listening 
devices and the tapping of telephones. There had been 
allegations of embassy bugging of the United States 
embassv in Moscow and at the Soviet embassy in 
Washington. In 1983 atleast 236 diplomats charged with 
"bugging" other embassies were expelled.Gerhard Von 
Glahn, Law Among Nations, An Introduction To 
International Law, P. 512, (1973) Keesing's 
Contemporarv Archives, P.25893 
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ambassador was called to the Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry and told that 
there was evidence that arms ~ere being smuggled into the country and stored at 
the Iraqi embas3y. A request for the search was refused by the ambassador. In 
the event a r~id on the embassy in the presence of the ambassador was made in 
which arms were found in crates in the embassy. 71 Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna 
Convention is categorical that the receiving State shall not enter the mission 
building save wi t h the permission of the head of the mission. 
Although Iraq had used the mission in contradiction to Article 41 (3) which 
forbids the premises to be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of 
t he mission, it was highly improper that the embassy was raided. Article 41(3) 
does not authorise a receiving State to enter and make a search in the premises 
of the mission. The mission must remain inviolable at all times and the 
inviolability is not lost because of unlawful acts72 • 
In keeping with the spirit of Art i c 1 e 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention, the ~fi 
agents of a receiving State may not enter the foreign mission save with the~ ~1, 0 I tiO, 
consent of the head of the diplomatic mission . In 1906 Carlos Weddington, the son 
of the Chilean Charge de affaires at Brussels, shot and killed the secretary of 
the legat ion. He took refuge in the legation which the police guarded without 
forcing its entry into the mission. Britain too exemplified it in the events of 
April 17, 1984 in which a young British policewoman was allegedly killed in 
London by shots of gunfire from a window of the Libyan People's Bureau 
71 Eileen Den za, Op. cit, P.95, se e also the 1973 
Keesing's Cont emporary Archives, P.2 5893 
72 Higgins R, Op.cit, P.646 
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I (equivalent to an embassy). 
The facts of the incident are as follows: On February 1984 the Chancery 
building of the Bureau was taken over by a group of Libyan students. On April 17, 
a planned opposition demonstration was held in front of the embassy at the same 
time when a pro-Qadhafi counter demonstration of about 20 people was also going 
on. The police had been notified and took position in front of the building. 
Later on, there was a burst of gun fire alleged to have come from the Libyan 
embassy windows. The bullets ki 11 ed the po 1 i cewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, and e 1 even 
demonstrators were injured. All the demonstrators were evacuated from the area 
and the building was cordoned off. The British government showed some desire to 
evacuate the building and search it. Meanwhile the Libyan government prevented 
anyone from 1 eavi ng the British embassy in Libya. 73 Although the British 
government was absolutely sure that the gunfire was from the embassy it did not 
force its way into the embassy. Other opin ions suggest that the British 
government did not make any attempt to force its way and search the building, not 
because it was keeping to the spirit of article 22, but because it feared 
retaliatory measures against Brit i sh diplomats and citizens in Libya. That is 
why the search was made after making sure that their diplomats were safe in 
Libya. 
Goldberg74 disagrees with the concept of the inviolability of the 
diplomatic missions which are used in a manner incompatible with the functions 
of the mission (Article 41 (3). He opines that the British police should have 
73 
74 
McClanahan Grant V, Op . cit, p. 6. 
(1984) 30 South Dakota, P.1 
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entered the Libyan Peoples Bureau to search and seize the murderers of Constable 
Fletcher. We find that this view cannot be entertained for a number of reasons: 
First, the diplomatic premises enjoy absolute immunity since the beginning 
of residential diplomacy. Secondly, the storming of the embassy would erode the 
inviolability of the premises. Thirdly, the storming of the embassy would set a 
precedent. In the case of the United States Diplomats, Iran complained that the 
embassy had been used for criminal purposes other than the official functions. 
If we are to adopt Goldberg's views, the seizure of the U.S embassy in Iran would 
then be justified. 
In the incident when Iraq invaded Kuwait,~Iraqi soldiers entered the 
French ambassador's residence in Kuwait city and seized four French citizens, 
including a military attache'. This was contrary to the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations which provides that the residence of the diplomatic agent 
shall be inviolable. They also entered the Belgian and Dutch embassy compounds 
and the residence of the Canadian ambassador. 75 Iraq, on its part, denied the 
incidents and referred to the missions as former diplomatic missions. 
The Security Council by resolution 667 demanded that Iraq fully comply with 
the 1961 Vienna Convention and that the government should not hinder diplomatic 
and consular missions in the performance of their functions. 
In regard to international law, Iraq failed to observe its obligation to 
protect and honour the inviolability of diplomatic missions. It could not pursue 
its own course without the consent of the sending States. Even if the diplomats 
had done anything wrong which might have warranted the closure of the embassies, 
75 Gerhad Von Glahn, Op. cit, P. 521 
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due regard to international norm of respect and honour had to be observed. 
In 1908 the British embassy in Tehran was surrounded during revolutionary 
disturbances b~rsian troops. This was because it had granted refuge to certain 1 
political offenders. 76 
On June 14, 1980 Liberian troops, invaded the French embassy in Monrovia, 
and arrested Adolphus B. Tolbert, son of the late Liberian President, William R. 
Tolbert, who was assassinated during the April 12, 1980 coup. Although France 
protested, the Liberian Defence Ministry denounced the asylum that had been c;, 
granted to Adolphus. It described it as a grave situation which necessitated 
entry into the mission without permission. 77 
It may be noted that a Court in the United States 78 has held that: 
(a) A foreign embassy is not to be considered the territory of the 
sending State. 
(b) The local police have the authority and 
respons i bi 1 i ty to enter a foreign embassy if the pri vi 1 ege of 
diplomatic inviolability is not involved when an offence is 
committed there in violation of local law. 
76 Eagleton Clyde, The Responsibility Of The State For 
Protection Of Foreign Officials, (1925) 19 A.J . I.L, 
P.297. 
7i B. Sen Op.cit, p,·113 
The Liberian Defence Ministry commented that such was a 
grave situation which warranted entry into the mission 
premises without permission. But international law 
requires that permission must be given by the head of 
the mission before entry is effected. 
78 Fatemi v . United States Dist court, A.C ( 'i963) P. 525 
67 
The second duty imposed on a receiving State is the special duty to 
take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against 
intrusion or damage and prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or 
impai rment of its dignity. Since the wording of Article 22 is similar to that of 
Article 29 it is apparent that the duty imposed under it is the same . 
The State of Malaya (Malaysia) at the Vienna conference on Diplomatic 
Intercourse and Immunities 1961, had proposed a restrictive approach to the duty 
of protection of the mission premises. The representative suggested that instead 
of .. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to 
t 
protect the mission .... " jhe provision should read~ ;.rre' "The receiving ( 
State is under a speci a 1 duty and sha 11 take a 11 appropriate steps to protect the 
premises". i9 The purpose of the proposal was of result and not of means ~ ~In ? 
1 1 . . t d . . d t . h .*'-.vh B l . ~ ~ ' support of this proposa Be g1um c1 e an 1nc1 en 1n w 1c e g1 ~ Embassy was 
burnt down and ransacked and the 1 i fe of the members ~ the mission ~ere wtts 
endangered. The police assigned to guard the premises had been withdrawn and 
t..-(7t'> t . f th . . there~ no apology or compensa 10n rom e rece1v1ng State. The proposal was 
referred to the drafting committee but was not embodied in the final text.so 
It is mandatory that a receiving State should take all appropriate steps 
to protect the embassy from attacks, intrusion, damage or any sort of 
disturbance. If a State abdicates its obligation to protect the premises, it is 
legally liable to pay for the damage caused. When a German mob attacked the 
British embassy in Berlin after the outbreak of world war I, the German 
79 
80 
U.N. Doc A/CONF. 20/C.l/114 (1961) 
Kerley Ernest,"Some Aspect of The Vienna Convention On 
Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities'' (1962) 56 
A. J. I . L, P. 1 04 
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government expressed regret and paid damages to the British government .81 
The protection of diplomatic missions is indeed "a special duty" and 
therefore some countries have special police departments which are responsible 
for their protection. The police are trained to take care of the diplomats and 
the missions. The Metropolitan pol ice force of about 3,800 members in Washington, 
is given instructions and training in the special subject of the status of 
diplomats. In 1970, a uniformed division of the secret service was created to 
protect the increasing number of diplomats. They wear a distinctive police 
uniform with special insignia. 82 Another force, the "Diplomatic Protection 
Group" is assigned to protect foreign embassies in London. 8J In emergency 
cases, when an embassy requires extra protection or a twenty four hour security 
guard, it is such a force which is provided . 
Egypt and India, among others, have special police forces in charge of 
protecting diplomats. Such forces undergo special instructions and training in 
e;t./ 
regard to diplomats.B4 Other countries too, although they do not have special G 
1\ 
division in the pol ice to protect diplomats, provide I special protection 
whenever required by foreign missions. 
3. 7 DEMONSTRATORS INFRONT OF THE MISSION PREMISES 
It is observed that another situation which usually worries a receiving 
State involves demonstrations. Some demonstrations are peaceful while others 
81 Gerhad Von Glahn, Op.cit, P . 522 . 
82 McClanahan Grant V, Op. cit, P.119 
83 Wilkinson Paul, Op. cit, P . 142 
84 Commentary on Article 22 (1958) 52 A.J.I.L, P. 192 
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are violent. The police force has to take precaution to keep the spirit of 
Article 22 (2) i.e. " ... to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the 
mission or impairment of its dignity." 
The United States had a law enacted in 1937 that prohibits hostile placards 
and demonstrations closer than 500 feet from the embassy. But in March 1988, The 
U.S Supreme cour t ruled that protesters could demonstrate immediately outside 
foreign missions provided the demonstration did not interfere with the mission's 
normal activities or become a threat to its security. This decision therefore 
abrogates the 500 feet rule. 85 • 
In most countries demonstrations in front of the embassies require special 
permits. It is anticipated that with such a procedure, the police is given ample 
time to prepare for any eventuality. It is not known exactly whose judgements 
have to be satisfied to establish that the demonstration outside the embassy 
does, or does not, disturb the peace of the mission. It is not clear whether ,[ 's 
l'*H..J"l S' o o the mission h ,...to,......infor~ a recew1ng ~tat_e that the demonstration outside 
1t I t ~~f, f 
disturbs the functions of the mission or ~ receiving Statep;;r judge that {JY 
~ 
such a demonstration exceedecf the 1 imi t and therefore ,.i-t' disturbs the peace 
i98'$d t. t h~ b i1 <{i ng f r \.. ~ 
Suppose the diplomatic mission were to inform the receiving State that the 
crowd outside the mission building actually disturbs the peace, would the police 
di sperse the crowd? It all depends on the circumstances of the demonstration. 
The embassy is usually informed if there would be any demonstration. This is so 
85 McClanahan Grant V, Op. cit P.120 
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because in many countries staging a demonstration requires a police permit. 
HoweveJ in the United States it is an offence to display a flag or placard 
intended to intimidate or ridicule foreign diplomatic mission.a6 
It is suggested that the immunity and inviolability of diplomats should not 
be used to curtail the fundamental rights of the citizens of a receiving States 
from staging demonstrations, presenting memorandum of protests to the missions 
I ~ 
?n~\freedom of speech against a sending State. The citizens of a receiving State 
should be allowed to express their opinion in a manner that would not affect the 
normal functions of the mission. Political demonstration per se does not amount 
to the impairment of the dignity oft ,t .h~ premises of the mission. 8i Special 
~ fhu ~~ . . t>1MM){..i'V> . 
demonstrations in the orm or g1 1ng memora dum to the embass1es should be 
. --
allowed to give a clear notice of the sentiments of the people of a receiving 
State. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that Article 22(2) should override the 
local law and rights of freedom of speech and assembly because the embassies are 
treated as special buildings of the sovereign sending governments and established 
under international law based on mutual understanding. The mission is inviolable 
and a receiving State is under obligation to prevent such disturbances. 
86 
8i 
Jewish Defence League cited by Sutton Stephen, 
Op. cit , P. ·1 9 5 
Regina V. Rogue, Bow Street Magistrate Court, June 
1984, Foreign Affairs Committee Report, Paragraph 50. 
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EXPROPRIATION OF THE MISSION PROPERTY. 
The third obligation envisages that the receiving State shall 
expropriate the property of the mission even if the expropriation is in the 
public interest. If such a situation (of public interest) arises it shouid be 
dealt in the spirit of mutual understanding. There is no absolute right of 
either a receiving State to order the expropriation or a sending State to refuse 
to give up the mission. The establishment of the diplomatic relations is by 
mutual understanding and respect and it is that spirit which is implied in every 
situation. There is no use of force in any situation by either side.sa 
In 1966, when the fleet line underground railway was about to be 
constructed in London, the foreign office sought the consent of the diplomatic 
missions in London. There was a general compulsory procedure, but this was not 
applied in relation to diplomatic missions out of concern to protect the peace 
and dignity of the diplomats and their missions. 89 
Article 22 also accords the means of transport of the mission some form of 
inviolability which is not absolute . The immunity is only from search, 
requisition and attachment. It appears the immunity does not exclude towing 
away the means of transport and parking fees. AP news reported that foreign 
embassies in the District of Columbia were still ignoring requests to pay $17.5 
Million overdue bills to parking ticket firms. 90 Russia owes the City of 
88 Commentarv on Article 22 (1958} 52 A.J.I.L, P.187, 
See also (1962) 56 A.J.I.L, P.102 
89 Eileen Denza. Op. cit, P. 85 
90 New Sunday Times 29/11/92 printed in Malaysia 
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Washington $ 3.8m while Nigeria owe them$ 77,830. 91 However it is suggested 
that this article was not meant to be read in isolation. Although the wording 
of the article mentions, search, requisition, attachment and execution, it is 
contended that this article has to be read together with other Articles like 
Article 23, which exempts the mission premises from taxation. 
3. 8 LEGAL 1DUTI ES ) ---
~
The diplomatic agent is under~egal dut not to abuse the inviolability 
accorded to him under Articles 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention. 
Article 22 and 29 are read together with Article 41(3). The international 
customary law is emphatic that a diplomatic agent is under a legal duty under 
international law to carry out his functions in a manner that is compatible with 
the objectives of his mission. Article 41(3) of this Convention states that, 
91 
92 
The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner 
incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the 
present Convention or by any rules of general international law or 
by any special agreement in force between the sending and the 
receiving State.~ 
AFRIC A, EVENTS, Vol.9, No . 12 Dec . 1993 P . 35 
This article provides that a diplomat is duty 
bound under international law not to engage in 
activities which are incompatible with the functions of 
his office. For example, he is not supposed to gather 
classifi ed information of a receiving State, take 
photographs of the prohibited areas, engage in 
espionage, interfere in the internal affairs of a 
receiving State or commit any crime. The article is 
categorical that all his activities must conform to the 
functions of his mission. Unfortunately this legal 
liability cannot be tested in any court of law simply 
because Article 29 of this Convention confers absolute 
immunity on a diplomatic agent. It provides that, 11 The 
73 
The foregoing discussion also brings us to observe that the 1961 Vienna 
Convention On Diplomatic Relations offers very important provisions on the 
protection of diplomats, which are enshrined in articles 22, and 29, 
The objective of these provisions is to oblige the receiving State to 
protect diplomatic agents, not only from the wrath of the private citizens or 
organisations but also its very agents or organs, which may violate the 
t"'"\ 
diplomatic immunity. The inviolability of a diplomatic agent is not a sole right ; 
of protection of a receiving State, which can do away with or withdraw whenever 
.> 
it pleases, but it is a right t the diplomatic agent, which is found in the ~ 
international law of customary practices and usages . The obligation of State 
Parties is to abide by the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention On Diplomatic 
Relations, which in fact, codifies the practices and usages of international law. 
person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He 
shall not be liable to any form of arrest or 
detention. 11 
It is also noteworthy that Article 41(3) does not 
mention the likelihood of misusing documents (Article 
24) and Communication (Article 27) as being 
incompatible with the functions of the mission. Should 
we assume that these articles cannot be used in 
violation of Article 41(3) or should we imply that this 
sub - section is meant to be read together with Articles 
24 and 27? 
It is argued that the mission is the seat of the 
diplomatic functions which include all the activities 
of the diplomat. The diplomat is entrusted to use all 
facilities accorded to him under this Convention in a 
manner which is compatible with the objectives of 
diplomatic relations . The duty requires that he shall 
use all these facilities in the spirit in which thev 
were accorded to him. -
The mission of a diplomatic agent is meant for 
public good and~to promote friendly relations. He is 
there.fore un~er l\lega~ ~.uty to behave in a manner that 
befits the m1sS10n. He 1s not expected to behave in a 
manner that would bring disrepute to himself or/and a 
sending State. The diplomatic utility has always been 
seen in a sense of promoting friendly relations. 
74 
The detention of Mr. Mohammed Yusuf in 1985, a Nigerian diplomat who was 
implicated in the kidnap of Mr . Omaru Dikko in London, is still attracting 
academic criticism whether under international law, Britain could detain an agent 
who possessed a diplomatic passport though he was not accredited to the British 
government. If such a detention is allowed, it might create a very dangerous 
precedent that may affect the welfare of other diplomats passing through third 
States to or from the accredited missions. The Magistrate had ruled ; n this 
case, that " . the diplomatic passport, although was recognised by the 
British High Commission in Lagos and the Immigration Officer in London, did not 
confer diplomatic$ tatus on Mr. Mohammad! "93 
Earlier on, diplomatic immunity had also been rejected in another case. 
In Regina V. Governor of Pentonville Prison Ex Parte Teja .94 The court held 
that unilateral action in appointing a diplomatic agent did not confer diplomatic 
immunity on the representative and held that " ... until this country had 
accepted and received the intended representative as a persona grata, the 
diplomatic agent was not immune from proceedings in the English Courts." 
Teja, had been arrested on leaving Heathrow Airport, London, for Geneva, 
following a warrant of arrest issued by the Indian government, for a number of 
offences. He held a Costa Rican diplomatic passport . In the event the ambassador 
of Cost a Rica wrote ·to the Secretary of State for Foreign and commonwea 1 th 
Affairs requesting that the diplomat be freed. The President of Costa Rica too 
sent a telegram to his ambassador to affirm that Teja was a Costa Rican diplomat. 
93 
94 
Ade oye Aninsanya: "The Dikko Affair And Anglo-Nigerian 
Relations" (1985) 34, I.C . L.Q, P.606. 
(1971) 2 Q. B 274 (C.A) 
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In Australia the court ruled that Meier, a Canadian and former citizen of 
the United States who had a Canadian as well as a Tongan diplomatic passport was 
entitled to diplomatic immunity. Mr Meier had been given a diplomaticv. isa at the 
Australian High Commission in Fiji. 95 However when the Netherlands government 
detained an Algerian diplomat for carrying explosives, it confiscated the 
explosives but released the diplomat because of the diplomatic immunity.96 
In 1900, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a document in 
connection with the case of Due de Veragna whose personal effects were seized in 
execution of a judgment during his temporary stay in Paris, to the effect that, 
"a diplomatic agent passing through France, even if he only has a temporary 
mission to do in the State to which he is proceeding should be regarded as an 
accredited diplomatic agent and accordingly exempt from local jurisdiction . .. gi 
As the establishment of diplomatic relationship is mutual, the waiver or 
withdrawal of the diplomatic immunity cannot be done away with unilaterally. The 
-
concept of reciprocity in the regime of diplomacy plays much larger role than is1 ~ 
accorded under international law. 98 International law accords protection to 
all diplomats whether in a receiving State or another State through which the ~ 
passage takes place. The Preamble of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
affirms that the rules of the customary international law shall continue to apply 
95 Sydney Morning Herald, July,29 1978 
96 U.N Doc S/ 10816 as cited by E . Denza , Diplomatic Law. 
Commenta r v On The Vienna Convention On Diploma t ic 
Relations.(Oceana Publication Inc. 1976) P. 259 
97 (1901) J.D.I.P .342 cited by B. Sen, A Diplomatic 
~andbook Of International Law and Practice,(Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) P. 206 
98 Grzybowski Kezimierz, 'The 
Teheran Hostages' I.C.L.Q, 
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to questions not regulated by the provisions of the present convention. 
3.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the two main important articles regarding the 
inviolability of diplomatic immunities and privileges; Article 29 which provides 
for the privileges and immunities of diplomats and 22 which provides for the 
inviolability of diplomatic missions. 
In Article 29 two important obligations were discussed. These are the duty 
of the receiving State to treat diplomatic agents with honour and respect and to 
abstain from arresting or detaining them. The receiving State shall guarantee non 
exercise of all measures that may constrain the functions of the diplomatic 
agent. The receiving State, the law enforcement authorities and the courts shall 
act in a manner that protects the inviolability of the agent as enshrined in this 
article. 
The second duty is that the receiving State shall take all appropriate 
steps to protect the diplomat from any attack on his person, dignity and honour 
from private individuals and political groups. The duty to protect the diplomat 
extends to situations of kidnapping or hostage taking. The receiving State shall 
take all appropriate steps to gain his release. It appears that what matters most 
is the safety of the diplomatic agent. 
This chapter has also discussed Article 22 regarding the inviolability of 
diplomatic missions. The article envisages three main important duties: 
First, the receiving State shall treat the mission as inviolable. It shall 
restrain its agents from entering the mission premises with out permission. 
Secondly, the receiving State is under a special duty to protect the premises of 
the mission from invasion and prevent any disturbances or distraction of the 
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mission. Thirdly, the furnishings, property and means of transport fall outside 
the local jurisdiction in the form of search, requisition, attachment or 
execution. 
The above discussion has touched on a number of measures taken by the 
international community to honour and protect the diplomatic agent. Basically 
this was to enable him carry out the duties of his office without the slightest 
hindrance or interference from a receiving State. It was also meant to give 
further protection against individuals who might harm him. The list of diplomats 
who are victims of the attacks by both government organs and private individuals 
is non exhaustive of all the incidents . 
Although the i 961 Vienna Convention is a very comprehensive document on the 
protection of diplomats it is contended that there are some ambiguities and 
lacunae which required further international conventions 
Finally, we anal?~the legal duty of the diplomatic agent not to abuse 
the inviolability accorded him under the international law. The diplomat is 
legally bound to act in a manner which is compatible with the functions of his 
mission. The only snag is that the legal liability cannot be tested in any court 
of Yaw. 
CHAPTER 1V 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
AG/r1N r 
TERRORISM AND DIPLOMATS 
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The following discussion looks at terrorism and some of its causes. It 
deals with the problem of definition of the term "terrorism" and comes out with 
a tentative definition for the purpose of this study. The violation of diplomatic ~ 
immunity is divided into two categories. One such violation is done by the ( 
government agents and the other by private individual and political 
organisations. The dissertation looks at acts (terrorism) perpetrated by the 
1 ater. l0lte-r 
The word "terrorism" originated during the era of the French revolution and 
the Jacobin reign of terror. 1 It was identified as State action, when it was 
used as an instrument of political repression. Later when the government grew 
stronger terror was institutionalised and legalised.2 
The English term terrorism did not come into general use 
until the equivalent French word 'terrorisme' had 
developed in the French Revolutionary period 1793 - 98. 
Wilkinson Paul,(Ed) Terrorism: British Perspectives, 
(G.K. Hall & Co. An Imprint of Macmillan Publishing Co. 
N.Y. 1994) P.X1V 
Terrorism was first used as a word during the French 
Revolution as a synonym for a reign of terror. It was 
later used to refer to systematic use of 
terror.Vide:Thackrah John Richard, Encyclopedia of 
Terrorism and Political Violence, (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul: London & New York, 1987) P.99, See also Frank M. 
Thomas et al, "Preliminary Thoughts Towards An 
International Convention On Terror ism", ( 19 7 4) 68 
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4.2 CAUSES OF TERRORISM 
The recourse to terrorism is taken for various reasons and among these the 
following are considered for th's study,: ~I • -t.u,-1 v •~ 1 
(a) Extreme nationalism or autonomist and separatists a§itation. e.g The 
I 
Basque Separatists ETA, and The Tigers of Tamil Eelam,LTTE of Sri Lanka. 
(b) Ideologica ; This type of function(~ fights for a complete change in the Cr 
whole political, social and economic structure. For example The Red 
Brigades of Italy. 
(c) Exiled groups, forced by police or government action to operate 
-
exclusively abroad e.g: The Armenian Secret Army For the Liberation of 
Armenia. 
(d) Issue Group terrorists. These are employed by some people who seek to 
change specific policies. For example the Animal Liberation Front, the 
Anti Abortion bombers etc. 
~l'r1 (e) Religious extremists. These seek to impose their own beliefs or religious 
order on the masses. 3 
(f) State- sponsored terrorism is used as a tool of foreign policy by regimes 
which seek to suppress dissidents at home4 or intimidate and destroy 
exiled opponents and dissidents, weaken adversary States or export 
revolution.5 The governments of China, Cambodia, North Korea,Uganda under 
Wilkinson Paul (Ed.) Terrorism: British Perspectives, 
(G.K. Hall & Co. An Imprint of Macmillan Publishing Co. 
N.Y. 1994) P . 1 
In 1595 1 Sultan Mohammad of the Ottoman Empire killed his 
nineteen brothers to eliminate dynastic competitors. Bell 
Bowyer J 1 Transnational Terror (Hoover Policy Studies 1 
1975) herein after referred to as Bell Bowyer J 1 
Terror, P.4 
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Idi Amin and Libya under Gaddafi have all been accused of this type of 
terrorism.6 The United States and the USSR have been accused of engaging 
in and exporting terrorism. 7 Schlagheck writes that: 
8 
The Superpower-terrorism "connection" assumes many forms. It 
may take the form of support for groups using terrorism 
against friends or allies of the rival superpower, or against 
that superpower directly. "Support" includes providing funds, 
weapons, training, political endorsement or other logistical 
assistance (passport, intelligence, use of diplomatic 
facilities, etc.) to groups that use terrorism . The support 
may be channelled through a proxy or delivered directly by the 
superpowers'own military and intelligence services. Cuba 
frequently is identified by the United States as a Soviet 
proxy in Latin America and Africa, while expatriate Cubans in 
the nationalist - terrorist group known as Omega 7 are 
considered American proxies due to attacks on Chilean and 
Cuban officials. U.S.aid to Afghani Mujahedeen resisting 
Soviet occupation and Soviet support of Palestinian effort 
against what they consider Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
lands are further examples of the indirect Soviet-American 
conflict that often involves terrorism, proxies, and allies. 
Neither Superpower officially admits to sponsoring terrorism 
or publicly endorses terrorism, and the evidence to 
substantiate their inrolvement is scarce, indirect, or 
frequently unavailable. 
Grant WardLaw, Political Terrorism (Cambridge University 
Press 1989), P.175. 
Syed Jaffar AlSagaff,Motives Behind U.S Britain 
Accusation Against Libya. (University Publication 1992) 
p. 25 see also J. Bowyer Bell, A time terror (Basic 
books Inc, 1978) P.174 and Fan Yew Teng, The Continuing 
TerrorismAgainst Libya,(Egret Publication, Kuala Lumpur 
1993) PP.47-75. 
Kegley Charles W Jr, (Ed) International Terrorism, 
~C~h~aur;Ja!5c~t~e~r!:._l,_i~s~t.;!:i~c~s:-;,-~c~a~u~s~e~s~,'----~C~o~n'-.!::t~r~o!...:l~s ( Macmll an Education 
Ltd. 1990) P.171 
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4.3 DEFINITION 
A precise legal definition of the term terrorism is not yet formulated and 
the inability to agree on the nature of the problem continue to frustrate the 
world community. It has now become a matter of course for writers on terrorism 
to begin by pointing out how hard it is to define terrorism.9 
~· Hoffman dedicated the entire doctoral dissertation to the definition of the & 
, 
term 'terrorism.' He defined it as follows: 
Terrorism is a purposeful human political activity which is directed 
towards the creation of a general climate of fear, and is protagonist, 
other human beings and, through the same course of events. 10 
H. Vetter & G. Perlstein, 11 Perspectives On Terrorism 11 
quoted by Antje C. Petersen, 11 Extradition And The 
Political Offence Exception In The Suppression Of 
Terrorism 11 , (1992) 67 I.L.J, P.769 
Professor Richard Baxter at Harvard University and 
former judge of the International Court of Justice did 
not find it necessary to define the term terrorism. He 
remarked; 11 We have cause to regret that a legal concept 
of terrorism was inflicted upon us. The term is 
imprecise ; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no 
operative legal purpose. Vide: Murphy John F, 11 The Future 
Of Multilateralism And Effort To Combat International 
Terrorism 11 , herein after referred to as Murphy John, 11 The 
Future", (1986) 25 C.J . I.L, P.37. 
In September 1976, the New York Times reported Mr. 
Abu Zoid Durda, the Libyan Acting Foreign Minister to 
have defined ' terror ism' as follows; " to station American 
forces overseas is 'Terrorism'"; "to monopolize the 
wealth of countries is 'terror ism '" ; "to dominate the 
outlets of seas and oceans is 'terrorism ' " ; to use wheat 
and gold as political toys when the world is starving is 
'terrorism' Vide: J.Bowyer, Op. cit, P.96 . A Boston 
Irishman is reported to have defined the terrorist as 
"anyone the British don't like. 11 Paul Wilkinson , Political 
Terrorism, (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1974), P.51 
10 11 Vide: Schimid Alex P , Jongan Albert J. et al, Political 
Terrorism: A new Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts , data 
bases, Theories and Literature (North-Holland Publishing 
Company, Amsterdam, Oxford, New York, 1988) P.4 
83 
but could not implement it. 13 This is due to differing views on definition of 
the word 'terrorism' as well as 'offences which could be characterised as falling 
under it.' Many States as well as political organisations have given different 
definitions of the word Yterrorism.,j4 For example, Israe1 15 and its allies 
have viewed all action against it, whether on the Arab land it occupies or not, 
as acts of terrorism. In other words, it does not recognise any actions by any 
movements in Palestine for self-determination, while other States do consider 
some of these movements as genuine liberation organisations. The governments in 
both the East and the West 16 often use the word terrorism to describe their 
opponents even when no violence has been used. 17 The courts too cannot be relied 
upon when it comes to the definition of the term 'terrorism'.18 
13 
14 
15 
In a memorandum to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, (the Secretary General had invited member states 
on 24th April, 1978 to send proposals to him) the member 
states suggested to him that it would be hypocritical to 
limit oneself to the condemnation of terrorism without 
giving due consideration to its underlying causes. They 
believed that treatment should not be restricted to 
symptoms. Robert A. Friedlander, Terrorism. Documents of 
International and Local Control.(1990 Oceana 
Publications, Inc. Vol:111), P . 124 
Stohl Michael, The Politics Of Terrorism,(Marcel Dekker, 
Inc. 1979) PP. 24- 27. 
Israel is of the v iew that the most vicious and 
persistent terror crimes are those originating from the 
Middle East. (19 2 ) Y. B. U.N. PP.642 - 3 
16 For full deliberation on the question relatinq to 
International Terrorism, see {1972) Y.B.U . N, PP.639-650 
17 Thackrah John Richard, Op. cit , P.55 
18 The courts in the United States have been more 
sympathetic to offenders from the Northern Ireland than 
to those from the Arab world (Middle East). Yarnold 
Barbara M, International Fugitive. A new role for the 
International Court of Justice, (Praeger: New York, West 
6-. 
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Although this research is about terrorism against diplomats and the 1973 
Convention forms one of its central axes of discussion, the term terrorism does 
not appear in the 1973 Convention. It was left out due to controversies on 'who 
is a terrorist' and 'what amounts to terrorism' . 19 Considering the divergent 
opinions on what amounts to terrorism and who a terrorist is, it is no wonder 
that there is no universally acceptable definition of the word. Because of these 
controversies surrounding the term, it is almost impossible to find a definition 
which would be comprehensive enough to take care of these opinions.20 The 
International Law Commission defined 'international terrorism' in Article 16 of 
the draft code of Crimes Against Peace and Secur i ty as follows: 
19 
The undertaking, organising, assisting, financing, encouraging or 
tolerating by the agents or representatives of a State of acts 
against another State directed at persons or property and of such a 
Port, Connecticut, London, 1991) P.30- 46. We have also 
observed that there are different views on who is to be 
considered a terrorist . The examples of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation Chief, Yasir Arafat and the UNITA 
Chief Jonas Savimbi have been cited here to show that, CY 
these two chiefs have double status. In some countries 
• I 
they are considered terror1sts while others consider them 
national heroes and accord them ' VIP' or 'Head of State 
treatment. 
(1972) 11 Y.B.I.L.C, P .7 
20 The United Nations has not been much more effective. 
Although it established an ad hoc committee on 
international terrorism in 1972 , the committee finally 
issued a report and recommendation in 1979 . It did not 
produce a convention defining , le~ alone prohibiting , Cr 
terrorism. Moreover every resolut1on of the General/ 
Assembly condemning terrorism has included a paragraph 
reaffirming the right to self determination as if the 
later justifies ~he former. Ha~berstan Malvina, 
"Terrorism Of The H1gh Seas : The Ach1lle Lauro, Piracy 
And The IMO Convention On Maritime Safety" ( 1988) 82 
A.J.I.L. P . 310 
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nature as to create a state of terror in the minds of pub 1 i c 
figures, groups of persons or the general public. 
(2) The participation by individuals other than gents representatives of 
-
a State in the commission of any of the ac· referred to in paragraph ~~ 
1.21 ~ 
F%'m our working definition of terrorism, 22 the first element Q.f ..this Gr 
defini'f-iorris that the crime should be intentional. Secondly the offender should 
be aware of the status of the diplomat. Thirdly, it must be done in order to 
intimidate any person or State and fourthly, it must be done in furtherance of 
political or social ambitions. 23 This definition therefore excludes a car 
accident and the like from acts of terrorism . 
4.4 VIOLATION OF DIPLG1ATIC It+1UNITY AND PRIVILEGES 
Violation of diplomatic immunity and privileges can be divided into 
aspects· ; 
Violation of diplomatic inviolability by government agents. 
The violation of diplomatic inviolability by State agents has been in 
existence since the institution of diplomacy was created. The head of the 
21 MacCaffrey Stephen C, "Current Developments, The Forty 
Second Session of I.L.C" (1990) 84 A.J.I.L, P.933 
22 Refer to 'Introduction' Supra: P . 5 
23 Ambassador Fields' is reported to have told the judicial 
committee that "If you define terrorism, you ought to win 
the nobel prize, because we have been grappling with this 
definition for the last dozen years; to my certain 
knowledge I would think it would be extremely difficult 
to find a definition that even the United States and 
Britain could agree to" Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
the constitution of the S~nate Comm . on the judiciary, 
99th Cong., First Sess. 1b4 (1985) . 
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community or society would welcome and treat with honour and respect any diplomat 
whose office was considered peaceful. However in other circumstances, he would 
order the torture or assassination of an envoy whom he considered to be an 
enemi4 or a source of evi 1. 25 
24 
25 
Mat t ingly G, Op.cit, P.47 & 49, See also 'Ambassador of 
ill will' Ibid, 178- 205 
The Prophet Muhammad ' s envoys were generally warmly 
received with honour and dignity as he personally 
reciprocated to those he received. However it is reported ~ 
that two of his envoys were abused. The Prophet's envoy 
to king Kisra' of Iran was abused and the message he had 
carried to the king, was ripped apart in his presence. 
Musaylamah too, is reported to have tortured ambassador 
Habib to death . Vide: Siddiqui M. Y. M, Organisation Of 
Government Under The Prophet, ( Idarah) Adabiyat-i, Delhi, 
1987)P . 230-5 
In about 1526, Don Inigo de Mendoza, Charles V's 
ambassador to England was sent through France. He was 
refused safe conduct and therefore he ventured to proceed 
without it. Consequently, he was taken prisoner for four 
months. Vide Mattingly G, Renaissance Diplomacy, 
Penguine Books, 1955)P . 87 
In 1708 M. de Mathveof ( Matveev), the Russian 
ambassador to London who was about to present a letter of 
recall was arrested with some degree of violence at the 
instigation of certain merchants to enforce payment of 
debts but was released shortly afterwards on bail offered 
by friends. On hearing of the incident, the Queen 
commanded the Secretary of State to express regret to the 
ambassador who was not satisfied and hurriedly left the 
country without presenting the letters of recall. In 
order to make amends, the British envoy at St. 
Petersburg, was accredited as special envoy to Peter the 
Great at a public audience to express the Queen's regret 
of the assault on the person of the ambassador. Vide: 
Sa tow, Guide To Diplomatic Practices, (Longman 1978) P .121 
count Ghillemberg, the Swedish Minister to the Court 
of st. James 1716 was implicated in a vast diplomatic 
intrigue directed against King George 1 and engineering 
an insurrection in Scotland with the assistance of a 
swedish military force. A letter which contained his 
report was intercepted by the Danes who informed London. 
The diplomat was detained and his archives were seizad. 
The Spanish ambassador lodged a formal protest. As a 
retaliatory measure the Swedish governntent ordered the 
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It was these acts of abuse on dip~omats that necessitated the establishment 
arrest of Mr. Jackson, the British Minister resident in 
stockholm. The crisis was solved after the exchange of 
Ghillemberg and Jackson.Vide: Kazimierz Grzbowski, "The 
Regime Of Diplomacy And The Tehran Hostages" 1981 30 
I.C.L.Q, P.43 
In 1735, when the Polish King died, Russia 
intervened militarily to stop one of the candidates who 
was not favourable to them from becoming King. In the 
event, the Russians arrested the French ambassador for 
giving support to the candidate they did not favour. The 
ambassador was accused of interfering in the internal 
affairs of Poland and violating its legal and political 
order.Ibid 
The professional standards which had become accepted 
within the Asante diplomatic corps were interestingly 
exemplified in the mild protest registered by the members 
of the Asante Embassy to London against their 
mistreatment, prior to their embarkation in 1895 by the 
Governor of the Gold Coast. The protest stated: 
We cannot bring this to a close without 
mentioning the fact that since our arrival 
here (Cape Coast) we have been closely 
studying his Excellency's policy towards us, 
and have observed how contemptuously he has 
been treating individual members of the 
Embassy, and have satisfied ourselves as to 
the direction in which it tends, and shall lay 
the same before our royal master; who has 
invariably treated Her Majesty's officers to 
his court with unvarying respect and esteem. 
we would rather leave it with the civilised world 
to say whether any person or persons who are the 
bearers of a message from one party to another, 
professedly friendly, should be treated other than 
courteously, gentlemanly, and at least for the time 
being, as un-amenable to the laws of the land of 
which they are sent. 
our royal master, we may at once assure you, for 
the information of his Excellency, is so immoveable 
des i rous of maintaining peace and mutual regard 
between Ashanti and the Government, that no petty 
annoyances would be allowed to defeat his aim and 
good will. 
correspondence relating to affairs in Ashanti Accounts 
and Papers, V11 as cited by Ivor Wilks in his Asante In 
The Nineteenth Century . The Structure and Evolution of a 
Political Order (Cambridge University Press,1975) P.325 
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of the privileges and immunities. 26 When an abuse, injury or murder was 
inflicted on the person of the diplomats, the sending State would in revenge 
attack the receiving State. 27 It was important, therefore, that foreign envoys 
should be given due respect and that nothing should be done to violate their 
honour and dignity. 28 
~~ 
It is also submitted that the privileges and immunities were the result of I~, 
.)~CA.. 
the honour and respect given to the sovereign foreign ruler under the theory of .10 
personal representation. Since the envoy is the personification of the foreign 
sender, the honour that deserves being accorded to him was that which deserved ~ 
being given to the sovereign sender. It was in that respect that an abuse of a 
diplomat amounted to an abuse of a sovereign ruler by whom he was sent. However 
the theory of personal representation began to fade away as a result of the 
downfall of empires and kingdoms. 29 
Since diplomats were special representatives of their majesties, the 
emperors and kings, a method by which protect ion of the i nte~t of their 
sovereign rulers could be assured wa~ nec~ssa~y to~nable the envoy~arry out the 
duties and official function of the1r ma]est1es w1thout the least 1nterference 
26 For example the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1708 U. K (Often 
known as the Act of Anne) is the result of violation of 
diplomatic inviolability . 
27 Nicolson Harold, Diplomacy,(Oxford University Press, 
London, 1963) PP.17- 19 
28 The privileges and immunities are now codified into an 
international instrument, the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations,. The 1.97 3 Conv~ntion. was formulated 
to prevent and pun1sh Cr 1mes aga1nst 1nternationall y 
protected persons including diplomatic agents. 
29 Satow, Op.cit, P.106 
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from the receiving State. 30 The receiving State was by this idea required to 
give special exception to the general rule; 'That everyone is bound by the law'. 
4.4.2 Terrorism rivate individuals or litical or anisations. 
The second type of violations against diplomatic inviolability is that 
which is carried out by private individuals or political organisations. According 
to our working definition of the term terrorism these violations amounts to G; 
...,..., -
terrorism.31 Political terrorism is the resurgence of political murder and 
kidnap and seen as a strategy of political organisations who feel that their 
causes have been suppressed by their respective governments. They contend that 
the only way out is a resort to political violence in all forms. In doing so 
they seek to bring their grievances into the international arena. They also 
believe that by resorting to violence, the world will come to their sympathy and c; 
assistance. Therefore political bombings, kidnapping and assassinations are real 
and frequent occurrences for the struggle of political organisations.32 
30 
31 
32 
Murty B.S, The International Law Of Diplomacy; The 
Diplomatic Instrument And World Public Order, (New Haven 
Press, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, 
London, 1989) PP.337 - 8 
It is learnt that individual terrorism (not on diplomats) 
is traced back to the Ancient Greek and Roman Republics~ 
hence the assassination of Julius Caesar while group 
terrorism first manifested at the end of the middle 
ages.Friedlander Robert, Op.cit, P.7 
on August 28, 1968, The United States ambassador to 
Guatemala, John G. Mein, was short dead during a kidnap 
attempt. In 1969, Mr. Charles Burke Elbrick, the United 
states ambassador to Brazil, was kidnapped by men who 
ambushed his limousine in a street not far from the 
embassy in Rio de Jenairo. The revolutionary movement 
(MR 8) demanded the release of 15 prisoners and their 
safe conduct to Algeria, Mexico or Chile, within 48 hours 
or else Mr. Elbrick, would be executed. On September 5, 
the Brazilian government, agreed to the demands and to 
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Terrorism is an act of political desperation rooted in the belief that 
violence is legitimised when it becomes a form of public protest designed to 
compel the government agents to act in a particular way. Political deprivation 
or frustration is the key impetus of violence. The common denominator therefore 
for the terrorist activities has been the political protest.33 
Serious political terrorism ,against diplomats by private individuals and 
political or·ganisation is a late development in the second part of the 19th 
~ury and took deep roots in the twentieth century. There are very scant ~ 
I records to show that the act of hostage-taking of diplomats by private 
individuals or organisations has existed for a long time. Even though there were 
political organisations that resorted to political violence this did not take 
Place against diplomats until lately. 34 
4.5 REASONS FOR TERRORISM AGAINST DIPLOMATS 
":l 
Research on contemporary terrorism or revolutionary terrorism show that ~ 
/J y political organisations !!b£. have reasons to believe that they have been 
oppressed have now found diplomats a favourable instrument for their cause. The 
terrorist movement select diplomats because they represent the epitome of the 
enemy. 35 
broadcast the MR-8 Manifesto and the following day flew (> 
the 15 prisoners out to Mexic Two days later the 
ambassador was released. The FALN idnapped the Deputy 
Chief of the United States mill mission and released 
him about eight days later with some shoe polish in his 
hair 
33 Friedlander Robert, Op.cit, P.7 
34 Stohl Michael, Op.cit, P.147 
35 Bell Bowyer J, Terror, Op. cit, P.18 
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First, i't enables them to seek bargain with and or concessions from either Cr· 
the receiving State, the sending State or any other third party on commission or ~ 
\ 
omission of an act on demand. By kidnapping diplomats or taking them as hostage ' 
the political organisations tend to coerce the parties concerned to give in to 
their demands. These political organisations have to a certain extent succeeded 
k ', '6 in achieving these goals.J 
For example on February 17, 1980, there was a large reception at the 
Dominican embassy in Bogota. Many foreign diplomats had been invited. Across 
the road there was a University playground where 25 members of theM 19 movement 
Gr 
arranged to play football as a cover prior to their taking over the embassy. 
When one of them who was on the watchout signalled that the guests had arrived, 
the referee blew the whistle and all the members of the group took up arms and 
ran across the road into the embassy compound killing the embassy guard. They 
swift ly moved into the building, seized it, and took 75 people hostage including 
14 ambassadors. They eventually released all non-diplomatic staff and one 
ambassador keeping the rest for a period of two months . They demanded the 
"J .L :::p . 
release of 300 prisoners and a ransom of $50~ Ilion . The Colombian government !:.. 
refused to negotiate on either demand but the businessmen from countries whose 
1'\ f 
ambassadors had been held volunteered to pay a ransom of $2.5 illion upon which SL) 
I 
the Colombian government agreed that the terrorists and their hostages would be 
flown to Havana where on arrival the diplomats were released. 37 
36 Paul Wilkinson, Terror ism And The Liberal State, (The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1977). P.212 
37 Clutterbuck Richard , Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion. 
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1987) P.191 
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On March 1, 1973 there was a diplomatic reception in honour of the American 
ambassador {'n Sudan at the Saudi Arabi an embassy ~ Khartoum. The Charge' & 
d'affaires, Curt Moore, was about to be replaced by the new ambassador Mr. Cleo 
)tv v-
Noel. During the occasion the Black September broke into the embassy waving guns Gr 
- , c; 
and other ammunition orne of the guests escaped over the fence wall, while 
others were allowed to leave through the main entrance. But Mr. Curt Moore, Mr. 
Cleo Noel, the Belgium Charge' d'affaires, Guy Eid, the Saudi ambassador and the 
~ 
Jordanian Charge'd'affaires were taken hostages. ~r 
I 
\'1,.-
The Black September demanded that the Jordan government re 1 eased seventeen &r 
/1. 
members of their group including Abu Daoud and that, the Americans free Sirhan 
Sirhan the convicted killer of Robert Kennedy. In addition, the government of 
Israel was required to release Arab women Fedayeen prisoners and the Germans were 
to release members of the Baadar Meinhof . The negotiations were not fruitful 
because Jordan refused to comply with the demands while the American President , 
Mr.Richard Nixol}/ declared before television cameras that the United States 
cannot and will not bow to blackmail. While security forces and newsmen waited 
to see the developments, a muffled burst of shots were heard inside the building 
some few minutes after 9.00 p.m. It was later learnt that Moore, Noel and Eid had 
been killed. A few hours later the Fedayeen surrendered to the security forces 
in Sudan. They were tried and convicted but the sentence was 1 ater commuted. They 
were handed over into the custody of the Palestine Liberation Organisation .38 
38 Ibid, p. 89 See also Louis M. Bloomfield 1 Gerald 
FitzGerald, Crimes Against. Internationally Protected 
Persons: Prevention And Pun1shment, An Analysis of the 
1973 ConventionL (Praeger Publishers, Inc. 1975) P.20. 
93 
Secondly, these political organisations do, by taking diplomats as 
hostages, seek to pub 1 i ci se their cause. 39 Since tf diplomats are 
international persons, due attention is usually given to any incident that 
affects them. Therefore, these organisations use diplomats as a channel through 
Cfo 
which their grievances could be taken or heard in the international arena. They (;r 
I 
choose diplomats whom they consider valuable or who may be considered influential 
to their cause. This may explain why third world diplomats are generally found 
to be free in their movements with a relaxed security and many of them use the 
underground train in London whereas the diplomats of the first world or for that 
matter the developed world are not as free, and have a more tight security. They 
are in most cases captives of their own career. 
The usual demands put forward by these organisations are; inducing payments 
of ransom. release of political prisoners or detainees and gaining publicity. c;r 
A It will be recalled that in 1904, Raisuli, a Moroccan rebel kidnapped an American 
and an Englishman (these were not diplomats) and demanded that the United States 
and the British governments compel the Sultan of Morocco to comply with his 
ransom, prison re 1 ease as we 11 as other demands. 40 Later on these demands became 
39 When President Suharto paid a State visit to Holland in 
Sept 1970, a group 
0 
of Ambonese m~li~ ants seized the 
Indonesian Embassy 1n the Hague Wl th pparent aim of ri;r 
publicising th~ir cause and 
0 
trying to force the 
Indonesian Pres1dent to negot1ate the future of the 
Ambon. Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism And The Liberal State 
Op.cit, P.182 
40 Livingstone, Kress and Wanek, International Terrorism 
in the contemporary World (Greenwood Press Inc, 1978) 
Po26. 
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part and parcel of the terrorism bargain. 41 
Diplomats have, as a result of these activities, come to be an integral 
par-t of revolutionary terrorism. As a result of these acts by the political 
organisations and private individuals, safeguarding the personal inviolability 
of the(diplomatic agents require 1 increased protection and legislation. 
/ I. I( 
It will be seen that a number of countries enacted laws which were aimed 
4' /, 
at safeguarding the person of a diplomat. z To mention a few : 
King Alphons X issued an order in the welveth century that guaranteed the 
inviolability of diplomats and the immunities from suit in court. 43 The Law of 
Castile, 1348 (Law 1X, Part Vii ,Title XXV of Las Siete Partidas) which was 
probably completed in 1263 by Alphonso X of Castile provides as follows: 
Envoys frequently come from the land of Moors and other countries to the 
court of the King, and although they may come from the enemy's country and 
41 
42 
43 
On January 23, 1973 the United States ambassador to Haiti 
Mr. Clinton E. Knox was seized by two men and a woman 
while driving to his residence in the hills outside Port 
au Prince. He was taken out of his car and driven in 
another car to his residence at gunpoint. He was there 
taken hostage. They demanded the release of thirty one 
prisoners, safe passage out of Haiti and a ransom of us 
$500,000.00. The United States refused to pay the ransom 
but Haiti came up with $70,000 which the kidnappers 
accepted in addition to the release of twelve prisoners. 
In Mexico the government after consul tat ion with the 
United States and the Haiti governments agreed to the 
demands of the kidnappers. It was later that Knox and 
Christenson were released. The kidnappers and their 
collection were flown to Mexico where they were given 
sanctuary but the ransom was confiscated by the Mexican 
government. 
Satow, Op.cit, P.121 
M.Ogden, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity (1936) 
hereinafter referred to as M.Ogden, Juridical, P.46 
95 
by his order,we consider it proper and we direct that every envoy who 
comes to our country, whether he be Christian, Moor or Jew sha11 come and 
go in safety and security through all our dominions, and we farbid anyone 
to do him violence, wrong or harm or injure him in property. 
The English common law and the statute of Queen Anne 1708 asserted almost 
in similar terms that a person is guilty of a misdemeanour who, by force or 
personal restraints, violates any privilege conferred upon the diplomatic 
representative of foreign countries or who sues or persecutes or executes any 
writ or- process whereby the person of any diplomatic representative of a foreign 
country or the person of a servant of any such representative is arrested or 
imprisoned. 
The law of the United States, (the United States code section 252-254 of 
the title 22, Act of April 30, 1790) states that, c Every person who assaults, f= 
strikes, wounds, imprisons or in any other manner engages in violence against the 
person of an ambassador or a public minister in violation of the law of the 
nations shall be imprisoned for more than three years and a fine at the 
I discretion of the courts. 45 
It is emphasized that the origin or sources of diplomatic law are generally 
[derived from or based on customary rules of international law. And as a result 
the States owe their obligation, not to any treaty or Statute but to the rules 
rand usages that have been in practice for generations . 
The United Nations46 and other regional bodies4i have come up with a 
44 Trai te du juge competent des Ambassodeurs (The Hague 
1723) P.168 , cited by Mantell Ogden Op . cit, P . 461 
45 
46 
G.E. Do Nascimento E Silva, Diplomacy in 
International Law(1972), P . 92. 
See: 
Other 
Hague 
The Tokyo Convention on Offences 
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 
Convention For The Suppression 
and Certain 
{1963), The 
Of Unlawful 
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number of ~onventions in order to combat terrorism against diplomats and among 
I 
these instruments is the 1973 Convention on The Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents 
which is the central theme of this study. 
This brief study on terrorism and diplomats finds that there are various I 
~. 
• / t /'"' 
reasons for e au es of terrorism . The study also discusse~ that the most ~r-
common denominator in all terrorist phenomena isy political protest. 
Although all political protes begin as domestic violence or uprising, 
.. 
eventually the protes· cross s borders ; o other States . In the event, crimes 
which are perpetrated in the circumstances of political protest are committed 
beyond the original borders in which they originated. The transformation of 
political protests into violence is a sign of frustration by political 
organisations which press for reform or change. In doing so the political 
organisations endeavour to attract e world attention and sympathy to their 
causes. The actors in the political protest sometimes manifest their struggle 
through killings, kidnappings and other forms of violence. They are often 
~/ 
indiscriminate and no one is innocent .. Diplomatic agents are chosen by the 
actors in political protests for their role and status at the international 
arena. This is because anything that affects them causes much uproar and is 
seizure of Aircraft (1970), The Montreal Convention 
For The Suppression Of Unlawful Acts Against The 
safety Of Civil Aviation (1971), The Convention 
Against The Taking Of Hostages (1979). 
4i Reference is being made to: The Convention To Prevent 
and Punish The Acts Of Terrorism Taking The Forms Of 
Crimes Against Persons And Related Extortion That Are 
of International Significance (1971), The Organisation 
Of The American States Inter - American Convention on 
Extradition (1981) and The European Convention On The 
Suppression Of Terrorism (1977) . 
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given much wider coverage than other violations. The governments too, would 
be more willing to succumb to the demands of the actors if the captives are 
diplomats. The international community has responded by domestic legislations, {;.,. 
regional as well as international treaties and conventions to protect the 
welfare of diplomats. One of these instruments is the 1973 Convention which 
is the central theme of this study. 
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CHAPTER V 
APPREHENSION, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDERS. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
, ,..., 
The need for the 19 7 3 Convent ion was stressed upon the bf 
Commission in a letter received from the President of the Security 
Council dated May 14, 1970. 1 It illustrated the need for a draft 
convention due to increasing attacks on diplomatic agents and other 
internationally protected persons . These attacks not only affected 
the personal s~ety and freedom of innocent persons, but also 
L-J1\.):,. 
prevented them from exercising their official functions, thus 
hampering the normal course and safety of international relations, 
the communication between governments and international 
organisations and friendly relations and cooperation between 
States.2 The principle involved,? as viewed by some of the United 
Nations representatives, was that of the inviolability of 
diplomatic agents and a consequent obligation on the part of States 
to protect internationally protected persons . 3 Others felt that 
there was a need to protect and prevent attacks on diplomats by 
u.N Doc s/9789 cited by Bloomfield Louis /FitzGerald 
Gerald, Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons ; Prevention And Punishment;An analysis of the 
u.N convention. (Praeger Publishers,Inc.1975) PP.47- 49 
(1972} 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.6 
Ibid P . 16 
I 
c 
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prosecuting those who commit such crimes and by ensuring that they 
do not escape punishment by taking refuge in other countries.4 
The Cacuna in the law that is found in the 1961 Convention was 
I 
the direct concern of the international community which has great 
-----regard for the welfare of diplomats. The United Nations therefore 
found it necessary to come up with another convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents.s 
This study therefore seeks to analyse the provisions enshrined 
in the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic 
Agents. 
5.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE 1973 CONVENTION. 
The main objective of the 1973 Convention is partially to fill 
one of the gaps that had been created by the 1961 Convention. The 
United Nations, therefore , served this objective by adopting it.6 
The 1973 convention, 1 does not deal with the violation of the G 
I 
diplomatic immunity by receiving States or the abuse of diplomatic 
immunity by diplomats. The Convention is also meant not to address ~ 
crimes or acts of terrorism perpetrated by diplomats or by sending 
States through the diplomatic missions. We hope that future 
u.N Doc A/8892 cited by Bloomfield/FitzGerald, Op.cit, 
P.49. 
(1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.15 
1972 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.5 
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researches would look into these two issues. 
It had been suggested at the formulation of this convention 
that there were enough laws to cater for the violation of 
diplomatic immunity by States7 and therefore, the Convention was 
devoted to the criminal acts of political organisations and private 
individuals.s It may be suggested that since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations is by mutual consent, member States would 
behave themselves and · would not violate the inviolability of 
diplomatic agents. 9 
8 
(1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, PP.11, 15 and 16 
one of the problems concerning offences committed by the 
governments of receiving States against diplomats is 
that, it is customarily a matter of mutual settlement and 
as of now it appears that the world can do very little to 
punish a State that commits any violations. This is 
basically due to the fact that diplomatic relations are 
established by mutual agreement. It is, therefore,by the 
same means that misunderstandings or conflicts can be 
solved. Unfortunately, this method is not so effective 
and does not seem to solve these problems. 
This study does not overlook the economic sanctions and 
suspension of diplomatic relations as means of reacting 
to these abuses and violations. But these methods 1 
whenever applied, have proven to be fruitless. The 
decisions of the International Court of Justice, have 
also been without any force . The issue reverts to the 
same recourse that such conflicts should be solved by 
mutual understanding. The normalization of diplomatic 
relations between Iran and the United States, Britain and 
Libya
1 
reverts to th~ sa~e means of settlement. The 
international community 1s probably left with very few 
choices under the United Nations. But so far there are 
no cases in which the United Nations has compelled a 
state to abide by its resolution on the abuse of 
diplomats. In the case of the United States diplomats and 
consular staff in Teheran, the Security Council of the 
United Nations, in its resolution 457(1979) 1 adopted on 
December 4, 1979, requested the Secretary General to lend 
I" 
H 
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The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents ,/was formulated against the background of the increased acts 7 . .. 
of terror ism on diplomatic agents. 10 The focus of the United 
Nation~ in resolution 2780 of the General Assembly was directed 
towards crimes committed by private individuals and political 
organisations. 11 
The 1973 Convention12 was opened for signature at New York on 
his good offices for the immediate implementation of the 
resolution. The resolution called on the Iranian 
government to release the United States diplomats and 
consular staff. When the Secretary General came back from 
his mission to Iran, he informed the Security Council, G 
that at that time the government authorities in Iran 
were not prepared to respond to the calls of the 
international community for the release of the hostages. 
The internationalfommunity can do very little to bring 
about compliance states which violate the .. diplomatic 9-, 
immunity. Vide: Pre aczinik Franciszek, Op.cit, PP.258-9 
10 ( 19 7 2) 1 y . B. I. L. c I p . 5 
11 Bloomfield Louis M. / FitzGerald Gerald F,Op.cit, P. 47. 
12 The commission had been requested by resolution 2780 of 
the General assembly to study the question dealing with 
the offences committed against diplomats and other 
internationallY protected persons under international 
law. The working group considered the draft documents and 
observations which had been prepared by the member 
states: Draft conventions by Uruguay to the general 
Assembly· Draft conventions and observations by Denmark 
conventi;n to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terroris~ 
Taking The Form of Crimes against Persons and Related 
Extortions that of International Significance, of The 
organisation Of Amer~can _states 197~; The International 
Civil aviation Organ1sat1on convent1on, The Convention 
For The Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 
and The Convention For The Suppression Of Unlawful Acts 
Against The Safety Of civil Aviation. (1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.c: 
P.185 
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14 December 197 3 .13 
The preamble reiterates: 
~ •. the purposes of the United Nations Charter concerning A the maintenance of international peace and promotion of 
'\ friendly relations and co-operation among States. 
Considering that crimes against diplomatic agents and other 
internationally protected persons jeopardizing the safety of 
these persons create a serious threat to the maintenance of 
international relations which are necessary for co-operation 
among States. 
Convinced that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate 
and effective measures for the prevention and punishment of 
such crimes, 
as reasons for the preparation of this instrument by which 
effective and appropriate measures can be found for the prevention 
and punishment of such crimes. 
13 Prior to the 1973 Convention, steps had been taken both 
at regional and international level to strengthen 
measures pertaining to the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against the internationally protected persons, 
including diplomats. For example: 
1. The 1937 Geneva Convention On "Prevention Of 
Terrorism." 
2. Resolution VI Of The American Foreign Ministers 
Held In Havana In 1940. It was resolved that 
the governments should adopt measures to prevent 
and suppress activities directed by foreign 
governments or groups. 
3. The convention On Special Missions (1969) adopted 
by the General Assembly Resolution 2330 (XXlV) of 
December 8, 1969. 
4. The General Assembly of The Organisation Of 
American States in a meeting held on June 30,1970, 
resolved to condemn acts perpetrated against 
officials of foreign states. 
5. The 1971 Organisation Of American States Convention 
"On Prevention And Punishment Of Acts Taking The 
Form Of Crimes Against Persons And Related 
Extortion Of International Significance." 
6. The council Of Europe Ministers• Committee adopted 
a resolution on December 11,1970 on "Protection Of 
Members Of Diplomatic Missions And Consular Posts." 
\ 
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5.3 CRIMES AGA I NST INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS. 
Article 1 of the 1973 Convention sets out the meaning of 
i nternationally protected persons, 'ratione personae' as 
The Head of the government, the internationally protected persons 
of State or i nternational organisations under international law or 
i nt erna t ional agreements 14 , family members of such officials. The 
Commission did not consider cabinet ministers to be part of this 
Article . 15 
()~ 
Article 1(2) defines "alleged offender" as a person .,ag ·ns-t 
whom there is sufficient evidence to determine prima facie that he 
ha s committed or participated in the crime. ~ 
Article 2 lists the following as constituting crimes 'ratione 
materiae' against internationally protected persons including 
diplomats; 
( 1). The 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
intentional commission of : 
a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the 
person or liberty of an internationally protected 
person; 
a violent attack 'l:lpon the official premises, the 
private accommodat1on or the means of transport of 
an internationally protected person likely to 
endanger his person or liberty; 
a threat to commit any such attack; 
attempt to commit any such attack;, and 
an act constituting participation ' as an accomplice 
14 Existing agreements such. as the 1961 Vienna Convention, 
the 1963 Vienna Convent1on on Consular Relations The 
1969 convention on Special Missions, The Ge~era l 
conventions of 1946 and 1947 on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations And Specialised 
Agencies. (1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.187 
15 International Law Commission Draft Articles , ( 1972) 11 
I.L.M. P.979 
The same 
2. 
3. 
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.6::- in any such attack shall be made by each State 
Party a crime under its internal law. 
article under clause 2 provides that: 
Each State Party shall make these crimes punishable by 
appropriate penal ties which take into account their grave 
nature. 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article in no way derogate 
from the obligation of State Parties under international 
law to take all appropriate measures to prevent other 
attacks on the person, freedom or dignity of an 
internationally protected person. 
Article 2 deals with two issues: 
Firstt it determines the crime "ratione materiae' and secondly', Gr 
the competence of State Parties to prosecute and punish offenders. 
The article describes crimes such as the intentional commission of 
murder, kidnapping and other attacks upon the person of the 
diplomatic agent. The violent at tack upon the premises of the 
mission, residential premises and means of transport of 
internationally protected persons. 
The general expression "violent attack" was used to avoid 
difficulties in definitions which may arise in connection with the 
listing of the crimes. It was urged that the crimes in Article 2(a) 
are usually found in the penal codes of State Parties. Each State 
Party is therefore at liberty to utilise local definitions. 16rt is 
however noted that Article 2 of the 1973 Convention, unlike Article 
1 of the OAS Convention, does not describe these crimes as 
constituting terrorism. 
16 (1972) 11 I.L.ML PP.983- 6, See also (1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, 
PP.187 - 196 
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5.4 The Motive of The Crime 
This study finds no single objection to the wording of Article 
2 in which crimes are illustrated. However the strongest objection 
relates to the motive and circumstances in which crimes are 
commit ted .li In other words, some States believe that if these 
crimes are committed in the course of struggle for liberation or 
self-determination, the offence would be politically motivated.18 
The issue as to whether a crime is politically motivated or 
not has been the main reason for lack of an overwhelming 
ratification of the 1973 Convention. 19 States which support 
liberation organisations and self-determination were uneasy with 
li Members observed that the primary question was how the 
international community could protect itself against acts 
of terrorism and not the motive of the criminals. (1972) 
Y.B.U.N, P.642 
18 In 1972 the u.s. draft convention for the prevention and 
punishment of certain acts of international terrorism 
was decisively rejected by the General Assembly because 
it was considered to be directed against liberation 
movements. Murphy John F, The Future, Op. cit, P.55 See 
also the General Assembly resolution 40/61 1985 which 
affirm the inalienable right to self determination and 
independence of peoples under the colonial and racist 
regimes and oth.er. forms o~ alien dom~nation, and 
upholding the 1eg1t1macy of th1s struggle, 1n particular 
the struggle of national liberation movements, G.A. Res. 
40/61 U.N. GAOR supp (No. 53) at P.301, U.N Doc A/40/53 
(1985). 
19 Reports from the office for combatting terrorism of the 
u.s Dept. of State pr~vide th~t diplomats have become the 
major target of ~nternat1onal terrorism. Despite 
diplomatic increase 1n attacks there are a few States 
which are Parties to the 1973 Convention, Murphy John F 
The Future, Op.cit, P.46 ' 
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the general application of the provision and sought to exclude 
incidents in which liberation organisations or movements were 
i nvolved. Burundi, for example, made the following declaration:-
In respect of cases where the alleged offender belongs to 
a National Liberation Movement recognised by Burundi or 
by International Organisation of which Burundi is a 
member and their actions are part of their struggle for 
Liberation, the government of the Republic of Burundi 
reserves the right not to app~y to them the provisions of 
Article 2 and 6 paragraph 1. 
f The liberation movements do not consider some people to be 
) inno~n~.~ On the contrary, the objective of these organisations is 
to demoralise everyone. 21 It is meant to generalise a situation ? 
of fear among the people. The movements consider anyone who does 
not resist an oppressive government as one condoning it.22 
Therefore some diplomats are kidnapped and some are killed with 
violence. The 1973 Convention does not refer to crimes 'ratione 
Materiae' in Article 2 as common crimes, nor does it refer to them 
as political offences23 • Article 2 of the 1971 OAS Convention 
specifically describes the crimes against internationally protected 
20 Multilateral Treaties Deposited With The Secretary 
General, Op.cit, P. 84 . 
21 Friedlander Robert A, Terrorism: Documents Of 
International And Local Control, ( V .1 Oceana 
Publications, Inc. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. 1979), P.1 
22 Neil c. Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism (Lexington 
Books, 1982), P. 135. 
23 one of the reasons for lack of overwhelming ratification 
of the 1973 Convention is found in the description of 
offences as "political offences" or "common crimes" in 
local legislation and extradition procedures. 
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persons as common crimes. However the 1973 Convention leaves it 
upon the individual States as well as judicial courts to 
investigate and decide what amounts to common crimes or political 
crimes. 24 
5.4.1 Judicial Decisions 
This section of the study looks at the decisions of the courts 
for the definition of political offences. 
In Re Castiont:2! e British Court of the Queen's Bench held ~r 
that a political offence must be committed in the course of 
political disturbance during which two or more parties in the State 
are contending and each seeks to impose the government of its 
choice. 25 This is a celebrated case and has been referred to by 
many writers on political offences exception. 26 
In Re Grovanni Gatti, a French Court of ~P eal of Grenoble 
described political offences as those which injure the political 
organism; .? which are directed against the constitution of the 
24 The term 'common crime' is sometimes used to refer to 
'political crime'. However a 'political crime', is not 
the same as a 'political offence' . A political offender 
is a person accused of a 'political offence' and is ) 
eligible for asylum and is not subject for extradition ~ 
whereas a political offender of a common crime is a 1 
person accused of <?r .convicted for a polit~cal crime and \ 
as such is not el1g1ble for asylum and 1s subject to 
extradition . Vide: Przetacznik Franciszek, Op. cit, P.104 
25 L.R. (1891) 149 IQB, P . 156 
26 Re. Meunier (1894) 2 Q.B, P.415 and Quinn V Robinson 
(111) 783 F.2nd PP.776, 811 (9th eire). 
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government and against the sovereignty; which trouble the order 
established by fundamental laws of the State and disturb the 
• 
" distribution of powers. The Court held 
affects the political organisation of the 
that/\ political offence 
State whereas the common 
crime affects organisations other than those of the State.27 
The Chilean court In the Matter of the Extradition of Hector 
Jose Campora Nas and others, 1957, had the following definition. 11 a 
political offence is that which is directed against political 
h . '1 . h )\ organisation of the State or t e c1v1 r1g ts of its citizens and 
that the legally protected rights which the offence damages 
constitutional normality of the country affected. n28 
The definition given by the decided cases have maintained the 
traditional interpretation of political offences. 29 It is most 
likely that certain courts would treat crimes against diplomats as 
political offences. It is also to be considered that some courts 
may as well be influenced by the foreign policy of the government 
of the State in deciding crimes of terrorism. 30 However it was 
asserted during the formulation of this Convention that the 
existence of the motive for the commission would not shield the 
2i 
28 
29 
30 
Przetaczick Franciszek, Op. cit, P.105 
Ibid . 
Quinn v. Robinson 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Yarnold Barbara M, International Fugitive. A New Role For 
The International Court Of Justice, (Praeger, N.Y. 
westport, Connecticut, London, 1991) PP.31- 46 
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offender from prosecution. 3' Therefore these crimes are 
crimes and not political offences. 
5.5 EXTRATERRITORIAL rJURISDICTION 
Article 3 provides that: 
1. Each State Party shall take Sl!~h measures as may be 
necessary to establish it3 jurisdiction over crimes set 
!2rth in Article 2 in the following cases: 
(a) v.. )lhen the crime is c~mmitted . in t~e territory of that 
State on board a sh1p or a1rcrart registered in the 
State; (b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
(c) when the crime is committed against an 'nternationallv 
protected persons as defined in Articl 2 who enjoys his 
status as such by virtue of functions w ich he exercises 
on behalf of that State. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may 
be necessary to establisht jurisdiction.over these crimes ~ 
in cases where the alleg~d offender 1s present in its 1\ 
territory and it does not5 extr~dite .him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the Stat ment1oned 1n paragraph 1 of 
this Article. 
3. This convention does ot exclude any criminal 
jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law. 
Pursuant to Article 3, each State shall enact municipal law to 
establish jurisdiction over crimes mentioned in Article 2. Although 
the 1973 Convention requires States to legislate offences and 
punishments for crimes, it does not actually mean that there were 
no States with such provisions prior to this Convention.32 
31 (1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.190 
32 For example, the Bolivian Penal Code of November 3, 1834 
provide s that: . . . . 
An attempt aga1nst the l1fe of an off1c1al of a foreign ~ 
state shall be condemned to prison from four to ten years , G~ 
and a murder of such official shall be punished by the 
death penalty. 
The Polish Penal Code of January 1, 1970 says that: 
a person who commits an activ~ assault upon an official 
of a foreign state (the nead of the diplomatic 
representative) shall be subject to the penalty of 
110 
The United States Code (amended in 1972 and 1976) section 
116 (a) of Title 18 of the United States Code (as of October 8, 
1976), as amended by the Act of the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, states that, 
murder in the first degree of foreign official, official guest or 
internationally protected person shall be punished by life 
sentence. The attempt of such a crime is punishable by imprisonment rr-
of not more than twenty years. Conspiracy to murder of an 
internationally protected person (section 1117), is liable to 
imprisonment for any term of years or for life; conspiracy to 
kidnap is subject to the same penalties. Under Section 112(a) of 
title 18 of the United States Code (amended 1976), assault, attack, 
injury, imprisonment, or violence to a foreign official, official 
guest, or internationally protected person or any attack upon the 
person or liberty of such a person shall be fined by not more than 
$10,000 or imprisonment or both . 33 
The United States amendments to those sections, though may not 
necessarily be the result of this Convention, meet the requirement 
of the 1973 Convention which provides that State Parties should 
legislate to make crimes which violate diplomatic immunity 
punishable by severe punishments. On July 11, 1985 Senator Arlen 
Specter introduced a bill that expanded the United States 
33 
deprivation of liberty from one to ten years. 
Przetacznick Franciszek Op.cit, P.70 
Ibid, P.70 
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jurisdiction to include terrorists who attack American nationals 
abroad. The amendment to title 18 of the U.S Code, Section 1202 
grants U.S court, jurisdiction to prosecute any foreign national 
who, in an act of international terrorism, attempts to kill, kills 
assaults or make any violent attack upon any American national. It 
also provides for the prosecution of any terrorist found within the 
territorial limits of the U.S regardless of the situs of his 
offence.H 
This study finds that there are three basic problems regarding 
legislation, apprehensio;l and prosecution of offenders: ~ 
First, the legislation on crimes and punishments of crimes 
committed against internationally protected persons has not been 
uniform and therefore the description of crimes and punishments in 
municipal legislation differ from one country to another. It is the 
prerogative of each State Party to adopt its own legislation. 
Therefore some of these legislation/ consider appropriate penal ties 
which take into account the grave nature of crimes while others do 
not. The idea of appropriate penalties which take into account the 
grave nature of crimes might be the result of ~rlier legislationJ 6f-
of increased punishment when an offence is committed against 
--
internationally protected persons. Many States had increased 
H s . 14 2 9 , 9 9th Con g . First S e s s ion ( 1 9 8 5 ) quoted by 
Donnelly L, "Extraterritorial J';lrisdiction Over Acts Of 
Terrorism committed Abroad: Omn1bus Diplomatic Security 
And Antiterrorism Act Of 1986" (1987) 72 C.L.R. P.606. 
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punishments prior to the 1973 Convention. 35 The difference in 
punishment from one country to another and from one case to another 
indicates some difficulty encountered by the courts in sentencing 
the perpetrators. 36 
35 
36 
According to the Swedish Penal Code of February 16, 1864: 
if violence or other ill-treatment is directed against an 
official of a foreign state, 11 the offender" li the 
ordinary punishment is forced labour of not more than ten 
years, shall be punished with forced labour for life. If 
the ordinary punishment is less, it shall be increased by 
two years above the maximum. Where the ordinary 
punishment is imprisonment or fine, he shall be punished 
with forced labour. 
Under Article 20 of San Marino Republic's Law: 
an offence committed against an official of foreign state 
shall be punished by "double" penalty provided for the 
commission of such offence against private persons. 
The same legislation appear in Article 141 of the 
Paraguayan Penal Code 1914. Vide: Przetacznic Franciszek, 
Op.cit, PP.69 - 70 
In 1971 t he Pakistan Criminal Court, sentenced to death 
M.Feroz,Abdullah who had killed Z.Wolniak, the Polish 
Vice-Minister, at the Karachi airport, in 1970. The 
Turkish Military Court, in Istanbul, gave death sentences 
to two men and three women who killed the Israeli Consul 
General Mr. E.Elrom. The Chinese People's High Tribunal 
in the Peking Municipality pressed for a death sentence 
to Cheng Chick for the surprise attack and serious 
wounding of E.Lerary, the wife of a staff member of the 
French Embassy in Peking in 1975. In 1978 the Cypriot 
court passed a capital punishment upon S.M. Khadar and 
z.H. Ahmed al-Ali, for the murder of Y.El Sabai, a 
special envoy and personal friend of Egyptian President 
A.Sadat the Cypriot President later, commuted to lif~ 
impriso~ment. In 1972, the Brazilian Military Tribunal 
imposed a life sentence upon those who had kidnapped 
E.Von Holleben, the German ambassador in 1970. Further 
the court in Los Angeles, gave a life imprisonment to G. 
Yanik ian, who had killed. M. Baydar, the Turkish Consul 
General in Los Angeles 1n 197 3. The court in Rome 
sentenced Mehmet Ali Agca, a Turkish, to lif~ 
imprisonment for making an attempt on the life of the 
Pope in 1981. The supreme court . of Transvaal (south 
Africa) committed A .. Protter to pr1son f.or 25 years for 
occupying the prem1ses of the Israel1 consulate in 
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Secondly, it is submitted that although these offences are 
grave in nature and should be seen within that context, the 
perpetrators of these crimes should not be tried by military 
courts, or other tribunals, Ji as in most cases they have no legal 
procedures where the accused are supposed to be heard and 
repre s ented. 38 
Thirdly, the practices of the States with regard to the 
apprehension and punishment of the perpetrators of crimes against 
diplomats differ. In many cases, the offenders are either given 
Johannesburg and killing the vice consul. The Brazilian 
court sentenced C.T de Silva to ten years in prison for 
his part in the kidnapping of the U.S. ambassador. The 
members of the South Moluccan Commando were sentenced to 
six years in prison by the Amst~rdam Criminal Court, for 
the occupation of the Indones1an Consulate General in 
Amsterdam, in 1975. 
Unfortunately when the Sudanese court sentenced the 
murderers of C.A.Noel, the American ambassador to the 
sudan, G.C Moore, the American Charge' d'affaires and 
G.Eid, the Belgian Charge' d'affaires to life 
imprisonment, the Sudanese President, commuted the 
sentence to seven years and turned the murderers over to 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation after a shortwhile. 
Vide: Przetacznick Franciszek,Op.cit, PP.77- 78 
37 Terrorists extradited by the U.S to U.K face a special 
court system that lacks some of the protection a 
defendant could ordinarily expect to have in the u.s 
courts. Under the Emergency Provisions enacted in 
reaction to the waves of terrorism in Northern Ireland 
the Diplock courts (named after Lord Diplock wh~ 
recommended their installation) were empowered to try 
offenders accused of crimes of terrorism. The courts can 
adjudicate without a jury. Antj.e Petersen, "Extradition 
And The Political Offence Except1on In The Suppression Of 
Terrorism" (1992) 67 I.L.J, 786 
38 Article 10 of the Universal ~eclaration of Human Rights 
and Article 9 of the Internat1onal Covenant On Civil And 
Political Rights (1966). 
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minor sentences and sometimes even released without punishment or 
long sentences which extend to life imprisonment or even the death 
penalty. The question of the death penalty has been compounded by ~ 
the Amnesty International and some developed countries, who have 
--been campaigning against it. The thrust of the argument of the 
campaigns has been that such a penalty is inhuman and that it does 
not serve the purpose of punishment. 39 It is also believed that 
since of late there has been some miscarriage of justice, it is 
possible to hand down a death penalty to an innocent person. 
As of now, many countries and particularly some of the 
developed countries have abolished the death sentence. Indeed this 
means that perpetrators of crimes against diplomats in those 
countries cannot receive the death penalty. It therefore appears 
that there would be severe penalty in one country for those who 
violate the inviolability of the diplomats while in other countries 
minor and sometimes insignificant penalties will be meted out to 
the offenders.40 
39 Article 1 of the Second Optional to The International 
convention on Civil and political Rights Aiming At the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty (1990) provides: 
(a) No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to 
the present optional shall be executed. 
(b) Each state shall take all necessary measures to 
abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction. 
40 our concern here is that what costs the life of a person 
in one state should ~s well_ do so in another and 
particularly where the 1nternat1onally protected persons 
are concerned. The authority to legislate a death 
penalty should not be left to each individual State 
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These contradictions raise the need for a uniform maximum 
penalty that could be applied in all cases of offenders of the 
diplomatic inviolability. The Convention requires State Parties to 
make crimes in Article 2 punishable by appropriate penalties that 
PUt into account the grave nature of the crime. The 1973 Convention 
leaves it upon each State Party as a prerogative to decide what 
should be the appropriate punishment for the offence{s). 
5.6 PREVENTION OF CRIMES AGAINST DIPLOMATS 
Article 4 provides that: 
(a) 
(b) 
State Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the 
crimes set out in Article 2, particularly by: 
taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations 
in their respective territories for the commission of 
those crimes within or outside their territories. 
Exchanging information and co-ordinating the taking of 
administrative and other measures appropriate to prevent 
the commission of those crimes. 
Article 4 of the Convention under discussion states that 
Parties to this convention shall co-operate in the prevention of 
the crimes41 stated in Article 2 by preventing preparations for the 
commission of crimes whether inside or outside their respective 
territories and by exchanging information and taking other 
administrative measures which will prevent the commission of 
41 
Party. What is required is that the punishment should 
consider the grave nature of the offence and this could 
be anything short of the dea~h penalty. If there is no 
way by which the severes~ pun1shment can be made uniform 
then the death penalty 1n !egard to abuse of diplomats 
should be abolished worldw1de. 
Chapter 111 Questions relating 
terrorism, (1972) Y.B.U.N. 
to International 
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crimes. It is suggested that a State incurs international liability 
if it fails to exercise its authority to prevent terrorist acts 
from taking place on its territory. 42 
Article 4 requires States Parties to be vigilant against all 
Preparations of crimes in their territories. The events leading to 
the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French 
Foreign Minister in 1934, are seen as examples of the earliest 
Preparations of such crimes. 43 A number of States have directly 
or indirectly supported terrorism by providing support to 
Perpetrators qf crimes in their own territories. 44 Although there 
is a significant disagreement over the definition of 'State 
terrorism', there are acts which have been described as terrorist 
acts and sponsored by States. 45 The State sponsored terror ism 
i nclude financing terrorist organisation and providing training 
facilities and other necessary requirements for the commission of 
crimes in another State. 46 
It is absolutely clear that i f a State knows or is likely to 
42 
43 
45 
46 
John Murphy, Legal Aspects Of International Terrorism: 
Summary Report Of International Conference, December 
1978,(Westview Publishing Company,1980) herein after 
referred to as John Murphy, Legal Aspect Of International 
Terrorism, P.27 
Friendlander Robert A, Op.cit, PP.217 - 258. 
(1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, PP . 5 & 7 
Schlagheck Donna M, Oo . cit, P . 123 
(1972) 1 Y.B . I.L.C, P.26 
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know that certain preparations are being made in its territory with 
or without the support of the government agents for the commission 
of acts of violence against a diplomatic agent inside or outside 
that State, such knowledge amounts to 'State sponsored 
terrori sm. , 47 This would be the case if a State does not act to 
stop such preparations. 48 
It is submitted that under the present circumstances it is 
difficult to ascertain acts which form terrorism in general. The 
Fifth congress on "Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders", 
Geneva, September 1975, focused on the phenomenon of terrorism, 
4i Article 4 of the Declaration on Rights And Duties enjoins 
states "to refrain from fomenting civil strife in the 
territory of another State, and to prevent the 
organisation within its terri tory of activities 
calculated to foment civil strife." 
Article 2(6) of the Draft Code of offences Against The 
Peace and security of Mankind, describes terrorism as 
"undertaking or encouragement by authorities of a state 
of terrorism activities. .in another State, or the 
toleration by the author1t1es of a State of organised 
activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in 
another state. (1954) 11 Y.B.I.I.C, P.112 
General Assembly resolution 2625 (XX1V) 1970 
provides that "E~ery .state h~s ~he duty to refrain fro~ 
organising 
1 
inst19at1ng ass1s~1ng or p.articipating in 
acts of civil str1fe or terror1st acts 1n another state 
. . . Also no state shall organ.ise 1 assist foment finance 
incite or tolerate subvers1on, terrorist or armed 
activities directed toward the violent overthrow of the 
regime of another State." J?eclara~ion on Principles of 
International Law Concern1ng Fr1endly Relations and 
Cooperation Among .States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nat1ons October 24, 1970 
48 see deliberation of an international Convention on 
Terrorism along with the General Resolution 3034 (XXVII) 
U.N Doc A/AC. 160/2 (1973). 
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which has no accepted definition in the codes. 49 It is noticed 
that in one situation these acts are referred to as support for 
self-determination and independence, while in others, they are 
referred to as acts of violence thereby constituting terrorism. 
The duty imposed on a State is to stop all those activities 
which might be construed as preparation for the violation of the 
personal inviolability of diplomatic agents. The Convention enjoins 
States as provided for in Article 4 to co-operate and prevent the 
commission of such crimes against internationally protected 
persons. In doing this a State is required to take all practical 
measures to prevent the commission of crimes, not only in her own 
territory but in others as well. 50 In the United States V. Ariana 
49 Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism And The Liberal State, (The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1977) herein after referred to as 
Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism And The Liberal State,P.173 
50 This duty finds its first expression in Article 3 of the 
1937 Geneva Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 
to the effect that, " It is the duty of every state t~ 
refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist 
activities directed against another state and to prevent 
the acts in which such acts take shape." 
In Resolution VI of the Foreign Ministers ' Meeting held 
at Havana in 1940 , it was resolved that the governments 
of the American Republics shall adopt within their 
territories all necessary measures to prevent and 
suppress any activities dire~ted, assisted or abetted by 
foreign governments or fore1gn groups or individuals 
which tend to subvert the domestic institutions or foment 
disorder in their internal political life . 
While the Organisation of American States required its 
member states to adopt measures in their national 
legislation which could prevent and punish crimes of that 
kind and to co- operate .am.ong th,emsel ve~ '. in Europe, the 
council of Europe M1n1sters CommltLee adopted a 
resolution on Decer:tber. 11. ' 1970 , the "Protection of 
Members of Diplomatlc M1ss1ons and Consular Posts." In 
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the court observed that, "The law of nations require every national 
government to use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done 
within its own dominions to another nation with which it is at 
peace or to the people there of . II 51 
To effect the prevention, a State is required to demolish the 
facilities being used by a group and arrest perpetrators as well as 
send information to the States concerned. The information should 
be sent to other concerned States even if the perpetrators are 
held in prison. This would help other parties to guard against any 
eventualities which might have skipped the eyes of the State where 
the commission of the crime was being prepared. In this regard 
therefore, the preparation for the assassination of the King of 
Yugoslavia in another country which knew or ought to have known, 
amounted to State sponsored terrorism. 
The spirit under which Article 4 of the 1973 Convention, was ~ 
I 
formulated requires a receiving State to take appropriate steps to 
prevent any attack on a diplomat and to prevent the preparation of 
crimes. The wider implication of Article 4 requires States to 
cooperate and disseminate information among State Parties in order 
to prevent criminal offences against diplomatic agents . 
The duties of the state are :-
this resolution they encouraged close cooperation among 
European states in matters affecting the diplomats 
against attacks and ~unishments of those who perpetrate 
crimes against the diplomats . 
51 (1877) 120 US P . 475 
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(a) to ensure that its territory is not used by anyone to prepare 
evil operations which violate he diplomatic inviolability. 
(b) (It is incumbent on the state) to refrain from encouraging the 
preparation of those acts . 
(c) to prevent by all necessary measures the offenders of crimes 
against diplomats from escaping to another country. 
(d) to share the information which the State has with others on 
the offender and nature of the crime. 
The duty to prevent and punish offenders is very important and 
has always been implied in all circumstances. When the United 
States diplomats were taken hostage in Iran the United States, in 
. 1 ~ l<:r her application to the Internat1ona Court of Justice, stated that vr 
/ 
under Article 4 of the 1973 Convention the government of Iran, 
violated its international legal obligations to the United States 
in tolerating, encouraging and failing to prevent and punish the 
perpetrators of those crimes. 
Although the final deliberation by the court did not 
specifically refer to the provisions of the conventions as 
men t ioned in the statements of the United States, it was clear that 
there was a violation of Article 4 of this Convention when the 
government of Iran tolerated and encouraged the offenders. 
v 
5.6.1 
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THE DUTY TO APPREHEND AND PROSECUTE OFFENDERS OF CRIMES 
AGAINST DIPLOMATS. 
The duty of a State to punish perpetrators of crimes against 
diplomats has been exercised for a long time. In ancient Rome, a 
special tribunal existed whose main function was to deal with 
perpetrators of crimes against the inviolability of foreign 
officials and sometimes the offender could be handed over to the 
sending State to serve his punishment satisfactorily. In 565 B.C, 
Lucius Minicious and Lucius Manlius were delivered to the 
Carthaginian ambassador whom they had struck and were later sent to 
Carthage. Those who had robbed the French ambassador in Rome, in 
1500, were hanged and exposed to the public. In 1720, Sweden, 
condemned to death her own citizens who had publicly insulted the 
ambassador of Louis xv. 52 The four people who were found guilty 
of killing C. Von Kettler the German Minister and Sugiyama the 
Chancellor of the Japanese legation in Peking were given death 
sentences. When Vasiliev and Stein attacked Von Twardowski, the 
German ambassador to Soviet Russia, in 1918, they were put on the 
firing squad and all their properties were confiscated53 • In 1930, 
the assassin of M.Vojkor, the Soviet envoy in Warsaw, was sentenced 
to life imprisonment . 
The duty imposed on receiving States under the 1973 Convention 
52 Vide: Przetacznik Franciszik, Op.cit, P.75 
53 Ibid, PP. 76 & 77 
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the Secretary . General of . the Uni t~d Nations, all,{ pertinent 
facts regard1ng the cr1me comm1tted and all available 
information regarding the identity of the alleged offender. 
2. Whenever any of the crimes set forth in Article 2 has been 
committed against an internationally protected person, any 
State Party which has information concerning the victim and 
the circumstances of the crime shall endeavour to transmit it, 
under the conditions provided for in its internal law, fully 
and promptly to the ~t.,Q.te Party on whose behalf he was 
exercising his function. ~b 
A 
This article provides that State Parties should cooperate in 
sharing information on terrorists. It requires the State to which 
the alleged offender has fled to communicate to all concerned 
States all pertinent facts regarding the crime(s) committed and all 
available information regarding the identity of the alleged 
offender. The information that has to be disseminated has to be 
accurate and precise to avoid misleading other Parties from working 
on information that may not be wholly true. 57 Therefore, the need 
for a strong intelligence capability is very important if there is 
to be anything done to track down the perpetrators of crimes.58 
A well-developed intelligence net - work is a necessity to do 
the surveillance of suspected terrorists and terrorist groups, the 
inf iltration of their movements, development of informer networks; 
56 The Article is based on Article 4 of the Montreal, The 
Hague and Article 8 of 0 . A. S Conventions, ( 197 2) 1 
Y.B.I.L.C, P.206 
5i (1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.11 
58 Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism And The Liberal State,~ 
cit,P.134 
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and the collection, storage and analysis of information.sg 
The need for such information on computer is that it is easily :H 
retrieved than that recorded on papers. Since it requires reliable 
and accurate information to do this work, it is necessary to have 
well trained and disciplined members of the intelligence agency. 
Members of C.I.A and other agencies like the Mossad of Israel have 
had the reputation of good training. But even if the third world 
were able to have better equipment as well as good training, the 
safety and reliability of the information contained therein would 
be doubted as very rich terrorist groups could buy any information 
they need from members of such agencies. Although such information 
can even be bought from agencies of developed countries like the 
C.I.A and the K.G.B on payment of cash the situation would be 
worse where a third world agency is the target of information. 
There would be less resistance to temptations of money.60 
Another obstacle in sharing information on the movements of 
terrorists is the sympathy of certain countries towards these 
ter r orist organisations and/or the fear that these organisations 
59 It would be beneficial if all countries possess computers 
like the Octopus at the Langley, Virginia at the 
Headquarters of the C.I.A. This computer is very vital 
for this agency as it gathers data on the terrorists 
movements and the details of their activities. Neil 
c.Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism,(Lexington 
Books, 1982) P.161 
60 Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism And The Liberal State, Op.cit, 
P.164 
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might retaliate against these countries. One incident among others 
in which cooperation was lacking was the hijack of the Achille 
Lauro. Although this incident did not affect diplomats as such, the 
fact that there was no cooperation in sharing information on the 
terrorists is note worthy. 61 
61 on October 7, 1985, a group of terrorists seized the 
Italian Cruise Liner, the Achille Lauro, which was 
leaving the Egyptian port of Alexandria, heading for 
another, Port Said. They demanded that Israel release 
fifty Palestinian prisoners. They threatened to kill 
hostages, starting with the American passengers. The 
United States promptly dispatched a special rescue team 
of highly trained military personnel to keep the ship in 
international waters. Although Italy alerted its 
military rescue forces it preferred to seek a diplomatic 
solution. On October 8, Syria refused the ship to dock 
and there were some indications that an American hostage ~ 
had been killed. The United StateV did not make a t.:: 
rescue attempt even though it was able to follow the 
ship, with the help of the Israeli intelligence, into 
Egyptian waters. In Egypt, there were negotiations 
between the hijackers including Abu Abbas and the P.L.O. 
on Wednesday 9th October, the hijackers left the ship 
after which it was discovered that they had killed the 
wheel-chair bounq,t American, Leon Klinghoffer. Italy, <: 
sought extradition of the four hijackers from Egypt. It 
was at this moment that the violation of the duty of 
cooperation in disseminating ,..the .. information occurred. 6 
The Egyptian President falsely stated that the hijackers 
had already left the country and that he could not be of 
any assistance. When the United States learned from 
reliable intelligence sources that the hijackers were 
still in Egypt and were about to leave, they intercepted 
the Egyptian Air plane that was carrying Jlhem and forced 
it to land in Italy. Meanwhile, Egypt insisted that Abbas 
and n1s associates were still within Egyptian 
jurisdiction in a hijacked plane and therefore the 
hijackers could not be removed from the Egyptian plane. 
Egypt was still holdin~ the Achille ~auro and its crew 
and could S\"Jap them w1 th the terror1sts. The United 
states Department of Justice obtained an arrest warrant 
for Abbas, in Washington, and required Italy to arrest 
him. The Italian government, however, did not see the 
united States request though formally correct as good 
enough to satisfy . the factual and substantive 
requirements of Ital1an law. Eventually, Abbas was 
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The violation of the duty of cooperation occurred when 
the Egyptian President gave false information on the whereabouts of 
the hijackers and when the Italian government made~ockery of its 
judicial system by allowing Abbas to leave the country and decided 
to try him in absentia. 62 This was clear manifestation of the 
violation of the call for sharing of information about the 
perpetrators of crimes as well as punishing them and not giving 
them sanctuary. 63 Lack of cooperation among States has greatly 
aggravated the difficulties the world community has had in 
combatting international terrorism. This lack of cooperation 
constitutes State sponsored terrorism. 64 
The need for all States to share intelligence to prevent 
terrorist attacks, assist~ 9' in the arrest and trial of the 
perpetrators, and cooperati~ to enforce sanctions against any 
I t) 
State government which sponsors terrorism were very much to be G, 
found in the Achille Lauro case. 
allowed to leave for Yugoslavia . Later on the Italian 
judiciary and prosecutors proceeded to try bu Abbas, in 
absentia andA. was s.entenced to life imprisonment. The 
killer of Leon Kllnghoffer was sentenced to thirty 
years, the second in ?omman? was handed twenty four years 
while the third rece1ved f1fteen years. 
62 Murphy John F, The Future, Op.cit, PP . 47-9 
63 Heymann Philip B, "International Cooperation In Dealing 
With Terrorism A review of law and recent practice. 11 
(1990) Vol. 6:1 A.J.I . L.& Pol'y, PP. 1-6. 
64 Murphy John F, The Future, Op.cit, P.40 
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The governments which gave sanctuary to terrorist groups were 
l 
supposed to prevent such an attack promptly if they had known of 
the plan. Thus any shar in?, of he .... information between those 
t .. 
countries and Italy, the h me of the cruiser, would have prevented 
the attack and the hijack. The United States, ~ith the help of the 
Israeli intelligence agency, were able to ascertain which political 
group was actually in command. It is this same information which 
<' I 
l /~ 
was shared to track down the plane that was carrying perpetrators ~ 
!1~ lj s erA,.. to~ sanctuapy State ~ It is noticed that cooperation is vital if 6r 
f 
arrest of the offender i s to be a reality. Lack of cooperation 
initially prevented Italy and the United States from getting the 
offenders in Egypt. 65 
The cooperation in sharing intelligence information is very 
important. The United States, Israel, Italy, Germany, Spain and 
the United Kingdom are reported to be sharing information on 
terrorist groups}) their activities, organisational structure, and ~r 
.. S-1. (;k--
movements of their members. bb It is through s sharing of this· 
information that they were able to track down well-known 
65 Heymann Philip,Op.cit, P. 8- 9. 
66 In order to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland and to 
restrict outside supply of arms, the United Kingdom has 
needed active assistance of the governments of Ireland, 
France and the U.S.A, Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism: British 
Perspectives,(G.K Hall & Co. An Imprint of Macmillan 
Publishing Co. N.Y. 1994), P.24 
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international offenders. 67 For example, Germany, was able to 
arrest Hamadei, who was carrying a suitcase full of explosives . He 
. ~ 
was also accused of hijacking TWA Flight 847, en route to Rome from ~ 
I 
Athens. Greece arrested Rashid who detonated a bomb on an American 
jet flying over Hawaii. This cooperation resulted in the seizure of 
a lot of weapons and equipment meant for terrorism in Europe . 68 
Although these incidents did not specifically affect perpetrators 
of crimes against internationally protected persons, it is worth 
noting the importance of sharing information on terrorism. 
Another case of interest in sharing information involves 
Georges lbrahim Abdallah who led a small terrorist group, the 
"Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions" ( FARL). The operations of 
this group were mainly aimed at diplomatic officials. For example, 
in 1982, when he deputy military attache' Lt. Col. Charles Ray was 
killed, FARL, claimed responsibility. It was alleged that it was 
the same gun that was used to kill the Second Secretary, Yecov 
Ba · t f the Israeli embassy. rs1man ov, o -
~ ~ 
FARLI also claimed ( r 
6i Article 1 of the Organisation of American states 
convention "To Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism 
Taking the form of cr.imes Ag.ai~st. Persons and Related 
Extortion of Internat1onal S1gn1f1cance." (Washington 
February 2, 1971),~bliges States to cooperate i~ 
prevention and ~un1shment of acts of terrorism, 
especially kidnapplng, murder and other assaults against 
the life or physical integrity of those persons to whom 
the state has the duty under international law to accord 
protection. The convention ~ormed part of the legal 
material used in the formulat1on of the 1973 Convention. 
see OAS. council, Off. Rec Ser.G.Cp/Doc S4/70/Rev.1 at 
P.5 cited by Przetacznik Franciszek, Op.cit, P.90 
68 Heyman Philip,Op. cit, PP.11, 13 and 19. 
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responsibility for the assassination of an American General, Leamon 
Hunt, in Rome. Abdallah was also suspected of the assassination of 
the American ambassador to Beirut in 1976. The French counter 
terrorist officials obtained much of the information about FARL 
from~ Mossad, the Israeli agency. This information led to the 
arrest and prosecution of Georges Abdallah in Paris.69 
The non-cooperation in sharing the information about the 
terrorist groups and their movements has led some countries to 
tak~ unilateral action against ~ the terrorist groups with 
specific measures such as the use of force, economic sanctions, and 
diplomatic protests. 70 
5.8 APPREHENSION OF PERPETRATORS OF CRIMES AGAINST DIPLOMATS. 
Article 6 states that: 
1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the 
state in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall 
take 1 ppropr iate measures under its internal law so as to 
ensure his presence for 5 the purpose . o~ pro~ecution or 
extradition. such measure11 shall be not1f1ed w1 thout delay 
directly or through the '! Secretary General of the United 
69 Ibid, P. 27. 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, May 22, 1969 ~rovides that " A State is obliged 
to refrain from acts wh1ch would defeat the purpose of a 
treaty when: (a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged 
instruments constituting the treaty subject to 
ratification, acceptance or approval until it shall have 
made its intention clear not to be a party to the treaty; 
or . (b) it has expressed 1 ts. consent to be bound by the 
treaty pending the entry .1nto force of the treaty and 
provided that such entry 1s not unduly delayed. 
r 
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Nations to: (a) the State where the crime was committed. 
(b) the State or States of which the alleged offender is a 
national or, if he is stateless person, in whose 
territory he permanently resides; 
(c) the State or States of which the internationally 
protected person concerned is a national or on whose 
behalf he was exercising his functions; 
(d) all States concerned; and (e) the international organisation of which the 
internationallY protected person concerned is an official 
or an agent. 
2. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this article are being taken shall be 
entitled: (a) to communicate without delay with the nearest 
appropriate representative of the State of which he 
is a national or which is otherwise entitled to 
protect his rights or, if he is a stateless person 
which he requests and which is willing to protect 
his rights; and (b) to be visited by a representative of that State. 
Article 6 provides that a State Party where the offender is 
present shall, if satisfied of the circumstances of the case, take 
the offender into custody for the purposes of either prosecution 
according to local law or extradition to a State where he is to be 
prosecuted. The extradition request shall be carried out subject to 
conditions and limitations recognised by the law or practice of the 
surrendering State. 71 
71 similar wording or objective finds place in 
1 . Article 6 of the International Convention Against 
The Taking Of Hostages 1979, It says that: 
Upon being satisfied th~t .the cir?umstances so 
warrant any state party 1n ~he terr1tory of which 
the alleged offender is present, shall, in 
accordance with its laws take him into custody or 
take measures to ensure his presence for such time 
as is necessary to enable any criminal or 
extradition proceedings to be instituted . 
2. Article 7 of ~he Convention For The Suppression Of 
Unlawful Acts Aga1nst The Safety Of Civil Aviation 
{Montreal convention 1971) provides that: the contracting 
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The satisfaction which is referred to in this section is that, 
the person(s) present is the alleged offender(s) of the crime(s) in 
Article 2 of this Convention. 72 The evidence presented should 
demonstrate the following elements ~that the offence was committed eM 
within the jurisdiction of the requesting State, that the offence 
charged is an offence in the 1973 Convention, that the requested 
person is the offender and that the evidence establishes probable 
cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the charge. i3 The 
burden of proof is on the State seeking extradition. It must 
produce competent evidence to support the belief that the accused 
has commit ted the charged offence. Hm-1eve~ it does not need to br 
prove beyond reasonable doubt but only that there are reasonable 
state shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged to 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution. 
3. Article 10 of the Convention For The Suppression Of 
unlawful Acts Against The Safety of Maritime Navigation 
1988 says, to the same effect in almost similar wording. 
4. Article 7 of the Hague Convention For The 
suppression Of Unlawful Seizure Of Aircraft (1970) 
provides t is to the effect. that the . contracting State Gr 
shall if it does not e~~ad1te .be obl1ged to submit the 7 case to 1ts competent: author1ty for the purpose of 
extradition. Although the l.egisla.tions' given above are ,G-
not directlY concerned w1th d1plo~ats there is a 
similarity ~n the language used. 
The wording? in all ~hese conventions ¢1~ suggest that the c;r 
State in wfiose terr1tory the offender 1s present should 
think of extraditing him/her first . It is only if it 
cannot extradite him that it should submit him/her to her 
competent authorities. 
i2 (1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.206 
73 Sapiro Miriam E, Op.cit, P . 667 & 668. See also Abu Eain 
V. AdamL 529 F.Supp.685 (ND 111 1980) 
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grounds to believe that the accused is guilty.H Although such an 
offender is held under a special legal framework, there is no doubt 
that the humanitarian principles will apply to him when he is being 
held. 75 Therefore-' the offender will be notified of the reasons of ..;. 
his arrest, produced before a magistrate within twenty four hours 
and would be free to consult a lawyer of his choice. Article 9 of 
this Convention76 provides that 11 Any person regarding whom 
proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of the 
crimes set forth in Article 2 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at 
all stages of the proceedings. 11 
5.8.1 PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION. 
Article 7 provides that: 
The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender 
is present shall, if it does not extradite him, submit 
ru- without exception whatsoever and without undue 
-"d;l~y, the case to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution through proceedings in accordance 
with the law5of that State. 
This Article gfves an option to the State Party in the 
territory in which the alleged offender is present the option 
either to extradite him or submit the case to its competent 
74 Quinn v. Robinson 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) 
75 Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Riohts 
states that " Every one is entitled in full equality of 
the law to a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights 
and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 
Article 9 of the internatio.nal Covenant On Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) prov1des to the same effect. 
76 Article 9 is equivalent to Articles 4 and 8 (c) of the 
O.A.S. Convention 
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authorities for the purpose of prosecution. The oldest legal 
principle dealing with terrorism was developed by Hugo Grot ius 
(1624). It provides for either extradition or prosecution "aut 
dedere, aut judicare" . 77 It is , however argued that the obligation 
of the State is not to try the accused but only to submit the case 
to be considered for prosecution by the appropriate national 
authority. 78 
However it is submitted that the trial of an offender in a 
State where he did not commit the crime posses some difficulty. The 
' 
evidence presented in a criminal trial requires to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the suspect is the offender. This will 
requires the prosecution to produce evidence that implicate the ~ 
accused. There must be witness(es) to the crime who can identify 
the offender and other credible evidence necessary to convict a 
criminal. It is the objective of this Convention that a person 
convicted of any crime described in Article 2 should receive a 
punishment that takes into account the grave nature of the crime 
against internationallY protected persons. 79 
on the other hand extradition involves a State, at the request 
of another, surrendering a person accused of a crime under the laws 
of the requesting and the surrendering State for the purpose of 
77 Schlagheck Donna M, Op.cit, P.120, See also Murphy John 
F, The Future, Op.cit, P.60, and Sapiro Miriam E, Op.cit, 
P.667 
78 Murphy John F, The Future, Op.cit, P.43 
79 Evans Alena E and .Murphy ~ohn F, Legal Aspect Of 
International Terror1sm, (Lex1ngton Books 1978) P.506 
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prosecution. 80 The request for extradition may also be for a 
convicted person, who has escaped from a prison to another State. 
The concept of extradition has a venerable tradition in the 
relation between States. It dates back to eire. 1280 B.C., to a 
clause in the peace treaty betv1een Pharaoh Ramses 11 and King 
Hattusili 111 which provided for the return of the fugitive 
criminals.81 Earlier extradition agreements were primarily for the 
purpose of delivering political and religious offenders to the 
sovereigns. Later it was utilised for the exchange of common 
criminals. 82 
The process of extradition is usual l y based on bilateral 
agreements or reciprocity. It is a general rule that there is no 
obligation to extradite in the absence of a bilateral treaty. 83 
80 Osborn defines extradition as " The deli very by one 
state to another of a person accused of committing a 
crime in another ."Osborn 1 s Concise Law Dictionary (8th 
Ed.) Rutherford Leslie and Bone Sheila (Ed). 
The United States Supreme Court defines extradition 
as "the surrender by one nation (the requested State) to 
another(the requesting State) of an individual accused or 
convicted of an offence outside of its territory and 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which 
being competent to try and punish him demands the 
surrender" T~r lin?e? V ·
11 
Ames .18.4 U.S 2 70, 289 ( 1902) 
quoted by sap1ro M~r1am, Extra~1~1on In Era Of Terrorism: 
The need to abol1sh the pol1t1cal offence exception" 
(1986) 61 N.Y.U.L.R, note 3, P.655 
81 M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition And World 
Public order, (1974) PP . 3- 4 quoted by Antje C. Petersen, 
Op.cit, P.771 
82 Yarnold Barbara M. International Fugitive. A new role for 
the International Court of Justice.(Praeger, New York 
westport, Connecticut,London 1991) P.12 ' 
83 Ibid 1 P.11 
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The accused is held in custody until the formal application by the 
requesting State is received for the courts to decide. Usually the 
courts are empm-rered to decide whether the accused should be 
extradited or not. 
Extradition plays an important role in combat G', 
terrorism. 84 The extradition treaties eliminate of 
offenders escaping from punishment. 
, , I 
They assure that terrorist 
offenders are accountable for their acts wherever they are. 
Extradition treaties are based on the principle of mutuality. If a 
requested State extradites an offender to the requesting State the 
chances are that such an act will be reciprocated. The extradition 
treaties also confirm that contracting parties accept eacb other's 
judicial system. 85 
several countries bave made bilateral as well as multilateral 
c (> Yl.C.. ' . 
extradition treaties as some of the methods by which perpetrators 
of crimes can be prosecuted and punished. Hm-1eve7 bilateral 
extradition treaties remain the primary instruments of extradition. ~~ ~ f v 
For example s~Pf' the e treat s ar~ between the United States 
.. A 
and canada~b and tbe 1973 memorandum of understanding between the 
United states and Cuba. 87 Article 4 ( 2) ( 1.) of the U.S .- Canadian 
84 Antje C.Petersen, Op.cit, P.767 ~ 
85 Ibid, P.7'i1 
86 (1972) 11 I.L.M. P.22. 
87 ncuba-United States Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels",(1973) 12 I.L.M. 
P.370. 
r 
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extradition treaty provides that "[a] Kidnapping, murder or other 
assault against the life or physical integrity of a person to whom 
a contracting party has the duty according to international law to 
give special protection or any attempt to commit such an offence 
with respect to any such person" shall not be considered a 
political offence for the purpose of this treaty.88 
The governments of the United States and Canada, therefore do 
not offer political asylum to fugitives requested in either State 
for actual or attempted violation of diplomatic immunity and are 
liable for extradition. This treaty covers not only cases committed 
in the territories of contracting parties, but also offences 
committed outside the two territories . Article 1 of the treaty 
says "each party agrees to extradite to the other party persons 
found in its territory who have been charged with or convicted of 
offences specified in the treaty and committed within or outside 
that territory." Canada and the United States, both have 
legislation establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction over attacks 
on diplomats. Therefore, requests for extradition of persons 
charged with such an offence is very much likely to be granted. 
The Nordic states agreed to have a scheme on extradition 
whereby each state would enact legislation containing similar 
88 ( 19 7 2 ) 1 Y . B . I . L . C , P · 11 
terms . 89 The European Convention on Extradition 1957 
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~ims to .§r 
establish uniform rules with regard to extradition as part of the 
general aim that strives to achieve greater unity among the members 
of the Council of Europe. 
The Preamble of The Convention of The American States on 
Extradition of February 25, 1981 in Caracas, Venezuela, reads : 
"The close ties and the cooperation that exists in the Americas 
call for the extension of extradition to ensure that crime does not 
go unpunished. u90 In view of this, "the States oblige themselves 
to surrender to other State Parties that request their extradition , 
persons who are judicially required for prosecution, are being 
tried, or have been convicted, or have been sentenced to a penalty 
involving the deprivation of liberty." (Article 1). 
This is a remarkable convention which strives to deter 
terrorism in south America. Since South America has been a centre 
of international terrorism it is suggested that adhering to the 
principle of the 1973 Convention would help to deter such acts in 
the region. 
5 .8 .2 PROBLEMS OF EXTRADITION 
The problems of extradition might not be many but there are 
very substantial elements in the process of extradition wherever it 
89 Murphy John F, Punishino International Terrorists; The 
Legal Frame work For Policy Initiatives.(Rowman 
and Allanheld, 1989) P.37 
90 Ibid, P. 39. 
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occurs. 
The first problem is the requirement of the bilateral treaties 
in any extradition proceedings. Although Article 8 provides that 
the 1973 Convention could be taken as a legal instrument for the 
purpose of extradition, it is generally accepted that there should 
be a bilateral treaty for any extradition proceeding. It has been 
I 
conventionally accepted that there is no obligation to extradite in 
the absence of a bilateral extradition treaty.91 
The second obstacle is sometimes due to carelessness or 
genuine error in the paperwork and in the communication between the 
requesting and the surrendering State, extradition treaties, wrong 
identification of the offender, irregularities in the description 
of offences, the relevant laws and the supporting evidence. 
The third problem is due to fear of retribution or retaliation ~ ~~~other or the same organisations to. which the ~fender who is ~ 7"-'-/Y'Y \ r;,. 
the subject of extradition belongs . The requested State is usually 
reluctant to hand over the alleged offender out of fear of 
retribution. 92 It is noted that many countries would not like to 
91 Yarnold Barbara M, Op.cit, P.13 
92 The usual obstacle in the local prosecution is that local 
authorities are subjected to numerous threats from the 
terrorist organisations to the extent of pressing for 
light sentences or a!ly means ~f q~ick release from 
prison. The terror1st . or.gan1sat1ons also press 
governments in whose terr1tor1es the offenders are held 
not to allow the extradition applications. 
When France arrested Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, in 1984 
it chose to put him on trial rather than extradite him: 
The French government was under substantial pressure to 
release him by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions 
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( FARL). A fevl months after his arrest, Gilles Svdney 
Peyrolles 1 the Director for the French cultural centre in 
Tripoli, Libya, was kidnapped. T rench learned that 
the kidnappers would only release Payr llers, in exchange 
for Georg Ibrahim. A senior official from President 
Mitterrand 1 s Socialist party who had close relations with 
Aloeria arranged for an Algerian official to visit 
Ge~rges Abdallah, who gave the official the names of the 
people he should speak to in Beirut. The Algerian 
official ~ met these people in Beirut. It was conveyed to 
the kidrtappers that it was impossible to remove Georoes 
from the judicial process but given the state of the 
criminal charges against him, "It is possible to foresee 
that GeorgeS Abdallah will only be subjected to 
proceedings in a correctional court. " It was on that 
understanding that the organisation FARL released its 
hostage, Peyrolles. Unfortunately for Georges Abdallah , 
immediately after the release of Peyrolles 1 evidence 
surfaced implicating him directly and personally for the 
shooting/ of Chap~an Ray. an Americar: Milit.ary attache 1 in 
Paris who was k1lled 1n 1982 ana Bars1mantov of the 
Israeli Embassy. It was after.t~h· that new proceedings 
were instituted for the shoot1ng and homicide. 
GeorgesAbdallah~sent a pub ic letter to the Justice 
Minister, complaining of the delay in releasing him. He 
wrote 
1 
"The French government informed me that I would be 
judged within a month for the use of false documents and 
expelled to the country of my choice if the Arab 
militants who had Mr. Peyrolles freed him. But I am 
still in prison. " The ~RL 1 s representative threatened 
retaliation unless France released Georges Abdallah and 
two other members. The following months witnessed bombs 
exploding throughout Par is causing death, damage and 
injuries. The Algerian government, too which took part as 
intermediary felt betrayed and pleaded for his release. 
The French security Minister met the judge and urged him 
to delay his decision~. He later told the press that the 
evidence against Gedtges Abdallah seemed very weak. An 
official in the Justice Ministry issued orders to the 
Public Prosecutor 1 s off ice to dismiss the charges against 
Abdallah. The terrorists retaliated with a wave of new 
bombings in 1986, when the Public Prosecutor failed to 
release him. There was an implication in the statements 
made by the French Prime Minister and the Interior 
Ministe , suggesting that France might be prepared to 
make a deal by which Georges Abdallaywou.ld be. released 
in exchange for an !nd of terro~ of bomb}ngs 1n Paris. 
Although Georges was sen e~ce to l1fe imprisonment, the 
kind of pressu.re. unde5 wh1ch the governm~nt of France , 
had were magn1f1cent "' and could not be 1gnored. Vide: 
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be entangled with terrorist organisations for fear of striking at 
Heymann Philip B. Op. cit, PP.27-32 
In the incident of hijacking of Achille Lauro, the 
Italian government allov1ed Abu Abbas to leave Italy 
despite an application for extradition from the United 
States. The Prime Minister had indicated that Abbas 
would be tried in Italy when he said that relinquishing 
the terrorist would be contrary to Italian law. In other 
words in Italy it is the judiciary not the executive ~:rr 
whic had the responsibility for handlina the case of 
Abbas. However, the government released him shortly 
after. Whether the Italian judiciary proceeded to 
prosecute and sentence Abbas to life imprisonment it did 
not really matter because he had already left the 
country. When Germany arrested Mohammed Ali Hamadei for 
carrying a suitcase full of explosives, it refused to 
extradite him to the United States. The U.s Justice 
Ministry was supposed to forward the application request 
to Germany. Shortly after that, two German nationals were 
kidnapped in Beirut and the kidnappers demanded that 
Germany should not extradite Hamadei to the United w 
statesYbut release him in exchange for the two German 
relief workers, Mr.Heinrich Strubig and Mr.Thomas 
Kempter. Germany never extradited him and went on to try 
him for murder and hijacking at the same time negotiatina 
for the release of the two German nationals.Time: 
December 16,1991, P.23 
Greece refused to extradite Al-Zumar to Italy. 
Greek officials, had notified Italy that they would 
detain zumar until he had served his sentence. But later 
the Greek Minister of Justice denied extradition saying 
that zumar' s actions constituted legitimate political 
expression. This he did inspite of the court's ruling 
that he was subject to extradition. 
In 1977 France released Abu Daoud who was suspected 
of masterminding the 1972 terrorist attack at the Munich 
Olympics. west Germany and Israel had applied for his 
extradition but both requests were denied on technical 
grounds. Hemann Philip B. Op.cit, PP.22-24 
These examples, indicate that it has not been ~easy to G(-
prosecute ~ terrorists. In either way cffid in many 
circumstances, the state in whose territory the offender 
was found had to compromise its principles for such 
reasons as given in the foregoing examples. There has 
not bee? ~ch done to allevi~te the _si t~ation except that 
some o_J:...REfr states have somet1mes maae d1plomatic protests 
or in other cirGumstances threatened to isolate any Gf-
nation that ~uld refuse to cooperate against terrorism. 
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their interests worldwide. As a result of these fears, some States 
refuse to extradite and quietly release the offenders to safe 
havens. gj 
The effect of the fear of reprisals or retaliations by the 
organisations must have been the result of the release of the 
assassins of the diplomats in Khartoum94 and a free passage and 
transport to the hijackers of the Achille Lauro by Egypt to 
another country. Greece allowed Al Zumer, to flee to Algeria. The 
Italian government allowed Abu Abbas to leave Italy. Germany too 
released the Palestinians who had taken hostage the Israeli 
athletes in Munich in 1972. 95 
Fourthly, it is also observed that an amnesty is usually 
offered to the hostage takers in return for safe release of their 
93 For example, in August 1973, tl'IO Arab terrorists attacked 
Athens Airport, leaving five persons killed and 55 
injured. The terrorists were tried and sentenced to 
death. This sentence was commuted under pressure of 
those who seized the Greek £righter in Karachi, in 1974. 
These were the three members of the muslim international 
guerrillas who held two sailors hostage and made a forced 
flight on a Pakistani aircraft to Egypt and later to 
Libya. Greece expelled the two terrorists in response to 
Libya's undertaking that they would be held answerable 
for their activities. But Libya, was said to have been 
reluctant to act on its reported promises. Hence it 
became labelled as a sanctuary of terrorists. Wilkinson 
paul, Terrorism And The Liberal State, Op. cit, P.216 
94 See chapter 1V 
95 Clive Aston c, A Con~emporary crisis; Political Hostage 
Taking And The Exper1ence of We~tern Europe,(Westport, 
connecticut:Greenwood Press,1982J PP.73 and 79 
r-
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hostages96 as it had been suggested to the hostage takers of the 
Israeli athletes, in Munich. 9i In such circumstances the offenders 
are neither extradited nor prosecuted. 
The fifth problem pertains to the definition of terrorism. As 
L 1 ( I "'' ' 
observed in the fourth chapter there has not been a well unified 
definition of the word terrorism98 and as a result, States and 
academicians offer different definitions. It suffices to know that 
99 
one's rebel is another's statesman. 
96 Crelinsten Ronald L. / Szabo Denis, Hostage Taking, 
(Lexington Books,19 79) P.58 
9i 
98 
99 
Clive C.Aston, Op.cit, P.65 
Laquer Walter, Ed. The Terrorism Reader, A Historical 
Anthology, (Wildwood House London,1979) P.268, See also 
Sapiro Miriam, Op.cit, P.654 
History has recorded th~t Jonas Savimbi, the leader of 
UNITA in Angola, rece1ved a red carpet welcome in 
washinaton and an audience with the President of the 
United-States. He is a well known rebel who has been 
fiahting a guerilla war to topple the Angolan government 
for years. Not many coun~ries would give him such 
hospitality. I? Angola, he 1s ~ rebel and a terrorist. 
Another f1gure who occup1es double status is the 
leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Mr. 
Yasir Arafat. Many countries do respect and recognise 
him as the leader of the Palestinian State, and therefore 
he is received by heads of states and attends state 
functions in those countries where he is recognised. But 
until recently, there were some countries which did not 
give him that due and treated him as a terrorist or a 
person who sponsors acts of terrorism. It therefore 
virtually depends on state policy to define who and who 
is not a terrorist. The P.L.O . leade~ woul now enJOY full 
recognition from all States 1nclud1ng the United States 
of America. This follows the recent exchange of letters 
of recognition between the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation and the States.of Israel on Sept. 13, 1993 
at the White house, Wash1ngton. See also Ferencz 
Benjamin B, "When ones person's terror ism is another 
\ ( 
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While the U.N General Assembly Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
contained in Assembly resolution 2625 {XXV) of October 24, 1970, 
provides that "Every State has the duty to refrain from organising 
,instigating, or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist 
acts in another State or acquiescing in organised activities within 
its territory directed toward the commission of such acts", the 
declaration makes an exception to the obligation of the States to 
assist peoples struggling for their right to self - determination and 
independence . 100 
Article 3 of the constitution of the International Criminal 
Police Organisation (Interpol) , provides that "It is strictly 
forbidden for the organisation to undertake any intervention or 
activities of a political, military, religious or racial 
character. n}Ol According to this article I the international police 
··~ ?.. . . . 
would not indulge itself . 1n cr1mes committed 1n the process of 
political struggles or self-determination, liberation motivated 
activities or such acts which are politically motivated. However in 
person's heroism" 1981 Human Rights, PP . 38-42 
100 D. Schindler 1 J. Toman, Eds. The Laws Of Armed 
Conflicts, ( sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers : 
The Netherlands,1981) P.129, See also,Paul Wilkinson 
Terrorism And The Liberal State, Op. cit, P.232 ' 
101 Murphy John, Legal Aspect Of International Terror ism, 
Op.cit, P.13 
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1984 Interpol adopted a resolution announcing a more liberal 
interpretation of Article 3 of its constitution. The resolution 
allows Interpol to become involved in antiterrorist activity by law 
enforcement officials at the preventive stage102 
In 1977, the Diplomatic Conference on Laws of War adopted a 
') 
proposal which in effect provided a measure of legal protection 'for 
terrorist attacks. Under this proposal, liberation movements are 
accorded lawful belligerent and prisoner of \var status as of 
, 
right .103 The proposal recognises the activities of heliberation 
movements as well as their status. Terrorism therefore should not 
be confused with the struggle of the peoples ' right of national 
/ 
liberation . 104 
Sixth, the principle of extradition under international law, 
extradition treaties, bilateral and multilateral treaties or 
codes conventions, ~tutes, 
constitutional provisions exempt 
of procedures and 
political offenders 
sometimes 
from the 
d . t . 105 process of extra 1 10n . The principle of non- extradition for 
102 Murphy John F, The Future, Op . cit , P . 54 
103 Wilkinson Paul, Op. cit, P . 2 3 4 
104 Questions relating to I nternational Terrorism, ( 1972) 
Y.B.U.N, P.642 
105 Murphy John, Legal Aspect Of International Terror ism, 
Op.cit, PP. 7 & 10 
( 
) 
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political offences was first laid down by Belgium, in 1833,106 to 
the effect that "no foreigner may be prosecuted or punished for any 
political crime antecedent to the extradition, or for any act 
connected with such a crime." Extradition is hampered by the fact 
that the political offence exception contained in many extradition 
treaties protects from extradition, political offenders of all 
types, non violent and violent alike including terrorists.lOi The 
political nature of terrorism has led many States to provide 
terrorists with protection from extradition . 108 Unfortunately, the 
1973 Convention does not forbid the application of a "political 
offence" exception in extradition treaties in regard to crimes 
committed against diplomats . 109 
Since the Belgium Law, there have been bilateral as well as 
multilateral treaties emphasising that political offences are not 
extraditable. The Argentinean - Extradition Law No. 1612 of 1885 
and the French Extradition Law Article 5 of March 10, 1927 provide, 
t hat extradition shall not be granted when "offences committed 
shall be of political character or connected with political 
offences. "110 
106 Elsewhere it is said that the P! inc.iple was developed by 
France in the Jacobean const1 tut1on 1793. Schlagheck 
Donna M, Op.cit, P.120, See also Sapiro Miriam, Op.cit, 
note 29 , P.660 
10i Antje c.Petersen, Op.cit, P. 767 
108 Schlaoheck Donna M, Op. cit, P .120 
109 Murphy John F, The Future, Op.cit, P.64 
110 Franciszek Przetacznik, Op. cit, p. 108. 
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The 1974 Treaty of Extradition between the United States and 
Australia provides that extradition shall not be granted when the 
offence is political in character. Article 3 of the 1953 Treaty 
between Belgium and Lebanon provides that extradition shall not be 
granted if the offence is regarded by the requested party as a 
politica l offence or as an offence connected with political 
offence. 111 rt is interesting to note that this treaty provides that 
it is the requested State112 which shall determine whether in its 
111 
112 
Ibid, P. 106. 
The definition of these terms by the judiciary_ and """' 
sometimes a ro~e assumed by the executive has be-en 
detrimen -aT and wanting. The judiciary is sometimes 
influenced by the state ' s foreign policy. This leaves 
the system with a doubl~ standard. On one occasion the 
offences which are committed do amount to 'terrorism' 
and on another, are trea ed as acts of political 
movements, liberation or self-determination. Therefore 
some governments have assum~d the role of judiciary in 
determining whether a particular case requires to be 
deemed as political or related therewith and therefore 
considered for asylum or not. The decision of the 
executive in a certain case whether a particular person 
deserves to be extradited or not may be based mainly on 
th~ interest of the State in which that person is found. 
sometimes the decision is based on political or economic 
motives. The executive, therefore cannot be depended 
upon to decide cases o! all~ged offenders . 
The united states - United Kingdom treaty on extradition 
provides that power to grant political asylum and to 
refuse to surrender persons declared extraditable by the 
courts is to be exercised by the executive on the basis 
of political rather t~an legal criteri?. According to 
this treaty the executive may have the final decision on 
asylum applications. On the other hand, the United 
states' extradition statut~s (18 U.S.C. Sections 3181, 
3184 3186 3188-95) are Interpreted as to permit the 
secr~tary ~f State a ' d~ nova' review of the evidence 
presented to the court . 1n cases whe~e the magistrate 
certifies that there 1s ~no~gh evidence to permit 
extradition. But the executive 1s not permitted to order 
extradition where ~h~ court's dec:ision is to accord 
asylum to the fugitive. M.Cher1f Bassiouni, Legal 
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v i ew the offence is political or not . 113 Although in most cases it 
is the courts which usually decide whether an offence is political, 
it appears from this provis i on that apart from the judiciary, the 
executive , by its own standards can decide whether the offence 
committed is political or not. Under the political offence 
exception, the requested State may deny extradition of the offender 
if it considers the crime to be a political offence . 114 
The Fr ench and Israel Treaty of 1958 on extradition gives a 
wider view on non extraditable offences. Article 4 provides that 
extradition shall not be granted if the requested State considers 
that the elements of the offence or motives for the request are 
based on po 1 i tical, religious or racial considerat i ons .115 In 198 5 
the u.s and u.K signed a supplementary treaty exempting a number of 
violent crimes from the protection of the political offence 
exception .116 This was due to frustration of the U. S and u. K 
governments at the unwillingness of the U.S courts to extradite 
lli 
alleged offenders of I . R.A. 
Responses To Internat~o.nal Terrorism: U.s Procedural 
Aspects, (Nijhoff Publ1sners,1988)P.181 
113 Sapiro Miriam E, Op.cit, note 76, P.668 and note 83 , 
P.669 
114 5 Ibid, P.65 
115 Przetacznick Franciszek Op.cit, P. 106. 
116 Extradition Treaty I J une 8 I 197 2 I u.s- u. K Northern 
Ireland, 28 US . T 227 T.I .A.S No. 8468; Supp . Treaty. 
11 i Sapiro Miriam E, Op.cit, P.664 
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Apart from the bilateral and multilateral treaties, there are 
States whose constitutions, as discussed below in the text, provide 
or contain special provisions on non-extradition offences or acts 
which may be connected with or based on political, racial or 
religious offences. The exception clause has been characterised as 
a "double -edged sword" because while it protects the requested 
person against retaliatory trial by his political adversaries, it 
is detrimental to international public order because it offers 
shelter and immunity from criminal liability to persons who commit 
very serious offences. 118 
Article 3 of the 19i7 European Convention provides a special 
Provision which can remedy all the encumbrances of the bilateral 
extradition treaties and other arrangements. It provides that " The 
provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements applicable 
between Contracting States, including the European Convention on 
Extradition are modified as between Contracting States to the 
extent that they are incompatible with this Convention." This means 
that bilateral treaties and other extradition arrangements which 
exempt political offences would, in that regard, have to conform to 
Article 1 of this Convention which does not consider crimes therein 
as political offences. 
seventh, many States apply methods of torture in detention as 
well as the death penalty. It is usually a pre-condition to 
extradition that the alleged offender would not be tortured pending 
Prosecution or that he would not be sentenced to death. Although 
118 Ibid, P.657 
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this has nothing to do with the provision of the 1973 Convention, \ ~ 
I 
it is suggested that__ in a way it hampers the extradition of -< 
offenders since many countries have means of torturing suspected 
offenders .119 
Eighth, extradition may be difficult even in situations where 
there are bilateral treaties when existing diplomatic relationship 
between States becomes strained. The extradition treaty may be 
suspended and the request ignored. 
Article 7 frustrates the 1973 Convention, as the State has to 
be satisfied as to whether the extradition requested is necessary. 
All extradition incidents which have been discussed in this study 
were either frustrated by this very provision or lack of will on 
the part of the requested State to extradite. Therefore, it is most 
likely that no one has ever been extradited under this 
Convention 120 rfact it has been stated that this Convention per Sf 
se does not create a legal obligation to extradite, 121 that it 
contains only an inducement . 122 Under the applicable U.s Statute, 
a fugitive can only be extradited only in accordance with 
119 Amnesty International. list~ 32 countries with whom u.s 
has extradition treat1es wh1ch have some kind of torture 
of prisoners in the recent past. Amnesty International 
Report 1984. 
120 Yarnold Barbara M, Op.cit, P.12 
121 The u.s has constr~ed this phrase to exclude the 
antiterrorist convent1ons on the ground that they are not 
strictly speaking "extradition treaties" even when they 
expressly provide that they can be used as the basis of 
extradition.Murphy John F, The Future, Op.cit, note 48, 
P.45 
122 Murphy John F, The Future, Op.cit, P.42 
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applicable "bilateral extradition treaty" in force .123 
It is however noted that the 1971 OAS Convention depends much o~ateral treaties for the purpose of extradition. Article 
3 provides that "Persons . charged or convicted . shall b 
. . e 
subject to extradition under the provisions of the extradition 
treaties in force between parties or, in accordance with 
their own laws." 
The weakness 1 0f the 1973 Convention prompted States 
w! j ,..~ 1.; I 
formulating conventions and contracting bilateral treaties to 
include provisions which exclude from the "political offence" 
exception crimes committed against internationally protected 
persons. Hence Article 1 (c) of the European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism 1977., provides that a serious offence (>J 
~ 
involving an attack on the life, physical integrity or liberty of 
international protected persons, including diplomatic agents shall 
not be regarded as political offence or that inspired by political 
motive .124 
Political offences are generally divided into two kinds: 
'Pure' political offences for example treason, sedition and 
espionagei and 'ordinary' offences often violent crimes which occur 
in circumstances connected with political disturbances. In 
determining whether the political offence exception applies, the 
Anglo_ American courts use the "Political incidence test" which is 
different from the European courts' theory of "Injured rights 
123 (1982) 18 u.s.c S.3181 
124 Jochen A. Frowein, Op.cit, P. 79 
151 
approach 11 • The European theory also differs from the 11 political 
motivation approach 11 of the courts of Switzerland and the 
Netherlands . 125 Although ordinary crimes are enumerated in the 
penal codes, it is contended that these crimes can attain the 
11 political offence" status when a relative test is used. It is 
therefore observed that there has not been a precise definition of 
the political offences and as a result the extradition treaties 
lose value in combatting terrorism. 126 Earlier cases do not offer 
analysis of any determination of political offences .127 
5.8.3 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND THE 1973 CONVENTION. 
Other critical issues concerning the 1973 Convention have to 
do with constitutional provisions. Some countries have 
constitutions which contain special provisions for exclusion from 
extradition of political offences or acts connected therewith. For 
example, the 1946 Brazilian constitution states that extradition of 
foreign subjects 11 shall not be granted for political crimes 11 • The 
19 49 costa Rican -Constitution, Article 31 and the 1936 Honduras 
constitution Article 20 provide that, extradition shall never be 
granted for political offences or any acts connected therewith. l28 
Ireland refused to sign the European Convention on the Suppression 
125 Yarnold Barbara M1 Op.citl P.17 
126 Antje c. Petersen 1 Op. cit, 7 7 51 See also Sapiro Miriam I 
Op.cit, P.660 
127 sapiro Miriam E, Op.cit, note 90, P.670 
128 Franciszek Przetacznik , Op. cit I p . 109. 
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of Terrorism because it believes that extradition of political 
offenders is inconsistent with Article 29 of its constitution.l29 
I~act, Constitutional provisions override the 1973 
Convery{ion, and any interpretation made is likely to be 
independent of any other document including this Convention. It is 
the judiciary which decides whether the offence is political or not 
and whether any act is connected therewith considering other local 
legislations as well as government policies. 
Finland made a reservation upon signature of the 1973 
Convention in 1974 and confirmed it upon ratification on October 
31, 1978 that: 
It reserves the right to apply the provisions of Article 8, 
paragraph 3, in such a way that extradition shall be 
restricted to offences which, under Finnish Law, are 
punishable by a penalty more severe than imprisonment for one 
year and provided also. t?at other c~nditi?IQS in the Finnish 
Legislation for extrad1t1on are fulf1lled. j 
However Franciszek Przetacznik
131 observes that since 
following documents, 
(a} the General Assembly of the Organisation of American 
states (OAS) by its resolution 4, of June 30, 1970132 
(b) The OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish133 
129 sapiro Miriam E, Op. cit, note 186, P. 685 
130 Przetacznik Franciszek Op.cit, P . 115. 
131 Ibid. 
the 
132 The resolution recognised that kidnapping of officials of 
foreign states and extortion are serious crimes. 
133 Article 2 provides t~a~ kidnapping,. murder,and other 
assaults against off~c1als o~ fore1g~ states,"shall be 
considered common cr1mes of 1nternat1onal significance 
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(c) the Uruguayan Draft134 (a working paper on the 
formulation of The 1973 Convention) . 
(d) R.D Kearley's Draft135 (a working paper on the 
formulation of The 1973 Convention). 
formed part of the preparatory documents of the 1973 Convention, it 
is apparent that the offences committed against officials of 
foreign States are considered common crimes and therefore 
extraditable. 
However, the government of Israel in its declaration stated 
that its accession to the 197 3 Convention does not constitute 
acceptance by it as binding of the provisions of any other 
international instr~ent, or acceptance by it of any other 
international instrument as being an instrument related to the 1973 
Convention . 136 
It has however been observed that some of the recent 
legislations have made exceptions to political offences. A typical 
regardless of motive " . 
134 Article 1 of the draft provides that murder and other 
offences against the life and physical and mental 
integrity of officials of ~oreign States regardless of 
their motives are common cr1mes . 
135 Article 2, provides that "an international crime 
described in Article 1 shall not be considered as a 
political offence or as an act connected with such an 
offence." 
136 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary 
General, status at 31st Dec 1986 United Nations, New York 
1984, p. 85. 
( 
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example being an attempt on the life of the head of State. Belgium 
amended its laws following an assassination attempt on the life of 
Napoleon 111 to make it an extraditable offence if an attempt is 
life of the head of State .13i Likewise, in recent 
years, exception has been extended to crimes against human life 
I 
genocide, attacks on diplomats as well as hijacking aircrafts. The 
tension betv1een the legal principles "extradite or prosecute" and 
. II • (._ ~ itical offence except1on 1s one of the weakness.J.. in an 
effort to apply international law to the prevention and pu Ishment 
of terrorism.m The European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism which was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1977, among 
others excludes the following from the classification of political 
offence: 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
( f ) 
a serious offence involving an attack against the life 
physical integrity or liberty of internationally 
protected persons~ inc~~ding . diplomatic agents; 
an offence involv1ng k1anapp1ng, the taking of a 
hostage . 
or serious unlawful detent1on. 
an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, 
rocket,automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if 
this use endangers persons. 
an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or 
Participation as .an accomplice of a person who commits 1H such an offence. 
Article 2 additionally excludes from "political offence" a 
Ui Moore John Norton, "Toward Legal Restraints on 
International Terrorism", (1973) 67 A.J.I.L, P.88 
138 Schlagheck Donna M, Op.cit, P.120 
139 (1976) 15 I.L.M, P.1272, See also, Alona ~.Evans/ Murphy 
John F. Murphy, Legal ~spects of Internat1onal Terrorism 
(Lexington Books,1978J P.497. 
-
I 
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serious offence involving an act of violence other than one covered 
by Article 1. However, Article 13 of the European Convention 
provides that "any State may . . declare that it reserves the 
right to refuse extradition in respect of any offence connected 
\vith a political offence or an offence inspired by political 
motives .... " This provision in a way reverses the purpose of 
the Convention. The Scandinavian countries, France and Portugal, 
reserved the right to declare any of the enumerated offences in 
Article 1 to be politically motivated. nl40 Despite ~ 
disappointing record ~ of western political and judicial cooperation 
against terrorism, the prospects for improvement are much better in 
Europe. Europe share similar values including the belief in the 
sanctity of individual human life, the rejection of violence as a 
method of resolving political differences and a commitment to a 
democratic government and the rule of law . 141 It is argued that 
similar treaties should be encouraged to enable States to extradite 
offenders of crimes against internationally protected persons. 
It is however noted that the extradition process is indeed 
more difficult than it seems to be as it involves conventional and 
customary international law as well as issues of international 
relations and foreign policy . 142 Therefore, extradition has been 
140 Antje c . Petersen, Op.cit, P.783 
141 Wilkinson Paul , British, Op. cit, P. 6 & 7 
142 In re Me Mullen, the alle.g~d offender, was a deserter 
from the British Army who JOlned the Provisional Wing of 
the Irish Republican Army . He was charged with 
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more often denied than it has been granted. What some countries do 
is to prosecute the offenders under their own laws and then deport 
them. Spain became a well publicised haven for persons wanted for 
various crimes in the U. K . 143 In 1978, President Mobutu of Zaire 
criticised Belgium for granting asylum to some of his political 
participating in the bombing of Claro Barracks in Britain 
in which a charwoman was killed. Britain sought his 
extradition from the United States pursuant to the 
extradition treaty between both countries. At the 
hearing, He Mullen alleged that Britain 1 s extradition 
request was political. The magistrate agreed and found 
that "an insurrection and a disruptive uprising of a 
political nature did exist in northern Ireland, in 1974, 
when the offender participated in the bombings and that 
his actions were directed by his organisation." 
In Abu Eain 1 S case, the offender was alleged to have 
killed two young Jewish males and wounded 36 others by 
detonation of explosives in a trash bin in a public 
market place in Tiberius, Israel, in 1979. When Israel 
sought his extradition .f~om Chicago the Magistrate 
refused the plea of pol1t1cal offence and said that 
" random and indiscriminate placing of explosives near a 
bus stop on a public street diffuses any theory that the 
target was a military one or one justified by any 
military necessity. " 
In 1983, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California ordered the release from 
jail of William Joseph Quinn, a member of the Irish 
Republican Army who was accused of shooting a London 
police constable to death in ~975~ ~nd of co~s~iring to 
send letter bombs to a Cathol1c b1snop, a Br1t1sh judge 
and a newspaper executive. The explosives were placed at 
a railroad station and two restaurants. In contrast with 
Abu Eain 1 s case the court ruled that all the alleged 
crimes constituted political offences . Murphy John, 
Op.cit, P.S0-1, See also Yarnold Barbara M, Op.cit, P.23 
- 46 
143 scott Davidson, et al, "Treaties Extradition And 
Diplomatic Immunity; Some recent development" (1986) 35 
r.c.L.Qt P. 429 
157 
adversaries . 144 
The District Judge of Southern District of New York, denied a 
request to extradite Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty to Britain . 
Doherty claimed to have been involved in the provisional Irish -
Republican Army attack on British soldiers, which resulted in the 
death of one of them. He was thereafter charged with murder but 
escaped before sentencing. He claimed that his offences were 
political. The court upheld this contention. However in 1979, when 
Italy requested the extradition of one Piperno on the ground that ~ 
he had participated in the kidnapping and murder of Prime Minister 
--Aldo Mora, in 1978. The court of Appeals of Paris, rejected the 
-- ---
claim that the offences were political in nature. In 1968, an 
Austrian court found that the seriousness of the offences, the 
killing of several persons by explosives / outweighed the political 
motive .1 45 / 
Italy requested the extradition of Zumer from Greece after he 
allegedly participated in the bombing of a Synagogue in Rome that 
injured dozens of people and killed one child. Greek had notified 
Italy that it would detain Zumer until he had served his sentence 
144 Mobutu considered this act as an effective support to 
those willing to overthrow him and hence a hostile act. 
Wijngaert van den, "The. Political Offence Exception To 
Extradition" quoted by G1lbert Geoffrey S, "Terror ism And 
The Political Offence Exception Reappraised" (1985) 34 
I.C.L.Q, P.695 
145 Murphy John, op.cit P. 54 - 55. 
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for passport violation. But the Greek Minister of Justice denied 
extradition thereafter stating that Al Zumer 1 S action constituted 
legitimate political expression . 146 A fugitive who flee to a State 
that is politically sympathetic or that embraces a broad view of 
the political offence exception may escape prosecution and 
punishment. If extradition is denied on the basis of political 
offence exception or another ground, the requested State may lack 
the jurisdiction to prosecute or punish the requested person . 147 
Apart from the theory of political offence, there have been 
other situations in which the victim State is not willing to put 
pressure on the sanctuary State . 148 One such situation arises 
,... 
when the offender is in a sanctuar State that is politically or of 
economically important to the victim State. For example, the 
United states bargained with Iran on the release of hostaaes in 
Lebanon ? and took lesser measures with Syria .regarding terror ism 
while i't did not find any difficulty in attacking Libya.149 
146 Bulgaria is reported to have.turned over to West Germany 
four suspected German terror1sts. See John Murphy, Legal 
Aspect of International Terrorism, Op.cit, P.24 
147 1 Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
states (Revised) S.402 -404 Tent. Draft No.6, 1985 
148 Heymann Philip B, Op.cit, P. 11. 
149 It may be remembered t~at the Uni.ted States bargained 
with the Islamic republlc of Iran 1n the famous 
~Iran-Contra Affair 1 arms deal, while it did not find it 
difficult to attack Libya. Although Syria has remained on 
the United states 1 list of sponsors of terroristic 
activities the u.s never took steps to attack it. 
Recently there have been o~ficial meetings between the 
Syrian officials and the Un1ted States government. 
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The second situation relates to the historical nature of 
relationship. For example, Italy has long historical as well as 
economic ties with Libya, while France has similar ties with Syria. 
Italy and France would therefore be less willing to adopt severe 
measures against these two countries respectively .150 
However it is learnt that some State Parties have responded 
positively to the letter and spirit of Article 7 of this Convention 
which provides that a State Party in whose territory the alleged 
offender is present shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, 
without exception whatsoever and without undue delay the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution through 
Proceedings in accordance with the law of that State . 151 Therefore, 
some states have tried and sentenced offenders found in their 
150 In January 1977, France released Abu Daoud who was 
suspected of ma~terminding t~e 1972 terrorist attack at 
the Munich OlympiC Games . Altnough Germany and Israel had 
filed request applicati~ns for extradition both requests 
~ dismissed on technical grounds . '!'he lHteli:RooG-G.t.. 
;-e~r of terr?rist retribution an~ desire to maint~in good 
relations w1th Arab States be1ng the cause ror the 
releas~-~annot be ruled out. 
Ira_lian Prime Minister Craxi ' s handling of the 
Achille Lauro hijackers is another situation that is 
worth noting. In this incident the Italian government 
allowed Abu Abbas to leave Italy. Abu Abbas who had 
negotiated the return of the Achille Lauro was wanted in 
the united states for savage attacks on civilians. When 
the united states s~ught extra~ition of Abbas, Italy 
announced that the Un1ted States request though correct 
did not satisfy the factual and substantive requirements 
laid down by Italian Law. 
151 Murphy John F, Punishing In~ernatio?a.l T.errorists: The 
Legal Frame\vork For Pol1cy In1 t1at1 ves ( Rowman & 
Allanheld, 1989), PP.117 -18 
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territories. 
On November 15, 1982, Switzerland rejected a request from 
Poland for the extradition of F. Kruszyk, M. Michalski, M. 
Plewinski and K. Wasilewski, who on September 6, 1982 occupied the 
Polish embassy in Berne and took 12 members of its staff including 
the Polish officials as hostages. In rejecting the extradition of 
these men, the Swiss authorities told the Polish government that 
they wanted to try the men because the offences were committed on 
Swiss soil.l52 
;:.I:..::.n::......-_.ao.:..:n.:..:o~t;;..;;h-.e~r:_ i n_c i d en_t;__ which concerns hijacking and not r 
specifically diplomats, is when the Federal Republic of Germany 
denied a czech request for the extradition of 10 Czech nationals 
Who had hijacked a czech airliner to West Germany, killing the 
Pilot and injuring the co-pilot in the struggle . When the request 
for extradition was received, it was held that the offenders could 
not be extradited because the case had already been submitted for 
Prosecution in a German Court. They were convicted and received 
sentences ranging from seven years and above. iS 3 
The 
basically 
wording/ of Article 7 of the 
mean/ to give an option to a 
1973 Convention are 
= 
State Party in whose 
territory the alleged offender is found, or presenJ to either 
152 Przetacznik Franciszek, Op. cit, P . 14 7. 
153 Alona E. Evans 1 John F. Murphy, Op.cit, P. 512 note 24. 
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prosecute or else extradite him /her to a requesting State where 
he/she would be prosecuted and punished. The ultimate objective of 
the 1973 Convention is to punish the offender for the crimes 
committed wherever he/she may be. 
5.8.4 ALL OFFENCES IN THE 1973 CONVENTION ARE EXTRADITABLE 
The offences contained in Article 2 of the 1973 convention are 
extraditable. Article 8154 provides that: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
To the extent that the crimes set forth in Article 2 are 
not listed as extraditable offences in any extradition 
treaty existing between States Parties, they shall be 
deemed to be included as such therein. State Parties 
undertake to include those crimes as extrad't ble 
offences in every f~ture extraditio~ ~etween ~hem. ~ ~ bv 
If a state Party which makes extradit on conditiona on~ ~~ 
the existence of a treaty receives a request for 
extradition from another State Party with which it has no 
extradition treaty, it may, if it decides to extradite 
consider this Convention as the legal basis fo~ 
extradition in respect of those crimes. Extradition shall 
be subject to the procedural provisions and the other 
conditions of the law of the requested State. 
state Parties which do not make extradition conditional 
on the existence of a treaty shall recognise those crimes 
as extraditable offence~ between themselves subject to 
the procedural provisior~and the other conditions of the 
law of the requested State. 
Each of the crimes shall be treated, for the purpose of 
extradition between States Parties, as if it had been 
committed not only in the place in which it occurred but 
also in the territories of the States required to 
establish their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 
1 of Article 3 
The p ovisions of Article 8 are corollary to Article 7. The ~ 
International Law commission intended that the provision of Article 
&A~ . t ' . . . /" 8 assist in implementing the op Ions provided In Article 7 to c~r 
_A 
\ 154 Article 8 reproduce~ Article 8 of The Hague and Montreal 
conventions and Article 5 of the Rome draft, (1972) 11 
I.L.ML 992 
effect the legal basis of extradition . 
~I} ; 
1E2 
I Article 8 ( 1) apply when the States concerned have an 
extradition treaty which does not include the offence for which 
extradition is sought . It provides ttat all offences listed in 
Article 2 shall be deemed t0 be extraditable offences in any 
extradition trC:laty existing between States . 155 The paragraph is 
intended to cover all extradition treaties irrespective of the 
manner in which the extradition offences are described therein . 
. \rticle 8 ( 2) covers the situations of State Parties which make 9-i 
'· extradition conditional on the ex1stence of an extradition treaty 
and no such a treaty exists at the time when extradition is G. 
requested. A state which chooses to extradite is enjoined to 
consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in the 
existing treaties between States. Article 8( 3) apply to cases 
between those States which do not make pn extradition conditional (1 
on the existence of a treaty. The State Parties shall effect the 
implementation of the decision to extradite in manner provided G7 
155 Although this articl~ is emphatiC? on . the crimes in 
Article 2 being extrad1table, there 1s st1ll a difference 
of opinion as to who should be extradited in case there 
is a request. And the snag as already seen, is caused by 
the definition of the word ' terrorism. 1 There are some 
opinions that even among the friendly States of Europe 
and united states and Canada, there is still some 
disagreement ab~ut what f~lls unde~. '.terrorism' when such 
crimes are comm1tted. Tne extradlLlOn problem is two _ 
fold. The requested state has to decide whether the 
offence committed was politically motivated and this has 
not been,s6easy. And if it decides ~the~wise and proceed Cr 
to extradite the offend~r the ll.ke.llt:ood of facing 
reprisals from the terror1st or pol1t1ca1 organisations 
would be envisaged . 
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for in the procedural provisions of the law of the requested 
State . 156 Unlike Article 3 of 1971 OAS Convention which depends 
basically on bilateral treaties for the purpose of extradition this 
provision provides a broader perspective which covers three 
different situations.15i 
5.8.5 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION FOR EXTRADITION. 
Finally, Article 8(4) seeks to establish jurisdiction over 
crimes set forth in Article 2 for the purpose of extradition 
between state Parties as if such crimes have been committed, not 
' 
only in 1 a state in which they occurred but also in the territories c; 
/ 
of States Parties as required in Article 3. 158 The article enjoins 
State Parties to take appropriate measures to establish 
jurisdiction over crimes set forth in Article 2 as if those crimes 
had been committed in those States. 
Article 1 of the United States - Canadian Extradition Treaty 
156 (1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, PP.218 - 225, See also (1972) 11 
I.L.M. P. 992. 
157 See: SupraL PP.156 
158 Article 3 provide~ that: . . . (a) when a crime 1s comm1t~ed 1n the territory of that 
or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that 
statei (b) when the alleged offender is a national of that 
State · (c) when the crime is committed against an 
internationallY protected person as defined in 
Article 1 who enjoys his status as such by virtue 
of functions which he exercises on behalf of that 
State. 
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provides that, each party agrees to extradite to the other party, ~ 
/ 
persons found in its terri tory who have been charged with, or 
convicted of, offences specified in the treaty and committed within 
the terri tory of the other or outside thereof . 159 
This article establishes exterritorial jurisdiction over 
offences not only committed within the territories of the parties 
d:J 0 
to this treaty, but even other offences that might be committed in 
the other parts of the world. In line with the 1973 Convention, the 
1971 U.S-Canada Extradition Treaty, / establishes exterritorial 
jurisdiction over attacks on diplomats. Therefore a request for any 
extradition of person(s) charged with such offence(s) is most 
likely to be granted. Likewise, State Parties to the 1973 
Convention are encouraged to adopt measures that bring within their 
jurisdiction for the purposes of extradition crimes committed 
within and outside their territories. 
The Mexican criminal penal code establishes jurisdiction over 
many offences of abuse of diplomats. Articles 148 of the code 
apply to Mexican embassies and consulates abroad and to foreign 
embassies and consulates located in Mexico160 . 
The Danish Penal code (1939) too provides in article 8 that 
l. 
159 
160 
Danish criminal jurisdiction shall comprehend an 
offence committed outside the Danish State irrespective 
of the domicile of the offender; 
Evans Alona E I Murphy John, Op.cit, P.324. 
Ibid I p. 284 
< 
-
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(i) If the offence is prejudicial to the independence 
security, constitution or public authorities of th~ 
Danish State or constitutes a breach of official duties 
or interests yrotec~ed by la~1 in . the Danish State by 
reason of the1r spec1al relat1onsh1p thereto. 
The implications of this article are comprehensive. The words 
"prejudicial to the independence ... of the Danish State II 
have a wide meaning and therefore would bring into its fold of 
jurisdiction for the purpose of prosecution, many offences 
committed in and outside Denmark. 
The Israeli Penal Law (Offences- Committed abroad), amended 
197 2161 provides 
The courts in Israel are competent to try under Israeli 
Law a person who has committed an act abroad which would 
be an offence if it had been committed in Israel and 
which harmed or was intended to harm the State of Israel, 
its security, property or economy or i)a transport or 
communication link with other countries. bt: 
This amendment was made a year before the 1973 Convention was 
formulated. Therefore it cannot be held to be the outcome of that 
convention. But indeed it is the result of many attacks on Israeli 
interests including diplomats. Israel has since the 1967 War, been Gr 
~a state of war with its Arab neighbours. A considerable attack ~ 
was made on he Israelt interests worldwide, 
" diplomats as well as its aircrafts. 
including its citizens I 
161 This amendment is not the result of the 1973 Convention 
162 "Extraterritorial. Jurisdiction And Jurisdiction Follm·ling 
Forcible Abduction: A new Israel Precedent in 
International Law" , (1974) 72 M.L.R, PP.1087 8. 
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The need for such a legislation was compelling. With such a 
Israel could prosecute the offender of a crime against its 
interests anywhere in the world as if such a crime had been Q 
committed in Israel. The legislation of extraterritorial criminal G; 
jurisdiction acts as a good deterrent to all those who would commit 
crimes against Israel. Although it does not specifically refer to 
diplomats, the wording of the law naturally brings into its fold 
diplomatic agents. Under this legislation, the Israeli court 
convicted Faik Balut, a Turkish citizen, of the offence of 
belonging to Al-Fatah in Lebanon and Syria. He was sentenced to 
seven years in prison. 
The Israeli legislation is a model as far as abuse of 
diplomats and other international criminal offences are concerned, 
since it brings into its jurisdiction all offences commit ted 
outside national boundaries. But whether other crimes which are 
not international in nature deserve such a legislation is a 
question of interest to many scholars of international law .163 
that: 
The united states too, has the following legislation. 
section 1116(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides 
163 The usual pattern of legislation is that State 
jurisdiction over criminal o.ffences ~hould be and is 
restricted to only those cr 1mes comm1 t ted within its 
terri tory. The Israeli legislation brings within its 
jurisdiction all cri~es.c?mmitted all ?V~r the world as 
long as they ~re.~reJUdlClal to Israel1 1nterests. This ~­
extraterritorlallt.~ gea_!_es a precedent where many r..rr 
countries can leg1slate such a law and arbitrarily 
prosecute the alleged cr1minals. 
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If the v1ct.1m of an offence under subsection (a) is an 
internationally protected person, the United States may 
exercise jurisdiction over the offence if the alleged offender 
is present within the United States irrespective of the place 
where the offence was committed, or nationality of the victim 
or the alleged offender. ' 
This Section is indeed very comprehensive as it covers all 
offences committed by any person against an internationally 
protected person, including diplomats whether such a person is a 
United States citizen or not, provided that the offender is in the 
United States at the time of indictment. 
Law No.75 - 624 of July 11 , 1975 of the French Criminal 
Code extends legal competence to offences committed abroad, 
specifically crimes committed against French diplomats and consuls 
"4 in foreign States . lb. 
Although most of these legislation were made prior to the 1973 
Convention, the articles reflect the spirit in which Article 8(4) 
was made. If such legislatio~ of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
were made by all the part1es to th1s nvent1on, the protection of 
diplomats and their security would be enhanced and the message to 
the perpetrators of crimes would be loud and clear, that there 
would be no escape. m 
164 crelinsten Ronald D/Szabo Denis, Op. cit, P.64 
16 5 A District court ~· A~lanta, h_as awarded compensatory 
damages of half a M ll1on US DoLlar each to three women 
against Kelbesso. ~ gewo, also a refugee !or d~taining and 
torturing them wn~le he was an.army off1cer 1n Ethiopia. 
Amnesty Internat1onal, Nev1slet.ter Nov. 1993 Vol. XXll, 
Number Eleven. 
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5.9 The Unilateral Action 
The unilateral action (or extralegal remedy) is an act the in :? 
form of the use of force by one State with the objective of 
jurisdiction ~ rescuing its citizens or cause to bring into its 
perpetrators of international crimes. It is unilateral (and 
extralegal) in the sense that a State in which the alleged offender 
is present is not usuallY consulted or asked for its permission. 
The unilateral action has also been used to trap terrorists as well 
as demolish their equipment in a ~anctuary State. It is unilateral c;,r 
in a sense that usually the sanctuary State does not give consent ~ 
to such action. The resort to unilateral actions is also due to 
..., 
frustration by countries who find extradition of offenders ,_-,.r 
difficult. As we have already pointed out some countries, due to ~-
~ 
fear of reprisals or retribution from the terrorists groups166 or 
sympathizers, allow the terrorists to flee to safe havens. In such 
situations, some states resort to unilateral action against 
terrorists to rescue their citizens, diplomats and sometimes to 
bring the offender(s) to their countries to answer charges. 
The first mode of a unilateral action is the abduction of 
/ 
offenders from states in which they might be found .167 Fawaz 
166 In 1972 Egypt refused landing rights to the Hostage-takers ~f the Israeli athletes . Clive C.Aston, Op. cit, 
PP.73 and 79 
16 7 Murphy John F, The Future, Op.cit, P.83, See also Ahmed 
v. Wigen 726 F.Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y 1989). 
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Younis168, a Lebanese, was lured into a yacht in international 
waters, in 1987. The FBI agents then arrested him and transported 
him to the United States where he was tried and convicted of 
involvement in the 1985 hijacking and destruction of a Jordanian 
airliner at the Beirut international Airport. Adolf Eichmann , a 
Nazi war criminal was kidnapped from Argentina by Israel agents in 
1960 and the United States invaded Panama in order to obtain 
. 169 
control over Manuel Nor1ega. 
The second mode of remedy which Yarnold describes as 
extralegal is the disguised extradition. It is a method through 
which a State relies upon its immigration laws to deny an alien the 
~I 
I 
privileges of remaining in the State. In carrying out the expulsion It; 
or deportation provision of such a law, it places the individual I 
directly or indirectlY in the control of the State agents which 1 
d • t ' 170 seeks his extra 1 10n. Britain sought Desmond Mackin's 
extradition for participation in a shoot - out in which a British 
soldie r was wounded .171 The m~~rate court in the US found that G.· 
Mackin's case fell \vi thin the political offence exception and 
extradition was denied. On appeal, the US appeal court upheld the 
r uling in Mackin ' s case. However, the immigration and 
168 Although the offender in ~his ill~stration d.id not affect 
diplomat as such, the cr1me comm1tted was 1nternational 
in nature. 
169 Yarnold Barbara M, Op.cit, PP . 47 - 59 
liO Ib i d, P.67 
lil Mackin's case too did not affect diplomats 
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naturalisation services had by then initiated proceedings against 
Mackin for illegal entry into the United States. He was 
subsequently deported to the Republic of Ireland. ii2 
The third type has to do with rescue operations. The classic 
case of the Israeli Raid at Entebbe, on June 27, 1976, was a 
unilateral action taken when four terrorists of the Popular front 
for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an Air France shortly 
after take off from Athens airport. They flew to Benghazi, Libya, 
for refuelling before going to Entebbe. On July 3, under the cover 
of darkness, three plane loads of Israeli commandos made a surprise 
landing at Entebbe, and rescued the hostages . One Israeli soldier, 
3 hostages, 20 Ugandan soldiers and all the hijackers were 
killed .173 
This and many other successful and unsuccessful unilateral 
1i2 Yarnold Barbara M, Op.cit, P.68 
ljj The Israeli negotiations revealed that Idi Am in 
(then President), was .. not m~king eff_orts to free the 
hostages but he was ac~1~ely Involved 1n supporting the 
hijacking. W~ei! the . a1rcr~~t landed at Entebbe six 
Palestinians JOined ~he hl]ac~ers. The hijackers 
demanded the release of 53 pr1soners.President Amin 
informed the hostages that the hijackers did not have 
grudges against them but the fascist Israeli government. 
All the Israelis were segregated whilst the non-Israeli 
women and children were released and allowed to go to 
Paris. The Israeli government decided to go ahead with 
the military raid on Entebbe. The Ugandan ai;rcrafto/ at Gr 
the airport were all dest~oyed. One Israel1 woman who 
had been taken to the hosp1t~l w~~ never heard of again. 
Kenya helped Israel to rerue~ ana ~o carry out emergency 
surgery on the wounded . . That ~a~ the w?rk of General 
intelligence and Reconn~1ssance Un1t 269 (Israel). Vide: 
Neil c.Livingstone,Op.clt, P.186 
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r e scue operations are known to be the result of unsatisfactory 
nego t i a tions between the terrorists and the victim States .174 
1i4 In another incident, (in which diplomats were not 
affected but only for clarification) the members of the 
West German Boarder Protection Group Nine ( GSG-9) , or 
locally known as Grenzschutzgruppe-9 received intensive 
training from a wide range of methods including tactics 
by Israel. When the Lufthansa flight 181 from West 
Germany was diverted in 1977, the Unit was activated and 
28 men were picked for the rescue along with medical and 
communication personnel. They caught up with the flioht 
at Larnaca, Cyprus, but the government of Cyprus refused 
them a rescue attempt. The hijacked plane left for 
Bahrain, Dubai, South Yemen and then landed at Mogadishu 
airport 
1 
in Somalia. While in Aden I the terrorists 
murdered the pilot and dumped his body at Mogadishu, and 
declared that if the government of West Germany did not 
agree to release their comrades from prison, they would 
destroy the aircraft and the remaining hostages. 
The government of Somalia, under pressure from Western 
governments 1 allowed the rescue to take place. The 
terrorists were made to believe that the German 
government was considering their demands before the i r 
deadline. The plane of commandos landed at Mogadishu 
• • I 
unobserved by the terrorists. Tne GSG 9 were dressed in 
dark clothing and ~f_§hoe~ were so soft that they 
could crawl without any noise. They utilised spike 
microphones to ascer~ain the exact. locations of the 
terrorists. When the1r leader was Informed that there 
were some complications, he called the others in one 
place to decide how to react to the new complications. 
It was at this moment that the commandos blew off the 
starboard doors of the plane and the windows of the 
emergency exits abo'-:e the wings. They ~sed stun grenades 
to blind the terrorists. They rushed 1nto the plane and 
all the hijackers were brought down by submachine gun 
fire and one was badly wounded. None of the passengers 
was seriously hurt. Ibid, P.176 
In 197 6 
1 
France, also used force to rescue a bus 
load of children held hostage on the Somali boarder. The 
representatives of the terrorists in Somalia had made 
demands from the French government and threatened to cut 
the throats of the children if their demands were not 
met. The French ~ol~iers attacked the terrorists on the 
somali boarder, killing all of them and rescued all the 
children except one who had been killed by the 
terrorists. Vide : Alona E.Evans/Murphy F.John, Op.cit , 
P.556 
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Although we have called such actions unilateral, in actual sense, 
they are not unilateral, because, in one way or another, a third 
1"' State appears to have offered some help. 1 ~ For example, Kenya, was 
instrumentally used when Israel raided Entebbe Airport without 
which such an operation could not have been such a success. 
Likewise, Somalia (in this particular incident was the sanctuary ~ 
S~te) offered considerable assistance and cooperation to the 
German rescue team. Although these incidents were rescues from 
terrorist groups in no way were diplomats directly involved. If 
there was any diplomat in any one of them, she /he was only a 
passenger and would not have been the main target of the 
terrorists. 
Two rescue attempts that are also worthy of attention are the 
Project Blue Light and the SAS operations. The former was an 
operation authorised by President Jimmy Carter on a rescue mission 
to free fifty - three United States hostages, comprising mainly of 
diplomats and members of the Consular corps, who were held in Iran, 
after the seizure of the United States embassy, by student 
175 The unsuccessful rescue attempt which was carried out 
unilaterallY was the unsuccessful attempt made when the 
Egyptian saiqa atta~ked the ai.rport at Larnaca in Cyprus. 
They were sent ~ga1nst th~ w1shes of the government of 
Cyprus, and unt1l ~he lasL moment when they went into 
operation, theY .d1d not have the bl~ssing of the 
government. .rt lS not known ~hether th.ls attempt was 
intended to g1ve ample opportunity to the1r commandos to 
exercise their skills or whether it was a show off to the 
Cyprus government .. When the 15 minute fire fight was 
over fifteen Egypt1an commandos lay dead, their c-130E 
had been destroyed and the rest were in custody. 
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militants students. The latter took place when the SAS (Britain), 
went into operation to free hostages in the Iranian embassy in 
London. Both these incidents concerned diplomats and embassies 
and are therefore very important for this discussion. 
In May 1977, the White House announced the formation of a 
commando force similar to that of West Germany and Israel. The 
core of the force designated as Project Blue Light was stationed at 
Fort Bragg. The United States had also formed the Black Beret 
Ranger units in 1977, that engaged in training exercises to free 
the United States diplomats and to retake nuclear installations and 
oil refineries that had been captured by terrorists. In 1979 
Project Blue Light constituted a new Unit code named Delta. It 
represented the cream of the United States military establishment. 
Its commander, colonel Charles Beckwith, had received training from 
the SAS (UK) and Israel. 
The first exhibition of the Delta's capabilities came in 1980 
on a secret mission to free the United States diplomats and 
consular staff in Iran, following the failure of about five months 
of diplomatic negotiations to win their release. Unlike the Gv 
previous rescue operations, the hostage takers in Iran were Iranian 
nationals receiving considerable support from the home government .li6 
1i6 The Iranian rescue missi<?n posed some difficulties in 
operation unlike the prev1ous rescue missions which all 
took place at inte~national airports. Tehran~ was about ~ 
seven hundred m1les away from . the order with 
sophisticated radar and detect1on equipments.Six 
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This mission failed solely on technical grounds . 1i1 One of 
helicopters , and RH-53 Sea Stallions were put aboard the 
US aircraft carrier Nimitz and later on two more were 
added to the mission. On 24th April 1980, the rescue 
attempt was given the green light . With the help of 
Egypt, six C 130 Hercules took off from an undisclosed 
location in Egypt with a ninety-member contingent of 
commandos, fuel, jeeps, motorcycles, weapons and 
sophisticated communication radar-jamming equipment. 
They followed the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden where they 
refuelled in mid-air and continued to Masirah Island off 
the coast of Oman. They crossed the Gulf of Oman after 
a short rest and entered Iranian air space. Meanwhile 
after 7.30 am the eight helicopters left the deck of th~ 
NIMITZ which was by then operating in the Gulf of oman 
near the Iranian coast and proceeded to a location about 
200 miles Southeast of Teheran (Desert One), scheduled to 
rendezvous with C 130s and refuel and then continue to a 
second location near Garmsar, about 50 miles from Tehran 
which was scheduled to be the actual stage for the raid. 
Here the commandos were to take off from the helicopters 
I ' 
and then later dr1ven to a garage 700 yards away where 
they were to remain hidden until the following night. 
The helicopters would then be flown to a site covered 
with camouflage netfitting. Friends in Tehran, had 
organised trucks and were pre-positioned near the garage. 
These would carry 26 commandos on the night of the April 
26th into Tehran. Most of them were to go straight to 
the embassy and the rest were to rescue three Americans 
held at the foreign ministry. The hostages were then to 
be driven to Amjadieh Stadium where there would be 
helicopters waiting to airlift them to an auxiliary 
airfield near Oman, about 50 miles Southeast of Teheran 
where the C130 were to be waiting for the hostages~ 
Precautions were taken a~d therefore two of the 
helicopters were to be kept ~n reserve during the entire 
operation onlY to be used 1n the event of mechanical 
problems or any interferences Secondly, A c 130 
gunship (Hammer) was to be deployed overhead at the 
embass y to spray .the streets <;1round th.e embassy and 
Foreign Ministry w1th heavy ?a~1bre ma?h~ne gunfire to 
prevent reinforcements from a1d1ng the m1l1tants. It was 
also scheduled that once the C 130s were airborne, they 
were to be escorted out of th~ Iranian air space by us 
fighter planes fro~ the carr1er fleet waiting in the 
waters off the Iran1an coast. 
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the helicopters made an emergency landing with a hydraulic problem 
t 1 I J I 
that affected the rotor blades. It was decided to abandon it. Its 
crew and equipments were taken by another. Then, shortly 
'> 
afterwards, the rest '. encountered a severe dust and sand storm. 
Another chopper was forced to return to the aircraft carrier NIMITZ 
when its gyrocompass and one of its two altitude indicators failed. 
And the third helicopter had a hydraulic problem. In view of all 
these problems which developed after entering the Iranian air 
space, it was decided that the operation be abandoned. The rescue 
attempt was unsuccessful and eight men were killed and five injured 
as a result of a collision eetween a chopper and c 130s during the 
. ,., liB mh .. . . d St . . Nt,tiJ Withdrawal to the NIMIT~. 1 e un1~e aLes 1s also reported ~ ,7t 
to have also been involved in the Son Tay Rand and Mayaguez rescue 
missions _Ii9It should be taken into account that such an operation 
was taken against international law because it violated the Iranian 
sovereignty. 
The last of these episodes or rescue attempts is that of the 
SAS (Britain). The SAS is a 900 man strong, twenty-second Regiment 
formed during world war II. SAS only come into operation whenever 
there is a major terrorist crisis, sometimes as advisors to the 
affected party or to other units going into the field for the first 
lii Ryan Paul B, The Iranian Rescue Mission,(Naval Institute 
Press, 1985) P.79 
178 Neil c. Livingstone, Op.cit, P.187 
179 See: Essays on Strategy, Se~e?tion Fro~ The 1984 Joint 
Chiefs Of staff Essay Compet1t1on,(Wash1ngton: National 
Defence University Press, 1984) PP.4-6 
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time. It is reported that two of the SAS men accompanied the West 
German GSG9 team to Mogadishu in 1977, giving both tactical advice 
and also expertise on the use of equipment. Another team was sent 
to Italy when the Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Mora, was kidnapped. 
In May 1980, in fact barely a month after the Delta storm 
operation, members of the SAS demonstrated their considerable 
skills, but this time in Britain . Therefore, it did not encounter 
any obstacles similar to those faced in the Delta operation. Five 
Iranian Arab men from the group seeking self-determination for the 
Iranian province of Khuzestan took over the Iranian embassy, seized 
twenty six hostages, and demanded the release of ninety one fellow 
Arabs, then imprisoned by the Khomeini government, and a safe C 
conduct out of the country. They threatened to kill some of their 
hostages if their demands were not met. A decision to make a 
rescue at tempt was therefore made when one of the hostages was 
killed. About twenty SAS commandos dressed in black, armed with 
Pistols and submachine guns, and with faces covered with hoods, 
stormed the embassy from its roof and adjacent houses. One of the 
terrorists died in the assault and another died later as a result 
of wounds he had sustained. The fifth man was taken into custody. 
One of the hostages was killed and two wounded by the terrorists 
who opened fire on them when the commandos began the rescue .180 
It is apt to reiterate here that all rescue attempts, 
Particularly those in foreign States should be discouraged unless 
180 Neil c. Livingstone, Op . cit, P. 194. 
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with the permission of the State in which the hostages are found. 
It is urged that diplomatic solution is a more civilised methodl81 
which should be given priority in all circumstances unless and only r' 
if such a method cannot succeed should rescues be considered. The 
United Nations Charter, discourages the use of force as a method of ~ 
solving problems bet;een member States . 182 The member States are 
encouraged to use all other means to find an amicable solution. The 
operations are seen internationally as acts of war against 
sovereign States, because inevitably innocent civilians will be 
killed or injured usually through crossfire. This is unavoidable 
when raids are restricted to terrorists bases which are usually 
found in areas of civilian population . 183 There is a danger of 
losing the support of both domestic and international opinion .184 
181 crelinsten Ronald D.iSzabo Denis, Op. cit, PP.42 
182 rt has been suggested that the concept of self help or 
unilateral action falls under Article 51, of the United 
Nations Charter, which allows measures of self defence. 
Whether a unilateral action to rescue diplomats falls 
under this Article is an interesting debate of legal 
importance. 
183 This is because counter terror ism involves a fight 
against a hidden target that it lead.s to actions which 
violet ethical norms. The frustrat1on of fighting a 
movement which is largely invisible creates a powerful 
thirst for intelligence and revenge. For example France 
used torture on detainees in Algeria. in 1954 - 61, The 
British army's abhorrent measures aga1nst post 1954 anti 
colonial campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus, and the 
Northern Ireland policy of . shoot to ~ill, the Nazi 
response to the attack o? R~l~hard Heydr1c~ in occupied 
Bohemia on 27 May 1942, wnen Hl tler ordered lO, 000 people 
taken hostage and 1~0 to be shot that night. Wilkinson 
Paul, British, Op.clt, PP.21 & 22 
184 Wilkinson Paul, British, Op.cit, P.8 
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There have been other methods employed by victim States such as 
economic sanctions. The United States applied some economic 
measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran when its diplomats 
were held by militant students in Tehran. 
The fourth method is by making a complaint to the 
International Court of Justice, in the same way as the United 
States did in respect of Iran. This serves a useful purpose in the 
sense that it would focus attention on the illegal acts of the 
respondent State and raise the consciousness of the world community 
regarding such activities. 
The fifth mode is by making a diplomatic protest . This could 
be done even by other states sympathetic to the victim State. It is 
vital for other states and particularly the developed States, since 
their support is very important as a contribution to solidarity 
against terrorism. There have been many of these kinds of protests 
in the diplomatic world. 
~.10 Asylum For The Perpetrators Of Crimes Against Diplomats. 
Article 12 provides: 
The provisions of this C?nvention shall.not affect the 
application of th~ Tre~t1e~ on Asylu.m, 1n force at the 
date of the adopt1on or th1s Convent1on, as between the 
states which are part~es to those ~reaties; but a state 
Party to this Conven~1on may not 1nv?ke t~ose Treaties 
with respect to anotner State Party LO th1s Convention 
which is not a party to those Treaties. 
Article 12 of the 19 7 3 Convention under discussion is not 
emphatic on whether there should be asylum for the perpetrators of 
179 
crimes against internationally protected persons or not. While 
the provisions of Article 8 are decisive and clear that offences in 
Article 2 are extraditable, Article 12 gives preference to the 
bilateral treaties made on asylum prior to the formulation of this 
Convention. The article suggests that any previous treaty prior to 
the 1973 Convention which~~udes some or all crimes mentioned in 
Article 2 as non extraditable offences, such a treaty takes 
priority over Article 8. The impact of Article 12 on the Convention 
is that it defeats the general objective of the Convention on 
extradition .185 
The crimes against diplomats such as murder, kidnapping and 
others should be regarded as common crimes because they are 
committed against internationally protected persons. These crimes 
are not to be considered political offences simply because of the 
motives of the offenders, but because the victims of such offences 
are internationally protected persons . 186 Although the right to 
grant asylum is basically left to the competence of each state, 
State Parties should give due priority to the 1973 Convention and 
most especially to Article 8 of this Convention. 
Articles 7 and 8 tend to negate all possibilities of giving 
asylum or sanctuary to anyone who commits crimes against 
internationally protected persons. These articles are affirmative 
. 185 Franciszek Przetacznik, Op. cit, P .132 
186 ( 19 71) 1 y. B. I . L. c I pp. 11 - 12 
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of the requirement that a State in which the offender is present 
should extradite him\her to the requesting State for trial and 
prosecution. The requested State has to ascertain the conditions 
of trial and punishment in the requesting State, for some countries 
do not allow extradition where it is certain that the offender is 
likely to face torture in detention or death sentence for his/her 
crimes. After ascertaining all these conditions, a State should not 
hesitate to extradite the perpetrator(s) of the crime(s) against 
the internationallY protected persons. If a State chooses not to 
extradite for various reasons, it should submit the offender to its 
competent authority for prosecution . 
The objectives of the 1973 Convention are clear. That is, to 
adopt appropriate and effective measures for the prevention and 
punishment of such offenders of crimes against internationally 
protected persons. They should not go free nor should they be given 
safe haven after 
Protected persons. 
committing crimes against i nternationally 
The basic foundation of the 1973 Convention 
provides that a state should extradite or prosecute the offenders 
in the local courts. The wording of Section 8(1) removes any doubt 
by stating that all crimes listed in the article are "extraditable 
offences". 
The Convention does not refer to these crimes as common crimes 
but crimes \'lhich should be punishable by appropriate penalties 
which take into account their grave nature. These crimes are grave 
181 
in nature because they are committed against internationally 
protected persons .18i The principles of international law as 
contained in other conventions refer to these crimes as "common 
crimes " which make the offenders not eligible for asylum. Under 
this principle, it is not permissible for States to grant asylum to 
persons accused of or condemned for common crimes. For example, 
Article 1 of The 1928 Havana convention, provides that "it is not 
permissible for States to grant asylum · · . to persons accused or 
· u188 
condemned for common cr1mes. 
(!/ 
The 1935 Montevidjo Treaty On Political Asylum and the 1939 
Montevid~ Treaty on Political Asylum And Refuge Articles 1 and 3 
respectively provide that States are not permitted to grant asylum 
to persons charged \vith common crimes and should be extradited.189 
The 1954 caracas convention On Diplomatic Asylum provides that, "It 
is not lawful to grant asylum to persons who at the time of 
requesting it are under indictment or on trial for common offences Gr 
or have been convicted by competent regular courts and have not 
served the respective sentences · 
rise to the request for asylum · 
nature. rrl90 
18i (1972) 1 Y.B.I.L.C, P.15 
. save when the acts giving 
. are clearly of a political 
188 Franciszek Przetacznik, Op.cit, P.124 
189 
190 
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Article 2 of the 1968 Draft Convention On Diplomatic Asylum 
& ates that "homicide or an attempt against the life of the head of ~.l 
State ... shall not be considered as a political offence nor as a · 
motive to change a mixed offence from its status as a common law 
offence to a political offence. n 191 Asylum shall also not be 
granted to a person charged with genocide or crimes against 
humanity.192 Article 1(2) of the 1967 United Nations Declaration 
(1; And Territorial Asylum provides that the right to seek and enjoy 
-asylum may not be invoked by any person with respect to whom there 
are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a crime 
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity .193 
The granting of asylum to a refuge seeker is entirely in the 
hands of a requested State. It has to decide who qualifies for 
asylum in its territory. But this right does not seem to extend to 
crimes committed against officials of foreign States especially 
crimes such as kidnapping, murder, and other assaults against the 
lives or personal integrity of internationa~protected persons. 6{-
Article 2 of the Organisation of American States ( OAS) 
Convention To Prevent And Punish Acts Of Terrorism Taking The Form 
Of Crimes Against persons And Related Extortion That Are Of 
191 6 Diaest of International L~w 7 34 I • (Washington 1968) cited by Franciszek Przetaczn1k,Op.c1t, P.125. 
192 Przetacznik Franciszek 1 Op. cit, P. 12 5. 
193 Ibid, P. 132 
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International Significance (1971 Washington) states that 
kidnapping, murder and other assaults against the lives or personal 
integrity of officials of foreign states, as well as extortion in 
connection with crimes are considered common crimes of 
international significance regardless of motive. The 1971 Rome 
Draft
1
194 provides that crimes against officials of foreign States ~ 
such as kidnapping, murder, and other assaults against the lives 
and physical integrity of internationally protected persons are 
deemed to be extraditable offences. The 1972 Kearney's draft195 
also provides that crimes such as murder, kidnapping, grievous 
bodily harm, extortion, attempt to commit or participate in any of 
such crimes are not considered to be political offences .196 
It is therefore suggested that, although the 1973 Convention 
does not say in explicit terms that the crimes in Article 2 are 
common crimes, it treats all such crimes in Article 2 as 
extraditable offences without due regard to the moti v~, · t is / 6 
apparent that all such crimes are common crimes .19i Therefore 
unless otherwise an interpretation is made to the effect that 
Article 12 means that with the exception of crimes committed 
194 The Rome Draft Convention was transmitted by Denmark 
(GAOR: 27th session, Supp, No. 10 A/8710/Rev.1). 
195 Richard D. Kearney (Cha~rman Of International Law 
commission) Draft Convention (U.N. Doc A/CN4 IL.182), 
Dated FebruarY 28, 1972 
196 Przetacznik Franciszek, Op. cit, PP .141 and p. 115. 
197 Ibid, P. 131. 
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against foreign officials specified in Article 2, the provisions of 
this Convention shall not affect the application of Treaties on 
Asylum in other situations, there is no justification for the 
inclusion of Article 12 in this Convention. 
5.11 DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS 
The last of these articles which requires attention and which 
is more likely to frustrate the objective of this Convention is X 
Article 13 ( 1) which provides that "Any dispute between hm or more 
State Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall I at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration". This 
provision suggests that a State may in a unilateral request submit 
a dispute on interpretation to arbitration or the International 
Court of Justice. However the provision of Article 13(2) allows 
States to declare that they are not bound by paragraph 1 of this 
Provision . 198 
It is suggested that a unilateral request by a Qarty to a ? 
dispute is not feasible, because in such a case the other party 
/ 
usually denies to be bound by the outcome of such a request. It is 
important that the two parties, by mutual consent, agree to settle 
198 Article 13 ( 2), ~' .Each. State ~arty may .at the time of 
signature or rat1f1ca~1on of th1s Con~~nt1~m or accession 
thereto declare t~at 1t.does not cons1aer 1t~elf bound by 
paragraph 1 of thlS art1cle. The State Part1es shall not 
be bound by paragr~ph 1 of this article with respect to 
any state PartY wh1ch has made such a reservation." 
G 
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their dispute by arbitration or at the International Court of 
Justice. This is the reason why a number of countriesl99 made a 
declaration to the effect that they are not bound by this provision 
in accordance with Article 13 ( 2). 200 The observation made was that 
the consent of each party to a dispute is necessary. 201 
5.12 INTERPRETATION OF THE 1973 CONVENTION. 
Another problem we intend to include in this discussion is the 
interpretation of the 1973 Convention in general. Although Article 
13 gives solutions to disputes concerning the interpretation of the 
convention, many other States prefer to interpret it in accordance 
with he local legislation which in turn gives a wide variety of ~ 
interpretations. switzerland made a declaration to the effect that 
the Swiss Federal council interprets Article 4 and 5, paragraph I 
of the 1973 convention to mean that Switzerland undertakes to 
fulfil the obligation_contained therein subject to the conditions 
. 1 . 1 t. 202 
specified by its domestlC eg1s a 1on . 
199 They are~ Arge.m:lna, Bulgaria., Byelorussia, soviet r;r 
Socialist Republlc, Czechoslovakla, Democratic Republic 
200 
201 
2 2 
of Korea, Ecuador, El - Sal~ador, German Democratic 
Republic, Ghana~ Hungar~, Indla, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, 
Malawi, Mongolla, Pak~s~an, Pe~u~ Pola~d, Rumania, 
Trinidad and Tobago, T~n1s1a, ~kr~1n1an Sov1et Socialist 
Republic, union of sov1et Soc1al1st Republic and Zaire. 
Multilateral treaties, Deposited with the Secretary 
General, status as at 31st December 1986, United Nations. 
N.Y, 1987, p. 83 - 86 . 
Ibid. 
Ibid 1 page 86. 
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This may encourage many other States to carry out their duties 
in accordance with the local legislation which could be a hindrance 
to the effectiveness of this 19 Convention. 
5.13 CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion, we have observed that the main instrument which 
the international c mmunity uses for the prevention and punishment 
of t)le" perpetrators of ' crimes against internationally protected 
t; 
persons is the New York Convention of December 14, 1973. 
-
The impact of the 1973 Convention is that as we have seen some ~ 
State Parties legislated to have jurisdiction over crimes specified 
in Article 2 and punish the offenders with appropriate penalties 
I 
which take into account the grave natures of the crimes. 
There has also been relatively little improvement on co-
operation to share information regarding terrorist groups, their 
members, and their movements particularly in Europe and America. 
The outcome is that manY of the highly wanted offenders of crimes 
against internationallY protected persons have been arrested and 
brought to trial. It is also the result of this cooperation that 
many of these offenders cannot move freely as they used to in the 
1970s. The fact is that some of the offenders are now known and 
the information is disseminated among member States. The other 
provision that is verY ~mportant is Article 7 \vhich requires a 
w?ose fey-.,' 4-- N ~ . . . 
State Party in ~na.a'h,.. the of render 1s present, 1f 1 t does not 
I 
extradite him, to submit him to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution. There has been a problem in implementing 
187 
this provision. Some States neither extradite nor prosecute the 
,., ~ 
offenders in the local courts. This is probably due to fear of 
reprisals from the terrorist groups, or for reasons that some 
groups are considered to be political in nature. Some countries do 
recognise certain organisations as political and to that extent 
they do not consider them as terrorists nor their activities. They 
look at their struggle as a means to achieve self-determination. 
The last of these provisions which is worthy of our attention 
as far as this subject is concerned is Article 8(4) which 
establishes "Extraterritoriality" for the purposes of extradition. 
-The provision states that for the purpose of extradition, such 
crimes shall be treated as if they had been committed not only in 
a State in which they occurred but also other territories of other 
States. 
- -In conclusion, we find that the 1973 Convention has 
significant loop holes which are manoeuvred by State Parties and 
Political organisations to frustrate the international effort to 
combat terrorism against diplomats. Further conclusions are to be 
made in the final chapter. 
CHAPTER SIX 
0 
IV S 
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OTHER METHOD~ADOPTED TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION u 
This chapter looks at measures taken at both international and regional 
, 
levels to enhance the protection of diplomats. The first part win loo~ at e Gf 
United Nations resolutions and the second part wi 11 be concerned with two of the 
regional corrventims, namely the 1971 Organisatim of American States Conv81tion 
to Prevent And Punish Acts Of Terrorism Taking The Form Of Crimes Against Persons 
And Related Extortion That are Of International Significance and The 1977 
European Convention On The Suppression Of Terrorism. 
6.2 INTERNATIONAL MEASURES 
The most serious problem with the 1973 Convention1 is that its 
ratification has not been as overwhelming2 as in the case of the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It took almost four years before the 
Convention was brought into force in February 1977. By 1993, 172 States were 
members to the 1961 Vienna Convention and only 86 State were members to the 1973 
Convent i on3 
As a result of the lack of overwhelming support for the Convention the 
Nordic states, namely Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden came up with 
the suggestion which was adopted in resolution 35/68 at the 35th Session of the 
General Assembly 1980, to the effect that, a •Communication Channel' between 
States and through the Secretary General, would be established against any ~ 
1 This convention is the main subject of this d.issertation and has 
been discussed in detail in Chapte.r V 
2 SchlagheckDonnaM_. International Terrorism: An Introduction To The 
Concepts And Actors. (Lexington Books D.C Heath and company. 
Ma.ssachusetts/Toronto _. 1988)! P.l21 & 123 
J (1993) 47 Y.B.U.N. P.l147 - 8. ~ee also Wilkinson Pa.ul. Terrorism 
And The Liberal State. (The Macm1llan Press Ltd_. 1977) herein after 
referred wasP. Wilkinson_. Terrorism and The Liberal State. P.226 
18.9 
serious violation of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and 
consular mission and representat ives. It was also to report on measures taken by 
a State to bring offenders to justice and to prevent repetition of violence, and 
eventually to communicate the final outcome of the trial proceedings against the 
offenders by a State where such proceedings are held. 4 The lack of ratification 
also resulted ~in resolution 34/145 for the Convention Against The Taking Of 
~tages 1979.5 In 1980 the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/168 in which 
. 
it deplored all violations of the principle~ and rules of international law 
LA- • 
governing diplomatic relations. It ar ~ued_ all members States to ensure the 
protection, security and safety of missions and representatives and to prevent 
illegal activities against their security. 6 On December 11, 1985 the General 
Assembly adopted another resolution 40/73 in which it emphasised the duty to take 
appropriate steps t o protect the premises of the mission, prevent any attack on 
diplomatic and consular representatives and to apprehend the offenders and to 
bring them to justice.i On December 3, 1986 the General Asst:mbly adopted 
resolution 41 /78 in which it recommended States to cooperatb closely through, 
inter alia contacts between the di plomatic antl consular missions and the 
receiving state, with regard to pract1cal measures designed to enhance the 
protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and 
representatives and with regard to exchange of information on the circumstances 
of a ·
1
; serious violations of diplomatic immunity .8 Again on December 7, 1987 , 
( B. Sen. oe.. cit. P.125 
j sell I agheck Donna .· Op. cit . P.123 
a· ( 1.980) 34 Y.B. U.N. P.l .l48 
i ( 1985) 39 Y.B.U.N. P. 1173 
8 (1986) 40 Y.B. U.N. P.994 
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the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/154 considering effective measures to 
enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missio s , 
f.P s ' J 
and representatives. Another resolution 43/167 of the General Assembly took pl,ace 
--
on December 9, 1988. It urged States to observe, implement and enforce the 
principles and rules of international law governing diplomatic and consular 
relations. 9 
6.3 REGIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM ACiAINST DIPLOMATS. 
6.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This discussion will briefly look at two regiona\ C ventions regarding the ~ 
protection of diplomats. These are : The 1971 Organisation of American states '~ 
Convention To Prevent And Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking The Form Of Crimes 
Against Persons And Related Extortion That Are Of International Significance, and 
~e 1977 European convention On The Suppression Of Terrorism. The objective 
underlying this discussion is to find out the impact of the regional responses 
and whether inkact the p!£visio~s of these COnventions offer some better method 
to combat ter/or1sm against diplomats. 1 
The 1971 OAS CONVENTION 
During the i960s there was a wave of acts of terrorism arising from 
political activities in the Americas. 10 It was in response to these activities 
that the General Assembly of The Organisation Of American States convened and 
resolved on June 30, 1970, inter alia: 
To condemn such acts. • . when perpetrated against representatives of 
foreign states, as violations not only of human rights but also of the 
9 ( 1988) 42 Y.B. U.N. P. 807 
10 Evans Alana E~ Legal Aspect Of International Terrori sm. (Lex ing ton 
Books
1 
Massachusetts . Toronto~ 1978) P.299 
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norms that govern international relations. 
The resolution also di rected the Inter- American Ju r idical Committee to 
..... 
prepare a draft convention on procedure7 and measures to fulfil the purposi of 
the resolution in cases where the prescribed acts might have international 
repercussions. This led to the formulation of the i971 OAS Convention of January 
8 , 1971. 
During the de 1 i be ration on the draft convention by the conference of 
foreign ministers, six governments_who thought that the convention should have G 
dealt with a wide range of issues pertaining to terrorism in general walked out 
in protest when the conference instead adopted a convention on specific issue, 
namely the kidnapping of diplomatic agents. 11 The conference was also given 
another shock when three governments either abstained or voted against the 
convention because of what they believed was an excessive infringement on state 
sovereignty. 12 
The objectives of the Convention are very well reflected in the preamble. 
It provides : 
. The General Assemb ly of the Organisation, in resolution 4, of June 
30, 1970, strongly condemned acts of terrorism, especially the kidnapping 
of persons and extortion i n connection with that crime, wh ich it declared 
to be serious common crimes; 
Criminal acts against persons entitled to special protection under 
international law are occurring frequently, and those acts are of 
II "The Inter- American Convent .ion On Kidnapping Of Diplomats" (1971} 
JO Columb J. T.L. PP. 392 - 397 
12 The convention did not the elfp~cted ratific'!tion from the beginning. 
See: Stohl Micheal ~ The Poll tJcs Of Terronsm. (Mercel Dekker. Inc~ 
N.Y . . 1978) P. 180 
( 
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international significance because of the consequences that may flow from 
them for relations among States .... 13 
The preamble declares from the outset that acts of kidnapping of persons 
) and extortions 
ordi nari 1 y to 
Y~ 1 r1 
in connection with that crime are common crimes. Common crimeA.re 
be found in penal codes are treated so for the purpose of 
prosecution and extradition. It is also the objective of the convention to curb 
criminal acts of terrorism against persons entitled to special protection under 
international law because of the repercussions of such acts on international 
relations. 
"---
THE PROVISIONS OF THE 197i OAS CONVENTION. 
The discussion intends to look at three provisions of this convention. 
Article 1 states: 
The contracting states undertake . . . to prevent and punish acts of 
terrorism, especially kidnapping, murder, and other assaults against the 
life or physical integrity of those persons to whom the State has the duty 
according to international law to give special protection, as well as 
extortion in connection with those crimes. 
First, the provision describes ' ratione personae ' as persons to whom the state 
has the duty according to international law to give special protection" The 
provision is not explicitlY clear whether the description includes other 
c~gories such as government officials, ministers, representatives of government 
bl . . t . 14 organisations and international pu 1c organ1sa 1ons . However the negotiating 
!J (1971) 10 I.L.M. P.255 
14 Przetacznik Fra.ncizek ... Protection of. Off.i~i.als Of Fnreign states 
Accordine To Jnternatwnal Law. (Martmus NJ]hoff Publishers! 1983) 
P.l4 
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history of this convention shows that it was intended to cater for a special 
class of diplomatic agents. 15 
Further, Article 1 establishes that kidnapping, murder, and other assaults 
which affect the life and physical integrity of diplomats (ratione materiae) are 
acts of terrorism. This is the case even though the 1971 OAS Convent ion does not 
/_r "' <:" 
define terrorism. It nevertheless describes these cts as offences of terrorism 
- - - . 
Therefore it may not be necessary to define terrorism in regard to these offence 
in any court of law in the Americas. fU_ I I 
T~~o .pro ision is tha founct in Article 2 wtfi fl'-' provides that .... 
kidnapping, murder and other assaults . .. shal l be considered common crimes 
of international significance, regardless of motive." 
In addition to the preamble, this provision reiterates that the offences 
described in Article 1 are common cr imes regardless of the motive. Therefore a 
political activist shall not claim the 'political offence exception' when he 
16 Th. . b · commits any of these offences. 1s 1s ecause common cr1mes are ordinarily 
considered so for the purpose of prosecution and extradition. These crimes by the 
fact that they are considered common crimes do not amount to political 
offences.1i This is an exceptional provision which has no equivalence in the 
1973 Convention. It seeks to negate the use of the 'political offence exception' 
in so far as these crimes are concerned. 
BILATERAL TREATIES 
~ Article 3 of this convention provides that: 
15 Evans Alana~ Op.cit. P.JOJ 
16 PJ·zetacznik Franciszek. Op. cit' . P.14 
17 
194 
Persons who have been charged or convicted . . . shall be subject to 
extradition under the provisions of the extradition treaties in force 
between the Parties or, in the case of State that do not make extradition 
dependent on the existence of a treaty, in accordance with their own laws. 
According to this provision the Convention depends almost entirely on the 
bilateral treaties for the purpose of extradition. The provision does not in any 
way suggest that the 1971 OAS Convention could be taken as a legal instrument for 
Its 
the purposes of extradition. The article also clari that a particular state has G 
the exclusive responsibi 1 itY to ascertain whether the acts perpetrated fall 
' 
within the confines of the treaty and if the details are applicable ~ As it has 
been 1 eamt on the prob 1 ems of extradit i on18 ~{ dependence on' b: at era 1 
treaties for extradition has its consequences. Howeve~the 1981 Caracas Inter _ 
American convention on Extradition urges State Parties to simplify procedures of 
extradition and promote mutual assistance in the field of criminal law on a wider 
It t t • • f 19 
scale than provided for in the rea 1es 1n orce. 
Alth~ugh we have noted that Article 2 provides that the offences described 
in Article 1 are common crimes, we find that this objective is defeated by 
Article 6 of the same convention. Article 6 provides that "None of the provisions 
-
..... 
of this Convention shall be interpreted so as to impair the right of asylum·~ in ( 
other words Articles 1 and 2 should not necessarily be taken as abrogating the 
right to asylum of offenders. ? I f. _,; ~if J , c..;<.-, • f ' 
Franciszek Przetacznik gives different interpretations'to this provision. L) 
He says that the provision means that .. with the exception of crimes committed 
18 
19 
suprl:l.. P.137 
Murph_v John~ p~n~sh~ng Jnternl:l.tional Terrorism: The Legal Framework 
For Policv rm t1at1ves. (Totawa . N.J. Rowman and Allenheld. 1988) 
P.39 
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against foreign officials ... the principles of the right to asylum apply to 
other situations . .. 2o 
However we do not find this interpretation sound to justify the inclusion ~ ~ 
of this provision in the Convention. If the objective of the provision was to 
offer asylum to offenders after serving their punishment for the crimes committed y 
or other offences not pertaining to officials of foreign States, we contend that 
this too, would not have necessitated the presence of this provision in the 
Convention.21 This is because it is within the prerogative of the States to 
offer asylum. Therefore Article 6 defeats the purpose of this convention. 
6.4 THE 1977 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM 
6. 4. 1 INTRODUCTION 
The European convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted by the 
Council of Europe on Nov. iO, 1976 . It was signed by 17 out of the i9 member 
States on January 27, i977.n 
It is noted that unlike the previous two conventions discussed this one is 
not exclusively concerned wi th di plomatic agents. It caters for other offences 
. 23 described in other convent1ons . 
THE OBJECTIVES 
The Convention begins its introduction , by stating the objectives. It provides 
20 
21 
22 
2J 
Przetacznik Franciszek. Op. cit. ?.132 
Wardlaw Grant. Political Terrorism: Theorv Tactics and counrer 
Measures. (Cambridge University Press. N.Y. 2nd Ed. 1990) P.JN 
Evans Alana! Op.cit! ?.497 
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that the Council of Europe: 
is to achieve a greater unity between its Members· 
' 
(is to show an awareness) of the growing concern caused by the 
increase in acts of terrorism; 
. to ensure that the perpetrators of such acts do not escape 
prosecution and punishment; 
. . . (and to emphasise that) extradition is a particular effective 
measure for achieving this result. 24 
.. 
As seen from the introduction_, the Convention acknowledges the increase in 
acts of terrorism and that the perpetrators of these crimes escape to safe havens 
where they cannot be prosecuted or extradited to other States for prosecution 
") 
because of the encumbrances of extradition. Since extradition is an effective 
measure for prosecution and punishment of offenders the Counci 1 found it 
necessary to come up with a measure which would limit some of the obstacles of 
extradition. The convention excludes the 'political offence exception' from all 
ff d · b d · h · n 
25 
o ences escr1 e t ere1 . 
In general, the Convention appears to be an additional instrument to 
CScl,ventions and i eaties in which problems of extradition have hampered the .( 
prosecution of offenders. Therefore the Convention does not follow the usual 
pattern of describing the "ratione personae". Further, when it comes to the 
offences "rati one materiae" it, among others, describes crimes mentioned in the I 
t . 26 / provisions of other conven 1ons. 
24 (1976) J.L.M. P.1272 
2j Mllrphy John . Op. cit. P. 45 
26 Weinberg Leonard B an1 Devis .Pa~l B. Inrroduction To Pol iUcal 
Terrorism. (Mcgraw- H1ll PublJshmg Co . N.Y. 1989) P.i68 
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6.5 THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1977 EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
Since the objective of this Convention concerns the extradition of 
perpetrators of crimes, it begins in Article 1 with solving one of the problems 
of extradition, the 'political offence exception'. It provides that: 
For the purpose of extradition between Contracting States none of the 
following offences shall be regarded as a political offence or as an 
offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by 
political motives. 
For the purposes of this discussion Article 1 (c) mentions crimes against 
I, 
internationally protected persons providing among others that: 
an offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or 
1 iberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents . 
However for the purpose of extradition all offences in Article 1 are considered r 
extraditable. The alleged offenders shall not plead the "political offence" 
exception. Unlike other provisions in the previous conventions this provision is 
emphatic that these acts are not political offences. 2i 
The convention strives to achieve greater unity among members of the 
European council in extradition arrangements. Article 3 provides that: 
The provisions of all treaties and arrangements applicable between 
Contracting states, including the European Convention on Extradition, are 
modified as between Contracting States to the extent that they are 
incompatible with this Convention. 
This means that other arrangements which do not consider some of the crimes 
to be extraditable, shall to that extent be inconsistent with this convention. 
/ 
One notable issue that requires mention is the absence from the convention 
21 Evans Alana~ Op. cit . P. 497 
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of a provision pertaining to asylum similar to that to be found in the i971 OAS 
Convention and the 1973 Convention. The absence of such a provision strengthens 
our argument that it defeats the purpose of the convention and hence it was 
deliberately omitted. It cannot be by coincidence that it was ieft out.28 
6. 6 CONCLUSION 
This discussion has looked at a number of resolutions at the security t:;r 
Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. The lack of overwhelming 
ratification of the 1973 Convention necessitated further measures to strengthen 
the protection of diplomatic agents. Therefore the resolutions adopted among 
I J 
others; appealed to States which had not yet become members to do so, , urged 
member states to ensure the protection, security and safety of missions and 
representatives, to prevent acts of violations of the diplomatic immunity and 
urged member states to cooperate and share information on acts of terrorism 
against diplomats. 
The 1971 OAS convention with the exception of one provision has very 
comprehensive measures of protecting diplomats. Article 1 explicitly calls crimes 
against diplomats acts of terrorism. Article 2 refers to crimes in Article 1 as 
common crimes. Common crimes are generally known because they are to be found in 
the penal codes worldwide and therefore are treated so for the purpose of 
extradition or prosecution. Therefore the political offence exception does not 
apply to these crimes. 
Although Article 2 refers to all crimes in Article 1 as common crimes 
28 It is apt to argue that Europe~ with irs proactive human ri!!hcs 
posture could not have accidentally left out the prov.isio;; on 
asylwn. 
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Article 6 defeats this objective. The offenders of these offences can qualify for 
asylum even before they are prosecuted. If the right to asylum was meant to be 
exercised after the offender has served his sentence or even if the offence was 
other than those prescribed in the above article there would be no need for the 
inclusion of this provision in this Convention. 
Lastly The 1977 European Convention aims at strengthening measures on 
extradition . It was adopted after having noted that many offenders escape 
prosecution and punishment. One of the obstacles it endeavours to remedy is the 
use of the political offence exception in crimes of terrorism. It was also 
intended that all other treaties and arrangements on extradition should conform 
to this Convention. 
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CHAPTER V11 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
The foregoing discussion brings us to a number of conclusions: 
1. The 1961 Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations offers very 
important provisions on the protection of diplomats, which are enshrined in 
Articles 22 and 29 . 
The objective of these provisions is to oblige the receiving state 
K.rlt 
to be duty-bound 1n protecting the diplomatic agent, not only from the wrath of 
the private citizens or organisations but also its very agents or organs, which 
may violate the diplomatic immunity. The inviolability of the diplomatic agent 
is not a sole right of the receiving State which can do away with or withdraw 
whenever it pleases, but it is a right of diplomatic agents, which is found in 
the international law of customary practices and usages. The obligation of the 
States is to abide by the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention On Diplomatic 
F€1atirns, which in fact, ccdifies the practices a1d usages of internatirnal law. 
As the establishment of diplomatic relationship is mutual, the waiving or 
wi thdrawa 1 of the diplomatic immunitY cannot be done unil at era 11 y. Internat ion a 1 
law accords protection to all diplomats whether in a receiving State or through c;._r 
which the passage takes place. The Preamble of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations / affirms that the rules of the customary international law shall C'r-
continue to apply to questions not regulated by the provisions of the present 
convention. 
2. The most important and unwritten law in matters concerning diplomatic 
-----
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intercourse is the principle of reciprocity. The concept of reciprocity in the 
regime of diplomacy plays much larger role than is accorded to it under 
international law. It is argued that the entire career of diplomatic immunity has 
been founded and maintained on mutuality and reciprocity. Every receiving State 
is infact a sending State. Each receiving State accords diplomatic immunity 
diplomats of the sending State so that its diplomats would be treated the same 
- 1-J . to r 
'I 
'' While inJ sending state. There are many incidents which may have occurred had it 
not been for this principle. As seen in the discussion, the British government 
in the fatal shooting of P.C. Yvone Fletcher in 198~would have ordered a search 
of the Libyan peoples' Bureau h~d it not been that thought, that Libya, would 
have done the same. When the British officers entered the Libyan People's Bureau 
after the diplomats had left, the Libyan authorities too, ordered the search of 
the British embassy in Tripoli. There are many incidents which can be cited in 
relation to reciprocity. However, the main. importan! fact is that normal 
existence of international relations owe much to the principle of reciprocity 
than to any other written law 
3. The discussion held during the field work found that some of the 
diplomats were affirmative that the provisions of the 1961 Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations offer adequate protection against private individuals. There 
is no need for any additional measures providing for similar provisions. Article 
29 of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations is emphatic that receiving 
States are under obligation to take appropriate measures to protect the 
diplomatic agents. This is so even though there is a lacuna in the law which does 
not provide for the violation of diplomatic inviolability by the receiving 
States. Even though the Convention does not provide for punitive measures against 
any State that disturbs the inviolability of the diplomatic immunity, it 
r 
, rr 
?)-
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neverthe 1 ess ob 1 i ges the States to take appropriate steps to protect the 
diplomats. The fact that some countries fail to offer adequate protection to 
diplomats against State agents does not necessarily affect the credibility of the 
provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention. 
It is certain that a reasonable protection has been set up in form of the 
provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention to protect diplomats. However the 
protection differs from one State to another depending on the security situation 
of a receiving State. In one situation, some receiving States are vulnerable and 
easily targeted by terrorists and, in fact, require increased security for 
diplomats. For example, a diplomat narrated that during the Gulf war, his 
country stepped up the security of diplomats for the allied States because of the 
Gulf war crisis during that time. 
The protection of diplomats therefore, varies from one country to another. c;(-
While in some states, around the clock, special protection is provided by 
specialised agencies, in others such protection is provided only in special 
circumstances. This find ing therefore seeks to separate the weakness of some 
countries to implement the provisions of the Convention from the document itself. 
It is however recommended that receiving States should step up appropriate 
measures to protect diplomats from their agents and other private individuals. 
They should also make arrangements for occasional patrol of the surroundings of 
diplomatic missions and diplomats' residences as well as screen their mai 1 
deliveries to avoid delivery of explosives. It should, whenever possible, offer 
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security alarms at their residences. It was learnt that some of the sending 
States offer their diplomats such fac i lities besides the protection provided by 
receiving States. 
4. This study has found that the attacks on diplomats occur for a number 
of reasons. 
In the first instance, it is due to lack of commitment by some 
countries to the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This is why there have been increased 
attacks on diplomats although many States believe that the provisions pertaining 
to the protection of diplomats are adequate. 
secondly, the attacks occur due to the fact that some countries fail 
to instruct their agents on the protecti on of diplomats and their inviolability. 
One diplomat recalls an incident where a receiving State had mounted a military 
road block where she was asked to produce her travel documents inspite of the 
diplomatic number plate on her car . The army personnel read the identification 
papers upside down! such a situation reveals lack of training of the government 
agents and respect for foreign officials. The diplomat cannot claim immunity from 
a government agent who does not even know who a diplomat is. The government 
agent may therefore proceed to search the diplomat and the car in violation of 
diplomatic immunity. It is suggested that the receiving States should take 
appropriate steps to train all its agents on the inviolability of diplomats. 
Thirdly, there are some receiving States who have committed 
themselves to helping the liberation groups and to a certain extent have allowed 
or encouraged such attacks to take place either by covering up those who commit 
acts of violation or/and allOW them to go free. Neither do these States make any 
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effort to detain and prosecute the offenders, nor do they share information with 
other States about their movements. This attitude is highly deplorable 
particularly when the attacks are directed against internationally protected 
persons. 
Fourthly, sometimes the receiving States also encourage or assist in 
violation of the immunities of diplomats whose ?tates are considered unfriendly. 
This is sometimes due to their direct interference in what is usually called the 
internal affairs of the State or when they are implicated in assisting a 
dissident opposition group in the receiving State or in exile. 
This way of solving such problems by receiving States is unacceptable and 
it is such unorthodox method, which has been referred to, in this study as 
' tate- Sponsored Terrorism ' . It is because it goes against a 11 norms of 
international law. The receiving States should abstain from encouraging such 
abuse of diplomatic agents. 
5. The responsibility of the States in protecting a diplomat extends to 
the situation where he is kidnapped. The receiving State is supposedly required 
under Article 29 of the 1961 Convention to take appropriate measures to secure 
his release. This includes talking to and negotiating with the captors of the 
diplomats. What matters is the safety of the diplomatic agent and not the means 
by which he is rescued from his kidnappers. The receiving State must endeavour 
to see that he is released and is safe. Reference is made to the 1979 Convention 
on The Taking of Hostage . The incident concerning the West German ambassador to 
Guatemala, K. Spreti, who was killed on March 31, 1970 by his kidnappers suggests 
that there should be strict liability on the part of receiving States in matters 
r 
,_r 
F 
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of protecting diplomats. The idea of talking to and negotiating with the hostage 
takers may only be favourable to those who accept or advocate negotiations with 
kidnappers and not with others who reject such a notion outright but it serves 
in the protection of diplomats. 
The two schools on negotiations, namely, those who wish to negotiate 
and those who vehemently reject any negotiations cannot be reconciled on a 
theoretical basis. Practically, it is believed, some States would wish to talk 
to the kidnappers. One diplomat was of the opinion that talking to the kidnappers 
amounts to recognising them. But other diplomats were favourable to negotiations. 
,... 
7 
One of them suggested that it is through talking to them that one would know the 
truth. This turned out to be the real situation when on November 18, 1974, Mr. 
Lechoco took hostage the Phi 1 i ppi ne ambassador to the United States. He demanded 
publicity and safe conduct of his son to the United States. While many states 
would favour talking to the di.plomats, there is no clue that the states would J -
give in to the demands of the nostage takers. 
Talking to and negotiating with the terrorists in diplomatic kidnapping is 
a subject many feel cannot be reconciled on the basis of a common policy. It is 
suggested that each state should be left to conduct its own course of solving the 
kidnap problem of kidnapping. No interference should be made with the receiving 
State to make it difficult for it to, or not to, enter into any talks. 
6. Although many receiving States have .2_ mproved on the security of the G, 
diplomats by providing necessary personnel and other forms of protection, the 
sending States too have stepped up measures to assist in the protection of their 
diplomats. For example, while it is easier to just walk into the third world 
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embassies with minor security checks, it is observed that many other embassies 
have strict security measures at the entrance of their missions. Far from the 
mission building, the main gate is manned by security personnel whose duty is to 
carry out body checks as weil ~arching the hand bags with electrical devices. 
The Israeli embassies and consulates are supplied with armed guards, walls and 
windows are reinforced, closed circuit television cameras are installed and 
inspection of parcels and visitors is stepped up. The United States too, employs 
stringent measures at its missions. It also employs marines, electrical devices 
and security cameras. 
7. There have been suggestions that the removal of the diplomatic 
car plates from their limousines would minimise the attacks on diplomats as the 
offenders would find it difficult to identify the diplomats. Although this 
sound~ a good suggestion, it does not take into account the fact that the ~ 
attacks on diplomats are usuaily well calculated_.? There are not many mist:kes 
about the identity of persons attacked. The pre-planned attacks enable the 
offenders to study and identify their targets right from their residences to the 
mission buildings including the routes. Therefore whether the diplomatic car 
plate numbers are on the car or not, the offenders can easily identify their 
targets. Some of the diplomats are in favour of retaining the diplomatic car 
plate numbers. One suggested that in any attack the people who might be present 
should be able to recogn ise that the victim is a diplomat . 
B. The mission buildings are inviolable and under no circumstances 
should receiving states enter their premises without the permission of the heads 
of the missions (Article 22). Any attack on the mission o~ entey 'nto it without 
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permission for reaso/ which may or may not be justified, for example, that tf-, 
activities which are incompatible with the functions of the mission (according 
to Article 41), are being carried out in the mission building, is not acceptable 
under the same convention and under any other acceptable source of international 
law. Some receiving States have taken a carefree attitude when it comes to mob 
demonstration by their citizens against the sending State. The receiving State 
is under a duty to protect the mission even if such demonstration is, according 
to the receiving State, justified. 
The option of seeking permission for entry into the mission or applying 
diplomatic pressure on the sending State should be exhausted before embarking on 
any attack on the mission building. It is recommended th~ the receiving State 
could as weli use pressure on the sending State to obtain its permission. Other 
means of solving such problems are not acceptable under international law. If 
I s~ch practices of breaking into the missions are not discouraged, some 
irresponsible States might be encouraged to mount occasional searches on 
embassies of countries they consider unfriendly. 
9. The objective of the discussion in the fifth chapter is to find out whether 
the provisions enshrined in the 1973 Convention enhance the protection accorded 
to diplomatic agents. The 1973 Convention was formulated due to increased acts 
of terrorism against internationally protected persons including diplomatic 
agents. The need for this Convention was overwhelming since the 1961 Vienna 
Convention did not specifically provide for the prosecution and punishment of 
Perpetrators of crimes. Since the beginning of the second part of this century, 
there has been all forms of attacks on diplomats committed by private individuals 
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and political organisations. It was therefore the objective of the 1973 
Convention to prevent, prosecute and punish crimes committed against diplomats. 
Although this Convention was initiated by the resolution of the United Nations 
General Assembly, it has however lacked an overwhelming ratification ~s it is in l J 
the case of the 1961 Vienna Convention. This has been caused by a number of 
reasons: 
(i) First, many member States were of the opinion that it was crucial to 
find solutions to the causes of acts of terrorism before the United Nations could 
embark on methods of prosecutions and punishments of crimes perpetrated by 
terrorism. However the majority thought that the need for the prevention of 
crimes was immediate and should be given priority . This was the case because most 
of those crimes are to be found in the penal codes around the world. The causes 
of the crime to which the 1973 Convention seeks to punish therefore remain 
largely unsolved. As it had been suggested at the formulation of this Convention, { 
the prevention of terrorism lies with finding solutions to the causes. 
( i i) The second problem concerns crimes described in Article 2 of the 1973 
Convention. Although it was deliberated upon during the formulation of this 
Convention that crimes against diplomats shall not form part of the activities 
of the liberation movements, State Parties have continued to treat these crimes 
as acts of liberation movements or self determination. 
(iii) Third, is the definition of the term ' terrorism'. Although the term 
does not form part of this Convention, this study finds that the 1973 Convention 
is one of the international legal instruments formulated to combat terrorism. It 
is learnt that the term terrorism has continued to cause problems among legal 
experts as well as government agents. It is therefore extremely difficult to 
ascertain in precise terms what amounts to terrorism. The 1973 Convention 
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therefore fails to effectively combat terrorism. 
(iv) This study finds that it is difficult for some State Parties to 
implement the provisions of this Convention because of the following reasons: 
(a) Some State Parties continue to fear reprisals or retaliation by 
Private individuals or political organisations against their interests. As a 
result such States fail to perform their obligation under this Convention. 
Consequently, many would be detained offenders are not prosecuted nor extradited ~-
. ,J 
but set free. This has been the case even where there are bilateral extradition 
treaties. 
(b) Some State Parties are sympathetic to the activities of the political 
organisations which perpetrate crimes against diplomats. Therefore these crimes 
are not seen as violent crimes or common crimes but offences incidental or 
directly concerned with political activities seeking to establish democratic 
governments. Therefore State Parties have continued to accord assistance in the 
form of logistics, funds and other necessary materials to political 
organisations. The State Parties therefore fail to prevent the preparation of 
these crimes and dissemination of information regarding the organisations and 
commission of crimes. 
10. This study has revealed that one of the problems in the prosecution 
of the perpetrators of crimes against terrorism has bee~E)Qtradition .l " The F 
study therefore found that there are basically three obstacles in the extradition 
Process. 
First, it is usually claimed that the circumstances in which these crimes 
are committed are either political or related thereto . The Middle East 
,...., 
countrie~~ give shelter to people in their region, to South Americans and others t 
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whose struggle or political aims they support. The offenders from Britain~ had 
/ 
until the supplementary treaty between United Kingdom and The United States of 
America found it easier to get sheiter across the Atlantic in the United States. 
It all depends on the country where the offender seeks asylum and her policy 
towards such a struggle. 
Burundi, as observed in chapter III, made a declaration upon signing 
of the 1973 Convention, that in respect of cases where the alleged offenders 
belong to the national liberation movements recognised by Burundi or any other 
international organisation of which Burundi is a member and their actions are 
part of their struggle for liberation, the government of the Republic of Burundi, 
reserves the right of not applying the provision of the 1973 Convention to such 
situations. 
The declaration creates a precedent by which many States might not 
recognise crimes in Article 2 of the 1973 Convention as offences if they are 
committed in the struggle of liberation by the recognised organisations. In one 
way or another, all such groups are recognised by regional groupings, which 
sympathise with their objectives. Therefore, the likelihood of many offenders 
escaping punishments to other countries is foreseeable. This attitude should be 
discouraged and States should stand together to curb crimes committed against 
diplomats. 
Secondly, most of the bilateral treaties between States do offer an 
exception to political offences or those related to political offences. The 
"political offence" exception, as discussed in Chapter V, has been used in many 
ways to give shelter to terrorist groups. It is therefore proposed that the 
r 
I 
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"political offence " exception should be done away with altogether and these 
offences should be treated as common crimes or war crimes. A revised or an 
additional protocol, whenever adopted, should provide for the removal of other 
impediments relating to extradition. It is suggested that the exception should 
be dropped altogether, when offences are committed against diplomats and other 
internationally protected persons. The political offence exception has in a way 
frustrated the 1973 Convention. This is the case even where bilateral treaties 
exist. Under this exception any offender of a crime incidental to or politically 
motivated cannot be extradited. Although some bilateral treaties have limited 
extradition to pure political offences it nevertheless remains an obstacle in the 
extradition of offenders. It is, therefore, observed that although the 1973 
Convention treats all these crimes as extraditable, it does not orovide in 
explicit terms that its provisions will be preferred over bilateral treaties. And 
as a result bilateral treaties which exempt these crimes on the basis of 
"political offence" exception are preferred by States to the international 
conventions. One the one hand the exception shelters political offenders from 
Persecution and on the other it hurts the international community by sheltering 
international criminals. 
Third, is the absence of bilateral treaties among State Parties. 
Extradition has been unnecessarily difficult because the 1973 Convention has not 
been taken by State Parties to be a legal instrument for extradition. This has 
been so even though Article 8(2) provides that this Convention may be considered 
as a legal basis for extradition. Bilateral treaties have been found to be 
fundamental prerequisites in any extradition request concerning crimes under 
this Convention. Therefore, in the absence of any extradition treaty this 
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Convention fails. 
11. It may be noted that the world community has done very little in 
removing the causes of 'terrorism'. Many causes of terrorism are the result of 
oppression by political groups against the rest of the community. 
There are also other struggles of political oppression of ruling 
cliques or parties by tyrants. They detain many citizens denying and violating 
~eoples' human rights and civil liberties. In order for the oppressed to stand 
up to the tyrants they use all means of force. It is probably the language the 
tyrants understand. 
It may be argued that the United Nations has not done much in trying 
to solve many of these conflicts. For example, it did not bother very much to 
look into the grievances of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the United 
States embassy in Tehran. International law was used to favour one conflict over 
the other. It has been argued that international law should be applied fairly to 
all cases. For example, the question of Palestine has been dragged along with one ' 
veto after another for a long time although at the time of writing this 
dissertation there has been a break through in the peace process. New cases like 
the Iraqi-Kuwai ti conflict received much more attention than the Israel;-
Palestinian conflict. The civil war going on in the Northern Ireland has never 
been put on the Agenda of the United Nations ' Security Council. However, this 
discussion appreciates that steps are being taken to find a political solution 
to the crisis. The Security Council has not acted swiftly and actively enough to 
solve these and many other conflicts which, are referred to as .. Internal Matters .. 
I 
of the State. ( 
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Independent organisations like the 'Amnesty International' have 
highlighted the suffering of the oppressed people. It i s on 1 y i nd i vi dua 1 
countries who have sometimes stood up to oppose these regimes. The United States 
of America and Britain have sometimes done that in cases where their interests 
were not affected. The problem of 'terrorism' in general needs a united front to 
confront it. 
12. Article 7 provides for extradition or prosecution. If the State decides 
not to extradite the offender, its duty is only to submit the offender to its 
competent authority for prosecution. It is up to the judiciary to decide whether 
the offender st~nds trial. In States where the executives interfere with the 
judiciary it ) i~ most likely to interfere with the proceedings of trial and the 
( I 
result may be superficial. ( 
- . 
The second problem concerns trial evidence which is required to convict the 
suspect in a criminal court. The process of collecting evidence and witnesses 
from the State in which the crime was committed may be cumbersome and difficult. 
Therefore the evidence required to convict a person in a criminal court must be 
beyond reasonable doubt. In cases of this nature, even competent courts cannot 
convict a person when the evidence presented lack some credibility. 
13. This study leads us to certain conclusions which enable us to 
make the following proposals. ? 
-
Diolomatic Relations·has some 
. . 
1. It is evident that the 1961 Convention o 
ambiguities and it is also not comprehensive in its coverage of all 
aspects of diplomatic practices. It is also apparent that at its 
formulation in 1961, the Convention created a number of problems in 
international law some of which have not been solved. It was found out 
among others that the Convention did not provide for the prosecution and 
2. 
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punishment of perpetrators of crimes against the internationally protected 
persons. Fortunately, this problem was solved in 1973, by the formulation 
of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. The other 
problems regarding the violation of the inviolability of diplomatic 
immunity by the receiving State and the abuse of diplomatic immunity by 
diplomats or the sending states through their missions have not been 
seriously tackled until this date. 
We would therefore suggest that the international community convenes a ( 
meeting or a convention within the ambit of the United Nations General 
Assembly to deliberate on these problems which require the consensus of 
the international community and which have always been a source of the 
violation of diplomatic institution. 
A convened meeting would as well deliberate on the solutions of diplomatic 
rupture or row between states. There has not been a systematic way of 
solving these problems and as a result many incidents have occurred. It 
has also been noticed that regional or pacific arbitrations have not 
really been so successful in solving these problems. This work therefore 
Proposes that the international community establishes an "International 
Diplomatic Arbitration Commission" to help resolve disputes between States 
concerning diplomatic ruptures. The main objective of this commission 
would be to explore every available peaceful and diplomatic means of 
resolving diplomatic conflicts between States. This would be useful for 
disputes which may not reach the International Court of Justice. 
' 
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3. Even though the International Court of Justice is empowered to 
handle disputes concerning diplomats, it is generally perceived that its 
~ role has been one of advisory and has not had any appreciable impact on 
the parties. Therefore, it is strongly suggested here that the role of 
the International Court of Justice, should be strengthened in order to 
make its judgement binding on the parties. Article 94(2) of the U.N 
Charter, empowers the Security Council, to take action on any party that 
fails to perform its obligation incumbent upon it under the judgement of 
the International court of Justice. This article needs to be enforced. 
4. It is proposed that Article 12 should be removed altogether from the 
Convention and another which would give strength to "Extradition" should 
be formulated. The United Nations Conventions should be given priority 
over bilateral treaties. 
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